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Human social interaction crucially depends on the ability to attribute
thoughts and beliefs to other individuals. This ability is referred to as The-
ory of Mind (ToM), and understanding that other people can have false
beliefs about the world is considered to be a critical test of ToM. In child-
hood, a developmental breakthrough is achieved around the age of 4 years,
when children start explicitly reasoning about others’ false beliefs. The
cognitive and neural developments that lead to this milestone of human
cognition, however, are currently unknown. Moreover, recently, novel im-
plicit paradigms have shown that, already before the age of 2 years, infants
display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false belief.
The processes that underlie these expectations and their relation to the
later-developing explicit false belief reasoning, however, are unclear. The
current thesis addresses these open issues in three studies. The first study
investigates the developmental trajectory and robustness of an implicit false
belief task longitudinally from the age of 2 to 4 years. We find that children
only perform above chance by the age of 4 years, but not at 2 and 3 years.
This indicates that early success on implicit false belief tasks is fragile. The
second study examines the correlation of implicit and explicit false belief
tasks with each other and with co-developing cognitive abilities. This shows
a dissociation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in that performance
on the two task types does not correlate, and that explicit false belief tasks
correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false be-
lief tasks do not. Finally, the third study shows that the maturation of
white matter in brain regions that support false belief reasoning in adults
and of their dorsal connectivity to the inferior frontal gyrus, suggested to
support hierarchical processing, is associated with the emergence of explicit
false belief reasoning in 3- and 4-year-old children. These associations are
independent of implicit false belief-related action anticipation and of devel-
opments in other cognitive domains. Taken together, our results speak for
a dissociation of the processes underlying implicit and explicit false belief
tasks. We suggest that the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief reasoning around the age of 4 years might result from improved belief
processing, emerging hierarchical processing abilities, and the maturation of
the connection between the relevant brain regions. Furthermore, I speculate
on processes that might underlie early success on implicit false belief tasks
in infancy.
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Summary
Successful human social interaction crucially depends on the ability to at-
tribute mental states to other individuals. This ability is referred to as
Theory of Mind (ToM), and is considered to be a hallmark of human cog-
nition. A full-fledged ToM implies the ability to flexibly represent thoughts
and beliefs that di↵er from one’s own view of the world. Understanding that
other people can have false beliefs about the world is therefore considered
to be a crucial test of ToM. This test is referred to as the false belief task. In
childhood, there is a consistent behavioral breakthrough between the ages
of 3 and 4 years when children start passing such tasks. This led to the
conclusion that ToM emerges around the age of 4 years. The cognitive and
neural steps that underlie this milestone in human development, however,
are currently unknown. Moreover, recently novel false belief paradigms have
been developed that show that infants display correct expectations of the
actions of an agent with a false belief if they are not explicitly prompted to
do so like in the traditional tasks. The nature of the abilities measured by
xi
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these novel implicit tasks and their relation to the traditional explicit false
belief tasks, however, are currently being intensely debated.
The present thesis aims to clarify the cognitive and neural develop-
ments that support the emergence of a mature ToM by focusing on three
core questions: (1) What is the nature of the processes that underlie im-
plicit false belief tasks and their relation to the traditional explicit false
belief tasks? (2) What is the relation of implicit and explicit false belief
tasks to co-developing abilities in other cognitive domains? And, finally
(3), what are the neural developments that support the emergence of ToM?
These questions are addressed in three studies. The first study examines
the developmental trajectory and robustness of performance on implicit false
belief tasks from 2- to 4-years of age when children start passing the tradi-
tional explicit false belief tasks. The second study addresses the relation of
implicit and explicit false belief tasks, and their relation to co-developing
cognitive abilities in preschool-aged children. Finally, the third study in-
vestigates white matter maturation associated with the emergence of false
belief understanding in preschool age.
The first study is a longitudinal study of the development of children’s
false belief-related action anticipation between the ages of 2 and 4 years.
While previous studies have reported success on such implicit false belief
tasks even before the age of 2 years, the developmental trajectory of per-
formance on these tasks beyond toddlerhood is unclear. Moreover, recent
studies have pointed towards a certain fragility of early success on implicit
xii
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false belief tasks, and it has been argued that performance limits on these
tasks might provide information about the underlying processes. Study 1
addresses these issues by testing children longitudinally from 2 to 4 years of
age with an anticipatory looking false belief task assessed with eye-tracking.
With this approach, we find that children only perform above chance by
the age of 4 years, but not yet at 2 and 3 years. There is a developmen-
tal change between the ages of 3 and 4 years, around the same age when
children start passing explicit false belief tasks. Furthermore, we report a
significant performance di↵erence between di↵erent conditions of the false
belief task. These findings indicate fragility of early success on implicit false
belief tasks. Based on di↵erences in our task settings compared to those of
previous studies, we suggest that factors which direct attention to the agent
who holds a false belief enhance early belief tracking, whereas directing the
attention towards the object of the agent’s belief disrupts early belief track-
ing in infancy and toddlerhood. This study was submitted for publication
in 2017.
The second study examines the relation between implicit and explicit
false belief tasks and their relation to language and executive function cross-
sectionally in 3- and 4-year-old children. We show that traditional explicit
false belief tasks do not correlate with an implicit anticipatory-looking false
belief task. Further, there is a developmental change between the ages
of 3 and 4 years in the explicit false belief tasks, but not in the implicit
task. Moreover, we show that explicit false belief performance correlates
xiii
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with syntactic and executive function, while the implicit task does not.
These findings suggest a dissociation of the processes underlying implicit
and explicit false belief tasks. This study was published in Developmental
Science in 2016.
Finally, the third study investigates the neural basis of the emergence
of ToM in 3- and 4-year-old children. While functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies in adults and older children have shown the involve-
ment of a bilateral brain network including the temporoparietal junction, su-
perior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex, and precuneus in ToM, the
neural developments that support the emergence of false belief understand-
ing are unclear. In this study, we combine a behavioral and eye-tracking
assessment of false belief understanding and co-developing cognitive abili-
ties with di↵usion-weighted structural MRI. This approach shows that the
developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief understanding between
the ages of 3 and 4 years is associated with local white matter maturation
near the temporoparietal junction, middle temporal gyrus, medial prefrontal
cortex, and precuneus as well as with increased dorsal white matter con-
nectivity between temporoparietal and inferior frontal regions through the
arcuate fascicle. These e↵ects are independent of co-developing cognitive
abilities and implicit false belief performance. Our results indicate that the
structural maturation of regions involved in belief processing in adults and
their connection to the prefrontal cortex specifically support the emergence
of explicit false belief understanding around the age of 4 years. Moreover,
xiv
Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann The Emergence of Theory of Mind
the findings support the dissociation of implicit and explicit false belief abil-
ities found behaviorally in study 2. This study was accepted for publication
in Nature Communications in 2017.
Taken together, the results of the current thesis speak for a dissociation
of the abilities measured by implicit and explicit false belief tasks. This dis-
sociation was observed on the behavioral as well as on the neural level. That
is, performance on the implicit and explicit tasks did not correlate, and the
neural maturation associated with explicit false belief understanding was in-
dependent of belief-related action anticipation. Moreover, explicit false be-
lief understanding correlated with syntax and executive functions while the
implicit task did not. The present thesis argues that the correlation pattern
observed with linguistic and executive functions as well as the brain struc-
tures associated with explicit false belief understanding speak for a view
in which improved belief processing and emerging hierarchical processing
abilities pave the way for the emergence of a mature metarepresentation of
others’ mental states. In particular, the connectivity between temporopari-
etal brain regions suggested to support belief-processing and the inferior
frontal gyrus presumably involved in hierarchical processing and inhibition
appears to be crucial for the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief reasoning. Earlier-developing false belief-related expectations, in con-
trast, do not seem to rely on hierarchical processing or executive function.
Our results indicate that, before the age of 4 years, these expectations are
fragile, and seem to depend on situational cues that direct the child’s atten-
xv
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tion towards the agent who holds the false belief. Based on these findings,
I suggest that infants and toddlers might succeed on implicit false belief
tasks by adopting rather than meta-representing the others’ perspective. I
propose that children’s false belief reasoning only becomes robust and inde-
pendent of disrupting circumstances, when they are able to process others’
beliefs as hierarchical metarepresentations and, simultaneously, to inhibit
their own perspective. The emergence of this ability is supported by en-
hanced connectivity between the relevant brain regions.
xvi
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die erfolgreiche soziale Interaktion des Menschen ha¨ngt entscheidend von
der Fa¨higkeit ab, anderen mentale Zusta¨nde zuzuschreiben. Diese Fa¨higkeit
wird als Theory of Mind (ToM) bezeichnet und gilt als ein Meilenstein
menschlicher Kognition. Eine vollsta¨ndige ToM beinhaltet die Fa¨higkeit
die Gedanken und Glauben anderer flexibel zu repra¨sentieren, insbeson-
dere solche, die von der eigenen Sicht der Welt abweichen. Zu verstehen,
dass andere Menschen falsche Annahmen u¨ber die Welt, also einen soge-
nannten False Belief, haben ko¨nnen, gilt daher als kritischer Test von ToM-
Fa¨higkeiten. Diesen Test bezeichnet man als False-Belief-Aufgabe. In der
Kindheit gibt es einen konsistenten behavioralen Durchbruch zwischen 3
und 4 Jahren, wenn Kinder beginnen diese Aufgaben zu bestehen. Daher
wurde lange Zeit geschlossen, dass ToM-Fa¨higkeiten im Alter von etwa 4
Jahren entstehen. Die kognitiven und neuronalen Schritte, die zu diesem
Meilenstein menschlicher Entwicklung fu¨hren, sind jedoch noch unbekannt.
Hinzu kommt, dass in den letzten Jahren neue False-Belief-Paradigmen ent-
wickelt wurden, mit denen gezeigt wurde, dass bereits Kleinkinder richtige
xvii
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Erwartungen an die Handlungen eines Akteurs mit falschen Annahmen
haben, wenn sie nicht - wie in den klassischen Aufgaben - explizit danach
gefragt werden. Es wird jedoch aktuell kontrovers diskutiert, welcher Natur
die Fa¨higkeiten sind, die mit diesen neuen impliziten Aufgaben gemessen
werden, und wie sie mit den klassischen expliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben
zusammenha¨ngen.
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die kognitiven und neuronalen
Entwicklungen zu beleuchten, die die Entstehung vollentwickelter ToM-
Fa¨higkeiten unterstu¨tzen. Die Arbeit konzentriert sich dabei auf die folgen-
den drei Kernfragen: (1) Welche Prozesse unterliegen den impliziten False-
Belief-Aufgaben und was ist ihr Verha¨ltnis zu den klassischen expliziten
False-Belief-Aufgaben? (2) Wie ha¨ngen implizite und explizite False-Belief-
Aufgaben mit der Entwicklung anderer kognitiver Fa¨higkeiten zusammen?
Und schließlich (3) Welche neuronalen Entwicklungen unterstu¨tzen die Entste-
hung von ToM? Diese Fragen werden in drei Studien adressiert. In der
ersten Studie wird der Entwicklungsverlauf und die Robustheit impliziter
False-Belief-Aufgaben zwischen 2 und 4 Jahren (dem Alter, in dem Kinder
klassische explizite False-Belief-Aufgaben bestehen) untersucht. Die zweite
Studie bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Verha¨ltnis von impliziten und expliziten
False-Belief-Aufgaben und mit deren Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung
anderer kognitiver Fa¨higkeiten im Vorschulalter. Die dritte Studie unter-
sucht schließlich welche Reifungsprozesse der weißen Substanz im Gehirn
mit der Entstehung von ToM im Vorschulalter zusammenha¨ngen.
xviii
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Bei der ersten Studie handelt es sich um eine La¨ngsschnittstudie, die
die Entwicklung der Antizipation von Handlungen, die auf einer falschen
Annahme beruhen, im Alter zwischen 2 und 4 Jahren untersucht. Bish-
erige Studien hatten berichtet, dass Kleinkinder bereits in ihrem zweiten
Lebensjahr entsprechende Tests bestehen. Der Entwicklungsverlauf der Per-
formanz u¨ber das zweite Lebensjahr hinaus ist jedoch unklar. Außerdem
weisen ju¨ngste Studien darauf hin, dass der Erfolg von Kleinkindern bei im-
pliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben fragil ist. Es wurde vorgeschlagen, dass Per-
formanzbeschra¨nkungen bei diesen Aufgaben Aufschluss u¨ber die zugrun-
deliegenden Prozesse geben ko¨nnten. Studie 1 widmet sich diesen Fragen
mit einem impliziten False-Belief-Paradigma, bei dem die antizipatorischen
Blickbewegungen von 2- bis 4-ja¨hrigen Kindern la¨ngsschnittlich mit dem
Eyetracker erhoben werden. Mit diesem Ansatz schneiden Kinder erst ab
dem Alter von 4 Jahren, und noch nicht mit 2 und 3 Jahren, besser als
Zufall ab. Entsprechend gibt es einen Entwicklungssprung zwischen 3 und
4 Jahren, etwa in dem Alter, in dem Kinder beginnen die klassischen ex-
pliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben zu bestehen. Außerdem finden wir einen sig-
nifikanten Performanzunterschied zwischen verschiedenen Bedingungen der
impliziten False-Belief-Aufgabe. Diese Befunde weisen auf eine Fragilita¨t
fru¨her Erfolge bei impliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben hin. Auf der Grundlage
von Unterschieden zwischen unserem und dem Versuchsaufbau in fru¨heren
Studien schlagen wir vor, dass Faktoren, die die Aufmerksamkeit auf den
Akteur lenken, der etwas Falsches glaubt, die Performanz von Kleinkindern
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verbessern ko¨nnten. Ein Lenken der Aufmerksamkeit auf den gesuchten
Gegenstand hingegen ko¨nnte die Kinder dabei sto¨ren, den Glauben des Ak-
teurs zu verfolgen. Diese Studie wurde 2017 zur Publikation eingereicht.
Die zweite Studie untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen impliziten
und expliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben und deren Zusammenhang mit Sprache
und exekutiven Funktionen querschnittlich in 3- und 4-ja¨hrigen Kindern.
Mit klassischen behavioralen False-Belief-Aufgaben und einem antizipatorischen
Blickrichtungs-Paradigma zeigen wir, dass implizite und explizite False-
Belief-Aufgaben nicht miteinander korrelieren. Weiterhin beobachten wir
einen Entwicklungssprung zwischen 3 und 4 Jahren in den expliziten, aber
nicht in den impliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass
die Performanz in den expliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben mit syntaktischen
und exekutiven Funktionen korreliert, nicht aber die Performanz in der im-
pliziten False-Belief-Aufgabe. Diese Befunde weisen auf eine Dissoziation
von impliziten und expliziten False-Belief-Aufgaben hin. Diese Studie wurde
2016 in Developmental Science vero¨↵entlicht.
In der dritten Studie untersuchen wir schließlich die neuronalen Grund-
lagen der Entstehung von ToM in 3- und 4-ja¨hrigen Kindern. Funktionelle
Magnetresonanztomographiestudien mit Erwachsenen und a¨lteren Kindern
haben gezeigt, dass ToM ein bilaterales Netzwerk aktiviert, das den tem-
poroparietalen U¨bergang, den superioren temporalen Sulcus, den medialen
pra¨frontalen Kortex und den Precuneus einschließt. Die neuronalen Rei-
fungsprozesse, die zur Entstehung von False-Belief-Versta¨ndnis in der En-
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twicklung beitragen, sind jedoch unklar. In dieser Studie kombinieren wir
behaviorale und Eyetracking-False-Belief-Maße sowie Tests anderer kogni-
tiver Fa¨higkeiten mit einer di↵usionsgewichteten strukturellen MRT-Messung.
Dieser Ansatz zeigt, dass der Entwicklungsdurchbruch in den expliziten
False-Belief-Aufgaben zwischen 3 und 4 Jahren mit der lokalen Reifung
weißer Substanz in der Na¨he des temporoparietalen U¨bergangs, des mit-
tleren temporalen Gyrus, des medialen pra¨frontalen Kortexes und des Pre-
cuneus zusammenha¨ngt sowie mit sta¨rkerer dorsaler Konnektivita¨t zwischen
temporoparietalen und inferior frontalen Regionen durch den Fasciculus
Arcuatus. Diese E↵ekte sind sowohl von anderen kognitiven Fa¨higkeiten
als auch von der Performanz in der impliziten False-Belief-Aufgabe un-
abha¨ngig. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen daher darauf hin, dass die Entstehung
von ToM-Fa¨higkeiten im vierten Lebensjahr durch die Reifung von Gehirn-
regionen unterstu¨tzt wird, die im Erwachsenenalter an der Verarbeitung
von Gedanken anderer beteiligt sind sowie von der Verbindung dieser Re-
gionen zum pra¨frontalen Kortex. Zudem unterstu¨tzen unsere Befunde die
in Studie 2 bereits berichtete Dissoziation von impliziten und expliziten
False-Belief-Aufgaben. Diese Studie wurde 2017 zur Publikation in Nature
Communications angenommen.
Zusammengenommen sprechen die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit
fu¨r eine Dissoziation der Fa¨higkeiten, die durch implizite und explizite
False-Belief-Aufgaben gemessen werden. Wir beobachten diese Dissoziation
sowohl behavioral als auch auf der neuronalen Ebene: Die Performanz in
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den verschiedenen Aufgabentypen korreliert nicht miteinander und die Rei-
fung der Gehirnregionen, die mit dem expliziten False-Belief-Versta¨ndnis
zusammenha¨ngt, ist unabha¨ngig von der impliziten Antizipation von Hand-
lungen eines Akteurs mit falschen Annahmen. Desweiteren korreliert ex-
plizites False-Belief-Versta¨ndnis mit syntaktischen und exekutiven Funktio-
nen, die implizite False-Belief-Aufgabe jedoch nicht. In der vorliegenden Ar-
beit wird argumentiert, dass das beobachtete Korrelationsmuster der False-
Belief-Aufgaben mit sprachlichen und exekutiven Funktionen sowie die as-
soziierten Hirnregionen dafu¨r sprechen, dass die verbesserte Verarbeitung
mentaler Zusta¨nde zusammen mit der Entwicklung hierarchischer Verar-
beitungsfa¨higkeiten den Weg fu¨r die Entstehung einer ausgereiften Metarep-
resentation mentaler Zusta¨nde ebnen. Insbesondere die Konnektivita¨t zwis-
chen temporoparietalen Hirnregionen, die fu¨r die Verarbeitung mentaler
Zusta¨nde zusta¨ndig sein sollen, und dem inferioren frontalen Gyrus, der hi-
erarchische Verarbeitung sowie Inhibition unterstu¨tzen soll, scheint entschei-
dend fu¨r den Entwicklungsdurchbruch beim expliziten False-Belief-Versta¨ndnis
zu sein. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen implizite Handlungserwartungen an
einen Akteur mit falschen Annahmen keine hierarchische Verarbeitung oder
exekutive Funktionen zu beno¨tigen. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin,
dass diese Erwartungen vor dem vierten Lenbensjahr fragil sind und von
situationsbedingten Hinweisreizen abha¨ngen, die die Aufmerksamkeit des
Kindes auf den Akteur mit der falschen Annahme lenken. Auf der Grund-
lage dieser Befunde argumentiere ich, dass Kleinkinder mo¨glicherweise im-
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plizite False-Belief-Aufgaben meistern, in dem sie die Perspektive des an-
deren u¨bernehmen, statt sie zu metarepra¨sentieren. Ich schlage vor, dass
das False-Belief-Versta¨ndnis von Kindern erst dann robust und unabha¨ngig
von Sto¨rungsfaktoren ist, wenn sie in der Lage sind die mentalen Zusta¨nde
anderer hierarchisch zu metarepra¨sentieren und dabei ihre eigene Perspek-
tive zu unterdru¨cken. Die Entstehung dieser Fa¨higkeit in der Entwicklung
wird durch die Konnektivita¨t der relevanten Hirnregionen unterstu¨tzt.
xxiii

Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Theory of Mind
Imagine you meet someone at a party and she asks you what you are doing
professionally. Depending on who the person is and what you know about
her background you will tell her very di↵erent things. If she is working in
the same field, or has studied something similar you will probably be much
more specific, and assume knowledge you would first explain to someone
from a completely di↵erent field. If it turns out that she is working in the
same company than you, you might start talking about departments and
people in the company, and assume that she knows the organizational struc-
ture. In our daily interactions with other people, we constantly engage in
inferring what they know, think, or believe. This ability to attribute mental
states to other individuals is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) (Premack
and Woodru↵, 1978). It is essential to the complex social inferences and
1
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intuitions that mark the interaction between human individuals. When ex-
plaining things to other people, trying to understand what other people
say or do, when predicting how they will act, or in our social evaluation of
another person, we take into account their knowledge, beliefs, or intentions
(e.g., Dunbar, 1998; Baird and Astington, 2004).
A full-fledged ToM implies the ability to attribute any possible thought
to another individual, in particular, also those thoughts that do not corre-
spond to reality or to one’s own representation of the world. Understanding
other individuals’ false beliefs about the world is therefore considered to
be a critical test of ToM (Dennett, 1978; Bennett, 1978). Whereas human
adults clearly understand this, decades of research had converged on the
conclusion that ToM is specifically human (Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Call
and Tomasello, 2008; Martin and Santos, 2016), and in human children only
develops around the age of 4 years (Wellman et al., 2001). Around that age,
a consistent developmental breakthrough is observed, where children start
correctly reasoning about others’ false beliefs across very di↵erent task set-
tings and belief contents (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Hogrefe et al., 1986;
Flavell et al., 1983, 1990; Wellman et al., 2001). It has therefore been argued
that it is at this age that children develop the ability to represent others’
mental states. In recent years, this conclusion has been questioned by novel
false belief tasks that seem to show action expectations in accordance with
false beliefs already in infancy (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010; Sodian, 2016)
as well as in apes (Krupenye et al., 2016).
2
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The aim of the present thesis is to clarify the cognitive and neural
factors that determine the emergence of this milestone of human cognition
in development.
1.1.1 Precursors of ToM in Infancy
From very early in life, human infants have preferences for social stimuli,
and seem to have some understanding of agency. Already in the first months
of life, infants show a preference for biological motion, prefer human faces
over inanimate stimuli (e.g., they smile more at humans than at dolls; Leg-
erstee et al., 1987; Opfer and Gelman, 2010), and display rudimentary forms
of gaze following (Farroni et al., 2004). Within their first year of life, in-
fants interpret actions as goal-directed (e.g., Woodward, 1998; Sommerville
et al., 2005; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Csibra, 2008; Johnson et al., 2007;
Woodward et al., 2009; Woodward, 2009), seem to understand others’ vi-
sual perspective (e.g., Sodian et al., 2007; Luo and Baillargeon, 2007; Luo
and Johnson, 2009), and around their first birthday start engaging in joint
attention (Mundy et al., 2007). However, it was long believed that it is
not before the age of 2 years that children fully understand the relation
between seeing and knowing or believing (e.g., Sodian and Thoermer, 2008;
Dunham et al., 2000). In the traditional view, the described social abilities
are assumed to develop before an explicit understanding of desires or of
epistemic states, such as, knowledge or beliefs, which are believed to de-
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velop even later (Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Perner et al., 2003; Yott and
Poulin-Dubois, 2016).
These early social capacities seem to reflect a sense of agency present
very early on in life that is also present in non-human primates (Call and
Tomasello, 2008). A hallmark of the mature adult understanding of other
agents, however, is the ability to attribute mental states to them. Reasoning
about their thoughts, beliefs, and intentions helps to understand and predict
how they act. It is traditionally assumed that this ability emerges around
the age of 4 years. The factors that determine this crucial step of social
development are still entirely unclear to date. In the present thesis, we ask
which earlier-developing precursors, which developments in other cognitive
domains, and which brain maturation processes underlie this milestone of
human cognition.
1.1.2 False Belief Understanding
To make sure that individuals really predict others’ behavior based on at-
tributing mental states to them and not just infer from their own knowledge
about reality, the content of these mental states needs to di↵er from reality
(Dennett, 1978; Bennett, 1978). The ability to reason about others’ false
beliefs is therefore considered to be the critical test of ToM. The false belief
task was therefore developed and established as the standard measure of
4
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ToM abilities in developmental and comparative psychology (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983).
Standard
explicit false
belief tasks
In the standard false belief tasks children are introduced with a protag-
onist who misses a piece of information, and thus, as opposed to the child,
has a false belief about the situation. In the false location task, for ex-
ample, the protagonist (Maxi) does not witness the relocation of an object
(his chocolate) and therefore has a false belief about its location (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983). In the false content task, in turn, the child but not the
protagonist is shown that a container has a di↵erent content than expected
(e.g., a smarties tube contains pencils instead of smarties) (Hogrefe et al.,
1986). A third variant of this task is the appearance reality task (Flavell
et al., 1983). The protagonist, as opposed to the child, is unaware that
the identity of an object is di↵erent from what it appears to be (e.g., the
protagonist believes a sponge that looks like a rock to be a rock). In all
these tasks, the child is then explicitly asked to either make a statement
about the belief of the protagonist (e.g., what does the protagonist think? )
or to predict how they will act (e.g., where will they look for the object? ).
Across di↵erent variations of these tasks, children have quite consistently
been shown to fail on these tests before the age of 4 years (Wellman et al.,
2001). Di↵erent theoretical accounts have therefore argued that there is a
fundamental change in how children reason about other agents around the
age of 4 years (Astington and Gopnik, 1991; Flavell et al., 1990; Perner,
1991), as will be elaborated in more detail below.
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Implicit false
belief tasks
In the standard explicit false belief tasks children are prompted ex-
plicitly and verbally what an agent believes or how he will act. In recent
years, however, novel spontaneous tasks have been developed that show
that, already in their second year of life, infants show di↵erent expectations
or interpretations of the actions of an agent depending on his beliefs (e.g.,
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Martin and Santos, 2016).1 Violation of expectation
(VOE) paradigms, for example, have shown that 13- to 18-months-old in-
fants look longer if an agent who missed the relocation of an object searches
for it in the correct location instead of the location where he should expect
the object to be (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Luo,
2011; Yott and Poulin-Dubois, 2012; Scott and Baillargeon, 2009; Tra¨uble
et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2012). Longer looking times are in-
terpreted as the infant’s surprise about the outcome, and these experiments
are thus considered to unveil the infant’s knowledge about other agents’
beliefs. Similarly, anticipatory looking paradigms have shown that infants
and toddlers direct their gaze to the location where an agent believes an
object to be in anticipation of his or her search for the object (Southgate
et al., 2007; Senju et al., 2011; Thoermer et al., 2012; Gliga et al., 2014;
Meristo et al., 2012; Wang and Leslie, 2016; Clements and Perner, 1994;
Low, 2010). These experiments are considered to show that infants form
1In the current thesis, these tasks are referred to as implicit false belief tasks, because
the matter of study is not made explicit to the participant and the studied response is
not explicitly elicited but reflects spontaneous behavior. Explicit false belief tasks, in
contrast, refer to tasks with directly elicited responses.
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expectations of another individual’s behavior based on their understanding
of his or her beliefs. Another series of experiments has taken advantage
of children’s spontaneous or indirectly elicited behavior in response to the
actions of an agent with a false belief (Buttelmann et al., 2009; Southgate
et al., 2010; Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2012; Buttelmann et al., 2014). In a
helping paradigm, for example, Buttelmann et al. (2009) showed that tod-
dlers help an agent with a false belief about the location of an object, who
tries to open an empty box, by opening the box that contains the object.
They do this significantly more often than when the agent has a true belief
about the location of the object. Similarly, 18-months-olds interpret the
communication of an agent with a false belief as referring to a di↵erent
object than the one in the box the agent pointed to, if the agent has a
false belief about the content of the boxes (Southgate et al., 2010). Finally,
Kova´cs et al. (2010) showed that already 7-month-old infants’ own expec-
tations of whether to find a ball behind an occluder or not was modulated
by the presence of an agent with a false belief about the presence of the
ball. These findings seem to suggest that, already by the age of 7 months,
infants have access to others’ mental state, although the interpretation of
these findings is debated (Phillips et al., 2015). Although recent findings
have pointed to a certain fragility of these early false belief findings (He et
al., 2012; Philips et al., 2015; Kulke et al., submitted-a, submitted-b), by
now, there is an abundance of di↵erent paradigms and studies that show
that infants display correct expectations of belief-related behavior. These
7
The Emergence of Theory of Mind Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
findings indicate that infants have some form of access to other individuals’
mental states already in the first and second year of life.
1.1.3 Relation between Implicit and Explicit False Be-
lief Tasks
What the underlying cognitive processes of infants’ success on these early
tasks are and to what extent they reflect a full and flexible representation
of others’ mental states (i.e., a mature representational ToM), however,
is a matter of debate (see, e.g., Sodian, 2016, for a review of the debate).
Di↵erent accounts strongly vary in the degree of continuity they see between
the early abilities measured by spontaneous, mostly non-verbal false belief
tasks and later explicit verbal false belief understanding (Sodian, 2016).
Continuity
accounts
In its strongest version, the continuity account claims that infants al-
ready fully represent others’ mental states, but that specific task demands
mask the infants’ abilities on the standard explicit false belief tasks (Bail-
largeon et al., 2010; Scott and Baillargeon, 2014). According to these ac-
counts, for example, lacking inhibitory control, working memory, linguistic,
or pragmatic abilities cause children to fail on the standard verbal false
belief tasks, while their ToM abilities are revealed with the spontaneous
nonverbal tasks (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Helming et al., 2014; Bloom and
German, 2000). Besides extraneous task demands, the cognitive processes
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underlying implicit and explicit false belief tasks are postulated to be the
same.
Other accounts, in contrast, have argued for di↵erent cognitive processes
underlying implicit and explicit false belief tasks (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2008;
Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Perner and Roessler, 2012; Ru↵man, 2014;
Heyes, 2014). These accounts diverge with respect to the degree to which
the early abilities measured by implicit tasks are considered to involve men-
tal state-related processes. Accordingly, they assume very di↵erent degrees
of continuity between the early abilities and later explicit false belief reason-
ing. While dual system accounts argue that the implicit non-verbal tasks
show abilities related to mentalizing, even though no full representational
understanding of beliefs (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Perner and Roessler,
2012), low-level accounts claim that infants solve the implicit tasks based
on low-level domain-general processes such as statistical learning (Ru↵man,
2014; Heyes, 2014).
Dual system
accounts
Proponents of a dual system account of social cognition propose that
implicit tasks involve implicit and automatic tracking of certain types of
mental states but not others. For example, Frith and Frith (2008) sug-
gested that we track others’ visual perspective or goals automatically with-
out awareness, while explicitly reasoning about others’ false beliefs involves
higher-level conscious processes. Support for the automatic tracking of oth-
ers’ perspective comes from experiments that show that the presence of a
person with a diverging visual perspective or knowledge a↵ects one’s own
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performance on a mere visual detection or counting task (Samson et al.,
2007; Kova´cs et al., 2010). It seems as if we cannot suppress tracking the
others’ perspective even if this interferes with our task or goals (Frith and
Frith, 2008; Samson et al., 2007).
Similarly, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggested two systems of belief
tracking. Success on early implicit tasks is explained by a cognitively e -
cient but limited system 1, whereas explicit false belief reasoning recruits
the cognitively demanding but flexible system 2. The authors argued that
system 1 might track belief-like states, obtained from registrations, which
are formed when an agent encounters an object in a location and are main-
tained unless the agent encounters the object in a new location. The concept
of registrations allows for certain mental state attributions based on level 1
perspective taking (i.e., what someone sees), but not attributing beliefs as
propositional attitudes which would involve level 2 perspective taking (i.e.,
how someone sees something). The authors argue that signature limits in
infants’ implicit abilities can give insight on the underlying processes.
Along similar lines, Perner and Roessler (2012) proposed experiential
records, with which infants keep track of what an agent has seen (i.e., level 1
perspective taking). Focusing on the agent activates this record and thus
enables the infant to correctly anticipate his actions based on his experien-
tial record. However, if children are explicitly asked where the agent will
search, they think about the agent’s reasons for searching, and then need to
understand that the agent has a divergent perspective, and switch between
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the perspectives intentionally. According to Perner and Roessler (2012),
this capacity is only achieved around the age of 4 years, which explains why
infants fail on the standard explicit false belief tasks.
Although the dual system accounts postulate di↵erent processes un-
derlying performance on implicit and explicit false belief tasks, the earlier
system 1 is also related to perspective taking and is likely to enhance later
representational ToM. These accounts therefore assume a certain degree of
continuity from the abilities displayed by infants in implicit false belief tests
to those measured by standard explicit false belief tests in preschool age.
Low-level
accounts
Low-level accounts, in contrast, question whether the implicit false be-
lief tasks measure anything related to the social domain. Instead, they
argue that the tasks can be solved on the basis of low-level domain-general
processes, such as statistical learning and perceptual novelty. According
to Heyes (2014), infants might succeed in VOE and anticipatory looking
paradigms because of lower-level perceptual novelty. She claims that the
unexpected events in the VOE paradigms are novel merely with respect to
the movements of shapes and colors. Consequently, infants might not pro-
cess these stimuli in terms of agents that act on objects at all. Similarly,
for the anticipatory looking paradigms, she argues that disruptive events
(such as, the ringing of a telephone in Southgate et al., 2007) might distract
children from the critical event of the object displacement and therefore
simply interfere with their own representation of the object. According to
this account, infants pass the implicit false belief tasks because of their
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own false representation of reality, independently of the presence of another
agent. However, well-controlled empirical evidence from young infants pro-
cessing of goal-directed actions (Woodward, 1998) shows that infants do
not merely process agents in terms of movements of shapes and colors, and
clearly speaks against Heyes’ view.
A less radical version of an account based on statistical learning was
o↵ered by Ru↵man (2014). According to this account, infants are endowed
with excellent statistical learning skills on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, with a preference for social stimuli, that is, eyes, faces, and biological
motion. In combination with the input from their social environment, these
two endowments enable infants to rapidly understand behavioral patterns
and develop sophisticated expectations about others’ behavior. Exposure to
mental state language, together with emerging language abilities and self-
other-distinction, then pave the way from their correct action expectations
in infancy to an explicit attribution of mental states around the age of
4 years.
In sum, the di↵erent accounts of the relation of the abilities measured
by implicit and explicit false belief tasks strongly diverge with respect to
the degree of continuity they assume between the abilities measured by the
tasks, and the nature of the processes underlying the implicit false belief
tasks in infancy. One way that might lead to a better understanding of
the nature of implicit false belief abilities is to study potential performance
limits (e.g., Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Low and Watts, 2013; Low et al.,
12
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2016). Another approach to address the relation of the processes underlying
implicit and explicit false belief tasks is to study the intercorrelation between
the di↵erent task types. A correlation between performance on implicit and
explicit tasks would speak for a continuity of the abilities measured by
the di↵erent tasks. The correlation could either be explained by the same
underlying processes (as in Baillargeon et al., 2010), or by di↵erent but
related processes. A longitudinal study showed that infants’ abilities on an
implicit false belief task predicted later explicit false belief understanding
in support of such a continuity (Thoermer et al., 2012; Sodian et al., 2016).
Cross-sectional settings, in contrast, have found contradicting results in
preschoolers (Low, 2010; Ru↵man et al., 2001). Further, in adulthood, a
dissociation is supported by autism data (Senju et al., 2009). Alternatively,
the neural processes involved in the di↵erent tasks might give insight into
the underlying processes. If implicit and explicit false belief tasks involve the
same processes, we would expect at least in parts overlapping brain regions
to be involved. Conversely, clearly distinct and independent brain regions
would suggest distinct processes underlying implicit and explicit tasks. First
brain imaging studies with adults do not allow clear conclusions on this
question (Schneider et al., 2014; Kova´cs et al., 2014; Hyde et al., 2015).
Crucially, moreover, this question needs to be addressed in the critical age
of the emergence of explicit false belief understanding to make sure that, in
the case of distinct processes, no explicit mentalizing is taking place.
13
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In all of the accounts that assume di↵erent processes underlying implicit
and explicit tasks, the exact mechanisms that enable the emergence of an
explicit representation of mental states remain unclear (see e.g., Perner
(2014) in response to Ru↵man (2014)). The following section will review
theoretical frameworks that try to explain the developmental breakthrough
in the standard explicit false belief tasks around the age of 4 years.
1.1.4 Theoretical Accounts of the Emergence of ToM
Meta-
representation
account
Reasoning about the contents of others’ false beliefs requires represent-
ing others’ mental representations, while separately maintaining one’s own
representation of reality. A classical account, therefore, suggests that chil-
dren start understanding false beliefs around the age of 4 years because at
this age they start building metarepresentations, that is, representations
of others’ mental representations (Perner, 1991). According to Perner, a
metarepresentation requires representing the content of the representation
(e.g., the chocolate) as well as its representation (e.g., Maxi’s mental picture
of the chocolate), and understanding the representational relation between
the two (i.e., that Maxi’s mental picture of the chocolate is a representa-
tion of the chocolate). Perner argues that, until the age of 4 years, children
might not be capable of metarepresenting and, therefore, do not understand
that others’ mental representations of the world can diverge from their own
ones. This view is challenged by the novel implicit false belief tasks, which
14
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are already passed in infancy. However, it is not clear to what extent these
tasks require infants to understand that the agent’s representation of an
object is someone’s mental representation. They might succeed the tasks
by adopting the agent’s representation without maintaining their own rep-
resentation of the world. Thus, implicit false belief tasks might be solved
without the need of metarepresentation.
Mental filesPerner et al. (2015) have extended this framework to children’s under-
standing of identity relations between objects by using the concept of men-
tal files (Recanati, 2012). Children start understanding identity statements
(e.g., “Clark Kent is Superman.”) around the same age when they start un-
derstanding false beliefs. Mental files represent perspectives on an object.
They either represent the aspect under which an object is looked at (e.g.,
“Clark Kent”, whereas “Superman” is a di↵erent mental file), or a person’s
perspective on an object (e.g., “Maxi’s representation of the chocolate” is a
vicarious file, whereas one’s own representation of the chocolate is a di↵erent
mental file). Perner et al. (2015) suggest that as soon as children are able
to form links between mental files, they start understanding both false be-
liefs and identity statements. Concerning implicit false belief tasks, Perner
(2016) proposed that infants might hold unlinked vicarious files indexed to
the agent but not linked to the infant’s own file of the object. Without link
to the child’s own file, children do not understand that Maxi’s chocolate
file and their own chocolate file refer to the same object and cannot delib-
erately switch between the two perspectives (Perner, 2016). Instead, the
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perspective adopted by the child is determined by external cues, such as,
the saliency of the agent or the target object (as in Rubio-Ferna´ndez and
Geurts, 2013, 2016).
Hierachichal
processing
The hierarchical processing account might be considered as a general-
ization of the mental file or metarepresentation account and extends them
to other cognitive domains. According to this account, children start pro-
cessing items hierarchically at the age of 4 years. This ability allows them
to process mental representation hierarchically, that is, to metarepresent
other’s mental representations. It is around the same age that children start
understanding syntactic hierarchy in complement sentences (de Villiers and
Pyers, 2002) or relative sentences (e.g., De Villiers et al., 1979; Kidd and
Bavin, 2002). Moreover, at a similar age children start passing executive
function tasks that require them to reason about embedded conditional rules
(Zelazo and Frye, 1998; Frye et al., 1995) or planning tasks in which inter-
mediate steps need to be embedded (e.g., in versions of the Tower of Hanoi
task that require an intermediate step; Kaller et al., 2008; McCormack and
Atance, 2011). The processes underlying all these tasks, including standard
false belief tasks, require participants to keep di↵erent perspectives, syntac-
tic elements, rules, or goals at di↵erent levels. Consequently, these tasks all
seem to require hierarchical processing. The developmental breakthrough in
false belief understanding, processing syntactic hierarchies, and embedded
conditional rules around the age of 4 years, therefore, might be explained by
the emergence of the ability to process items hierarchically. Interestingly,
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hierarchical processing has been suggested to be a candidate for specifically
human cognition that might explain the unique linguistic, ToM, and rea-
soning capacities of humans compared to nonhuman primates, birds, and
other species (e.g., Fitch, 2014).
As in the previous accounts, infants’ early success on implicit false belief
tasks might be explained by assuming that they adopt the other agent’s
perspective without simultaneously maintaining their own representation of
the world. Infants could thus have correct expectations of the behavior of
an agent without needing to process two representations at di↵erent levels
of hierarchy. However, without hierarchical processing, infants would not be
able to switch flexibly between perspectives, and the adopted perspective
would be determined by situational cues, such as, the salience of the agent.
PragmaticsA more continuous view of ToM development throughout early child-
hood claims that 3-year-old children fail on the standard explicit false belief
tasks because of a pragmatic deficit. Helming et al. (2014) have argued
that the standard false belief tasks introduce various biases that cause 3-
year-olds to misinterpret the test question. A cooperative bias might lead
children to try to help the agent and answer where he should search for
the object rather than to describe where he will search. Moreover, a refer-
ential bias might make children misinterpret the test question as referring
to the object, or to the child and experimenter’s common knowledge about
its location. This is supported by findings that explicit false belief tasks
are passed earlier if the searched object is not mentioned in the test phase
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(Rubio-Ferna´ndez and Geurts, 2013, 2016), and that toddlers fail implicit
false belief tasks if an experimenter with a common ground with the child
addresses them directly (He et al., 2012). Empirical support for the coop-
erative bias comes from studies that show that infants and toddlers act in
accordance with an agent’s false belief in cooperative rather than test set-
tings (Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2012; Buttelmann et al., 2009; Southgate
et al., 2010).
The pragmatic account o↵ers a powerful framework for a large amount
of current empirical findings on early ToM abilities and makes clear and
testable predictions for future studies. An open question is to what extent
the pragmatic deficits of 3-year-olds reflect a ToM deficit per se, that is, the
di culty to handle di↵erent perspectives and flexibly switch between them.
The empirical predictions from the pragmatics account seem to converge
with the predictions from the previous accounts that postulate a funda-
mental change around the age of 4 years, but suggest that, before that
age, children might adopt other agents’ perspective, but do not understand
that they do and, therefore, cannot flexibly switch between the perspectives
(e.g., Perner, 2016, and previous paragraphs). Instead, similar to the biases
introduced in the pragmatic framework, they rely on situational cues that
determine what perspective they adopt. Research needs to develop experi-
mental predictions and continue exploring the exact factors that enhance or
disrupt children’s performance on di↵erent false belief tasks between infancy
and 4 years of age to distinguish between these views.
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Inhibitory
control
Finally, a di↵erent view argues that improvements in executive function
and more specifically inhibitory control foster the development of a mature
false belief understanding (e.g., Carlson et al., 2002; Devine and Hughes,
2014; Hughes, 1998). Accounts di↵er with respect to the role that inhibitory
control is granted for the emergence of explicit false belief understanding.
One view proposes that improvements in inhibitory control enable children
to handle di↵erent perspectives, for example, to inhibit their own perspec-
tive and, therefore, reason about the relevant agent’s perspective (Devine
and Hughes, 2014; Steinbeis, 2016). Furthermore, inhibitory abilities have
been suggested to be important for the emergence of ToM because they
allow inhibiting immediate environmental stimuli and consequently picking
up on the existence of di↵erent perspectives (Devine and Hughes, 2014).
Finally, proponents of a continuity account of ToM have argued that in-
hibitory control is merely required by the standard false belief tasks and
that these task demands mask earlier ToM abilities in infants and 3-year-
olds (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Bloom and German, 2000). According to this
account, inhibitory abilities help children to suppress their tendency to an-
swer the test question with their own knowledge about reality (Baillargeon
et al., 2010; Birch and Bloom, 2003; Roth and Leslie, 1998; Robinson and
Mitchell, 1995). Theories on the role of executive function for the emergence
of false belief understanding also include other executive processes, such as,
cognitive flexibility or working memory (e.g., Carlson et al., 2002; Zelazo
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and Frye, 1998) that will be reviewed in more detail in the next section.
The section will also summarize the large amount of empirical evidence for
a relation between executive function and explicit false belief understanding
(for reviews see, e.g., Devine and Hughes, 2014; Perner and Lang, 1999).
To distinguish between the di↵erent accounts of the emergence of ToM
presented in this section, research needs to study the correlations between
di↵erent false belief tasks and of these with other cognitive domains. This
might give insight into the cognitive processes that underlie success in the
di↵erent task types and the mechanisms that explain the developmental
breakthrough around the age of 4 years. This approach is taken in study
2 of the present thesis. In study 1, we explore the circumstances under
which toddlers and preschoolers pass or fail false belief tasks, and their
developmental trajectory to inform the above debate. Finally, in study 3,
we shed more light on the mechanisms and cognitive processes that underlie
implicit and explicit false belief tasks by exploring the neural structures
involved in these tasks and, in particular, in the emergence of explicit false
belief reasoning.
1.2 Relation to Other Cognitive Domains
The role of developments in other cognitive domains for the breakthrough in
the standard explicit false belief tasks might provide information about the
cognitive processes that underlie implicit and explicit false belief tasks and
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about their relation to one another. Empirically, there is ample evidence for
a close relation of the explicit false belief tasks in particular with executive
function (Devine and Hughes, 2014; Perner and Lang, 1999) and linguistic
abilities (Milligan et al., 2007). The role of these co-developing cognitive
abilities for the emergence of explicit false belief understanding di↵ers de-
pending on the theoretical account. The exact pattern of correlations might,
therefore, help distinguishing between these accounts. In the continuity as
well as in the dual process accounts of early-developing and later explicit
false belief abilities, a correlation between other cognitive abilities and false
belief tasks might have di↵erent reasons (see e.g., Devine and Hughes, 2014):
The correlation might merely be due to superficial task features of the stan-
dard false belief tasks (e.g., children need to have the verbal abilities to
understand the test question). Alternatively, the correlation might result
from common conceptual demands of the studied processes (e.g., syntactic
processing as well as representing others mental states might require hier-
archical processing; Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Chomsky, 1966). Finally,
in the emergence account, abilities in other cognitive domains might be re-
quired for the emergence of false belief understanding in development (e.g.,
verbal abilities and in particular mental state language might help young
children to understand social interaction and thus develop an understanding
of mental states; e.g., Harris et al., 2005). Depending on whether continuity
or independent processes are assumed for the implicit compared to the stan-
dard explicit false belief tasks, these accounts make di↵erent predictions on
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the correlation of the di↵erent false belief tasks with executive function and
language (see also study 2, Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016).
Task-related
account
The task-related account predicts a correlation of language and execu-
tive function with the standard verbal explicit false belief tasks, but not or
less so with the non-verbal implicit tasks that are considered to make no
or low demands on executive function. Moreover, the account predicts a
correlation specifically with those linguistic and executive abilities required
by the false belief tasks under consideration. According to the continuity
account of Baillargeon et al. (2010), for example, the standard false belief
tasks require response-selection abilities in order to select the correct out
of two responses, and inhibitory control in order to inhibit the tendency
to answer according to one’s own knowledge.2 This account therefore pre-
dicts a correlation especially with executive function tasks that tap into
response-selection and inhibition capacities, but, for example, less so with
tasks of cognitive flexibility (Devine and Hughes, 2014). Similarly in the
language domain, the task-related account predicts a correlation with the
specific language requirements of the false belief task under consideration.
For example, if the task does not make use of complement sentences or
other complex syntactic structures, no correlation with children’s syntactic
abilities beyond their general language abilities should be expected.
2Similar arguments have also been made by Bloom and German (2000); Birch and
Bloom (2003); Roth and Leslie (1998), and Robinson and Mitchell (1995).
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Common
conceptual
demands
In contrast, if the relation between false belief tasks and other cog-
nitive domains is due to common conceptual demands rather than mere
task demands, a correlation might be present independently of superficial
features of the task. The continuity account would then predict a correla-
tion of executive function or linguistic abilities not only with the standard
verbal false belief tasks but also with implicit non-verbal tasks because of
common underlying processes. Dual process accounts, in contrast, would
predict di↵erent conceptual demands of implicit and explicit false belief
tasks and would therefore predict distinct correlation patterns of the two
task types. An example for a common conceptual demand account is the
cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory (Zelazo and Frye, 1998).
Zelazo et al. have argued that reasoning about others’ mental states re-
quires reasoning about embedded conditional rules, an ability also tested
by classical tasks of cognitive flexibility, such as, the dimensional change
card sorting (DCCS) task. In this task, depending on the condition, cards
need to be sorted according to di↵erent dimensions (typically color or shape)
and participants have to switch between these conditions. Zelazo et al. ar-
gue that, similarly, reasoning about others’ false beliefs requires evaluating
belief contents under di↵erent contexts (e.g., own versus other perspective)
and switching between these conditional rules. In line with the CCC theory,
a robust correlation between standard false belief tasks and the DCCS task
is observed (e.g., Frye et al., 1995; Perner et al., 2002; Low, 2010). The
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hierarchy account presented in the previous section, might be considered
as a generalization of the CCC theory. Reasoning about embedded rules
requires keeping higher order context (e.g., color or shape for the DCCS,
or which perspective for ToM) and lower-order rules (e.g., how to sort the
cards given the context) at di↵erent levels of hierarchy. Similarly, process-
ing complex sentence structures requires hierarchical processing (Chomsky,
1966). In the language domain, the common conceptual demand account,
therefore, predicts a correlation of ToM with syntactic but not with non-
syntactic language abilities. Empirically, a correlation of standard explicit
false belief tasks with syntactic abilities, in particular with embedded com-
plement sentences, is well-established (see, e.g., Milligan et al., 2007, for a
review). Depending on whether there is continuity from early-developing
to later explicit false belief abilities or not, the associations predicted by
the common conceptual demand account should hold for both implicit and
standard explicit false belief tasks (if subserved by the same process) or only
for the standard explicit false belief tasks (if distinct processes).
Emergence
account
The emergence account is related to the common conceptual demand
account in that it postulates that the correlation goes beyond mere task
demands (e.g., Carlson et al., 2015). It thus makes very similar correla-
tional predictions. However, if linguistic or executive abilities are already
required for the emergence of false belief understanding, we would expect
that earlier linguistic or executive abilities predict later false belief under-
standing. This prediction is supported by the meta-analysis of longitudinal
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studies that show stronger predictive e↵ects from earlier linguistic and ex-
ecutive function to later ToM abilities than the reverse (executive function:
Devine and Hughes, 2014; language: Milligan et al., 2007). The few train-
ing studies available support this direction of e↵ect in the language domain
(Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003), but speak
for a bidirectional e↵ect for executive function (as measured by the DCCS
task) in support of the common conceptual demand account (Kloo and
Perner, 2003).
1.2.1 Executive Function
Furthermore, Devine and Hughes (2014) suggest that the common con-
ceptual demand and emergence account di↵er with respect to the type of
executive processes that are expected to correlate with false belief under-
standing. While the CCC theory predicts a correlation with tasks of cogni-
tive flexibility (e.g., DCCS) for the common conceptual demand account, in
the emergence account inhibitory control is predicted to enable children to
notice di↵erent perspectives by suppressing environmental input. In partic-
ular, a combination of inhibitory control and working memory (as required
by conflict inhibition tasks, such as, the Go-NoGo task) have been suggested
to be important for the emergence of ToM (Carlson et al., 2002). According
to this view, the combination of inhibition and working memory is crucial
for children to learn maintaining di↵erent perspectives and suppressing the
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irrelevant one.3 There is a large amount of empirical evidence for both
views (for conflict inhibition, e.g., Carlson and Moses, 2001; Carlson et al.,
2002, 2004, 2015; Hughes, 1998; Moses et al., 2005, for DCCS, see previous
paragraph). The link with DCCS and conflict inhibition, in turn, seem to
be stronger than with simple inhibition tasks (Devine and Hughes, 2014;
Carlson et al., 2015) in support of a relation beyond mere task demands.
1.2.2 Language
In the domain of language, the emergence account suggests that general lan-
guage abilities and in particular the exposure to mental state language help
children to understand social interaction and develop a concept of mental
states (e.g., de Villiers and Pyers, 2002; Olson, 1988; Astington and Jenkins,
1999; Astington and Baird, 2005; Harris et al., 2005). In contrast to the
common conceptual demand account, the emergence account therefore pre-
dicts that general language abilities rather than merely syntactic abilities
should correlate with false belief understanding. Furthermore, a contribu-
tion of mental state language to false belief understanding over and above
general language abilities, but not of general syntactic abilities, would be in
line with the account. A number of studies have reported such a relation
of false belief understanding with mental state terms, such as, think, know,
or believe (Symons et al., 2005; Ru↵man et al., 2002, 1999; Rosnay et al.,
3Note, however, that a similar argument might also explain common online demands
of ToM and conflict inhibition, in support of the common conceptual demand account.
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2004; Ziatas et al., 1998). Whether these contribute to ToM over and above
general language abilities and syntax, however, remains to be clarified.
The role of
complement
sentences
More specifically, De Villiers and De Villiers (2000) have argued that
complement sentences provide the linguistic framework in order to express
a false belief. In a complement sentence, the object is replaced by a sub-
ordinate clause. This sentence structure allows to express a true sentence,
in which the embedded clause in itself is false (e.g., The pope believed
that the sun turns around the earth.). This account predicts a correlation
of false belief understanding with children’s understanding of complement
sentences over and above their syntactic or general language abilities. A
number of studies have indeed found a relation of explicit false belief under-
standing with memory for complement clauses (e.g., Low, 2010; Hale and
Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; de Villiers and Pyers,
2002; Cheung et al., 2014; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2012; Kamawar et al.,
2002; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2014, for a review). However, it remains
equivocal how the correlation with complement sentences compares to other
syntactic abilities. Moreover, to test children’s knowledge of complement
sentences, previous studies have employed a memory for complements test,
which had exactly the same structure as the explicit false belief tasks (i.e.,
they di↵ered from the typical false belief task only by the use of the verb say
instead of think). The observed correlation might therefore merely result
from the superficial similarity of the tasks rather than from a relation of the
underlying processes. Moreover, the task did not allow disentangling the
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role of syntactic and semantic knowledge of complement sentences. Further
research is therefore needed to determine whether the correlation of false
belief and complement sentence understanding goes beyond mere superfi-
cial task features, and is present over and above other syntactic abilities.
This requires a complement sentence task that does not entail a conflict be-
tween two contradicting statements or a false representation, as false belief
tasks do. Furthermore, to disentangle de Villiers’ account from a common
conceptual demand account with hierarchical processing as a common pro-
cess, the correlation needs to be compared with general syntactic abilities.
Studies that have directly compared the correlations of ToM with syntax
and semantics seem to find stronger e↵ects for complement sentence and
syntactic measures than for semantic measures (Milligan et al., 2007; Ast-
ington and Jenkins, 1999). This might point towards common conceptual
demands of syntax and ToM, but further verification from studies is needed
that directly compare the correlations of di↵erent false belief tasks with the
mastery of complement sentences, syntax, and non-syntactic measures.
Adult data Finally, data from adults might also inform on whether language is only
required for the emergence of false belief understanding in development or
is relevant for its expression until adulthood (e.g., Apperly et al., 2009).
Patient data suggests that in adults’ false belief reasoning is independent of
syntactic abilities (Apperly et al., 2006). A dual task study, however, shows
that language shadowing, but not rhythmic shadowing, impairs performance
on a non-verbal elicited false belief task (Newton and de Villiers, 2007).
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These findings also support the view of common conceptual demands of
language and false belief understanding in healthy adults, beyond emergence
and independently of mere task demands.
1.2.3 Correlations with Implicit False Belief Tasks
So far, most theoretical accounts and empirical research have focused on
the relation of other cognitive domains with standard explicit false belief
tasks. Whether these relations also hold for the implicit false belief tasks
depends on the degree of continuity that is assumed between early and later
explicit false belief abilities. In case of a continuity, the common conceptual
demand account and the emergence account predict the same associations
of language and executive function with the implicit than with the later
explicit false belief tasks. Conversely, if the tasks reflect di↵erent cognitive
processes, their correlational patterns with other cognitive domains should
be distinct. The lower-level domain-general account (e.g., Heyes, 2014)
would predict a correlation of the implicit false belief tasks with domain-
general abilities, such as, statistical learning abilities in non-social context.
The dual process theories that account for early false belief abilities by
some minimal ToM process, such as, registrations or experiential records
(Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Perner and Roessler, 2012), in turn, would
predict a correlation with working memory and attention especially for so-
cial cues. Empirically, the few studies that have been conducted on the
29
The Emergence of Theory of Mind Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
correlation of implicit false belief tasks with executive function and lan-
guage are inconclusive. In the domain of executive function, first studies
have found contradicting results: Whereas Low (2010) reports no correla-
tion of implicit false belief tasks with a dimensional change card-sorting task
in preschoolers, Yott and Poulin-Dubois (2012) find a correlation using a
detour-reaching task in infants. In adults, a dual task study indicated that
the abilities measured by an anticipatory looking false belief task recruited
executive function at least to some extent (Schneider et al., 2012), but it
is unclear whether these findings generalize to the developmental context.
In sum, the relation between executive function and implicit false belief
tasks remains equivocal. Similarly, in the language domain, Low (2010)
found no significant correlation of an anticipatory looking false belief task
with children’s memory for complement clauses. Yet, there is evidence that
deaf infants that lack early language input have an impaired performance
on a non-verbal anticipatory looking false belief task (Meristo et al., 2012).
This suggests that language might be important for the emergence of the
abilities measured by the implicit tasks. In sum, more research is needed
on the relation of other cognitive domains with the non-verbal and implicit
false belief tasks used in infancy. These relations might help understanding
the underlying processes and the relation of implicit and explicit false belief
tasks.
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1.3 Neural Basis of ToM
1.3.1 Neural Basis of ToM in Adults
fMRI studies
on ToM in
adults
The brain regions functionally involved in ToM in adults have exten-
sively been studied over the past two decades. A large number of functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on ToM show converging evi-
dence for the activation of a bilateral network for processing others’ mental
states: This network consists of the dorso- and ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (dMPFC / vMPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), superior temporal
sulcus (STS) and middle temporal gyrus (MTG), temporal pole, precuneus,
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and a region commonly labeled as temporopari-
etal junction (TPJ), which includes the angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus,
and posterior STG/MTG (as reviewed, e.g., in Schurz et al., 2014; Molen-
berghs et al., 2016; Bzdok et al., 2012; Carrington and Bailey, 2009). These
studies have used a variety of di↵erent ToM tasks, and recent meta-analyses
suggest that the activation patterns di↵er for di↵erent types of ToM tasks
(Schurz et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2016). In particular, reasoning
about others’ false beliefs (contrasted with other false representations (e.g.,
outdated photographs or false signs) recruits a network that consists of the
TPJ (angular gyrus and pSTS), STS/MTG, precuneus, and MPFC (Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014, see Fig. 1.1). A key finding from
the meta-analysis by Schurz et al. was that the only significant overlap
across all di↵erent types of ToM tasks was in the right TPJ, a region that
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has been proposed to specifically sustain processing of mental states (Saxe
and Wexler, 2005; Perner et al., 2006; Aichhorn et al., 2009). The left TPJ,
in turn, has been suggested to be associated with processing conflicting per-
spectives (Perner et al., 2006), but the role of the di↵erent regions of the
network in processing false beliefs remains to be clarified.
Figure 1.1: Regions of consistent activation across fMRI studies on false
belief processing in adults in a meta-analysis: bilateral TPJ, STS/MTG,
precuneus, and MPFC.
Structural
Connectivity
for ToM
The network character of the brain regions functionally involved in ToM
suggests that the connections between these regions should be important for
false belief reasoning. Surprisingly, however, very little research has been
conducted on structural brain networks involved in ToM. The only study
that combines white matter integrity in combination with a behavioral as-
sessment of ToM is a study that examined ToM performance in patients
with resected glioms along the associative white matter pathways (Herbet
et al., 2014). This study suggests that the dorsal connections from pos-
terior temporal and parietal regions to the prefrontal cortex are important
for ToM. More specifically, reduced integrity of the cingulum was associated
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with reasoning about others’ intentions (Brunet et al., 2000), and of the ar-
cuate fascicle with inferring a↵ective states (Reading the Mind in the Eyes
task by Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). However, no study so far has studied
structural connectivity in the context of false belief reasoning. Moreover, it
is unclear whether impairments in patients serve to infer the brain struc-
tures that support ToM in the healthy population. Hypotheses on the
white matter pathways relevant for false belief understanding can therefore
best be derived from the connections between the brain regions functionally
involved in the processing of false beliefs. These pathways include the cin-
gulum, which connects the PC and the MPFC, the corpus callosum (CC),
which connects the contralateral regions of the bilateral false belief net-
work, and temporoparietal-prefrontal connections that link the TPJ with
the MPFC (i.e., the inferior fronto-occipital fascicle [IFOF] and superior
longitudinal fascicle [SLF]), as well as short-range connections along the
STS/MTG (Oishi et al., 2011; Catani and Mesulam, 2008).
Impaired
structural
connectivity
in autism
Further support for the relevance of structural connectivity in long-
range white matter pathways for ToM comes from clinical studies with
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disor-
der characterized by core deficits in social interaction (APA, 2013) and
in particular ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 2000;
Tager-Flusberg, 2007). ASD has been associated with altered white matter
connectivity (for a review see, e.g., Ameis and Catani, 2015). Voxel based
morphometry (VBM) studies on white matter volume have found altered
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white matter structure in the arcuate fascicle, the inferior longitudinal fas-
cicle (ILF), the IFOF and the uncinate (Radua et al., 2011; Cauda et al.,
2014). A meta-analysis found significantly reduced fractional anisotropy
(FA, a measure of directionality of fibers) across di↵usion tensor imaging
(DTI) studies in the superior longitudinal and arcuate fascicle, the CC, and
the uncinate fascicle in ASD (Aoki et al., 2013). However, autism includes
a much wider range of symptoms then mere ToM deficits including broader
socio-emotional deficits, communicative deficits as well as restricted repet-
itive patterns of behavior, and only few studies have related white matter
structure to social impairment symptoms (Cheung et al., 2009; Noriuchi
et al., 2010; Cheon et al., 2011), and none of them specifically to ToM
deficits.
In sum, the white matter pathways important for false belief under-
standing in healthy adults remain unclear, and the best candidates are the
pathways that connect the functional false belief reasoning network (i.e.,
the cingulum, CC, IFOF, SLF, and arcuate fascicle). The brain structures
involved in the development and especially the emergence of false belief un-
derstanding in childhood, in turn, might di↵er from those activated for false
belief processing in adults.
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1.3.2 Neural Basis of ToM in Development
So far, only few studies have studied the neural correlates of false belief
understanding in school-aged children, and no neuroimaging study has in-
vestigated the neural mechanisms that support the emergence of false be-
lief understanding in preschoolers. Functional neuroimaging studies (Saxe
et al., 2009; Gweon et al., 2012; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2010)
in children aged 6 to 12 years report activation in a similar network than
in adults, that is, in TPJ, STS/MTG, PC, and MPFC. Additionally, some
children showed a recruitment of the more lateral right middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), the IFG (Kobayashi et al., 2007), and ACC (Kobayashi et al., 2007;
Sommer et al., 2010) also found in some adult studies (Carrington and Bai-
ley, 2009). The TPJ showed increasingly specific activation for processing
mental states compared to general social context in the course of develop-
ment from 5 years to adulthood (Gweon et al., 2012). None of these studies,
however, addressed the neural mechanisms that underlie the developmental
breakthrough in false belief understanding in the critical age period of its
emergence. There are only two studies with preschool-aged children, which
both employed electroencephalography (EEG). A study with 4-year-olds
localized individual di↵erences in alpha oscillations related to ToM perfor-
mance to the right TPJ and the DMPFC (Sabbagh et al., 2009). Source
localization of EEG signal recorded the scalp, however, is very restricted,
and the study did not examine whether the e↵ects were age-driven and
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mediated the developmental breakthrough in false belief understanding. A
second study on event-related brain potentials (ERP) reported a late slow
wave with a left frontal scalp distribution in a false belief task with 4- to
6-year-old children (Liu et al., 2009). In this latter study no source local-
ization was conducted.
In sum, the brain structures that support the emergence of false belief
understanding remain unknown, and research is in need of neuroimaging
studies to address this question. In particular, the structural brain matu-
rations that pave the way for the development of ToM are entirely unclear
to date. The maturation of structural connections between the regions in-
volved in ToM in older children and adults with already developed false
belief understanding might be critical. Their connectivity has never been
studied in the context of ToM, nore has their development throughout child-
hood. The present thesis addresses this apparent gap in the research field
in study 3 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in press) by combining measures
of white matter structure and connectivity with performance on false belief
tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children.
1.3.3 Structural Brain Development in Early Child-
hood
The current thesis combines measures of cognitive development in the field
of ToM with measures of structural brain development, that is, in partic-
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ular of white matter structure and connectivity. Although still rare as an
approach, a number of studies have shown how regional brain structure
maturation di↵erentially relates to the development of cognitive function in
various domains (for reviews see, e.g., Casey et al., 2005; Johansen-Berg,
2010; Kanai and Rees, 2011). For example, cortical maturation of the PFC
has been shown to be related to memory development (Sowell et al., 2001;
Nagy et al., 2004) and general intelligence (Shaw et al., 2006). Measures of
cortical development of dorsolateral frontostriatal regions were associated
with the development of executive control (Casey et al., 1997; Steinbeis
et al., 2012), and cortical development of the IFG as well as its structural
connectivity to the temporal cortex were shown to be related to language
development (Fengler et al., 2015; Skeide et al., 2016).
A number of studies have shown converging results of gray matter and
functional activation measures with white matter connectivity between the
reported regions (Olesen et al., 2003; Nagy et al., 2004; Leroy et al., 2011;
Saygin et al., 2012, 2016).
The time course of maturational processes in the brain strongly depends
on the region and parallels milestones of cognitive development (Casey et al.,
2005). Primary sensory areas and their connections, such as, the primary
visual cortex and the optical radiation mature first, followed by tempo-
ral and parietal association areas that subserve basic cognitive processes,
such as, visual and auditory attention. The last regions to mature are the
higher-order association areas in the prefrontal and lateral temporal cor-
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tices, which subserve higher-order cognitive functions (Casey et al., 2005;
Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015). While cortical volume undergoes an
inverted u-shaped developmental curve that peaks between early childhood
and adolescence depending on the region (Lenroot and Giedd, 2006), white
matter volume and connectivity of the major fibre bundles continues to in-
crease until adulthood with peaks between approximately, 20 and 45 years
of age (Lebel et al., 2012). Processes that contribute to these developments
are changes of synaptic organization (growth and pruning) for cortical vol-
ume, and axonal myelination as a dominant factor of white matter matura-
tion (Casey et al., 2005; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; Lenroot and
Giedd, 2006).
Study 3 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in press) relates measures of
structural brain maturation to cognitive developments in ToM. The focus is
thereby put on measures of white matter development, that is, white matter
structure and connectivity. Developments in other cognitive domains are
controlled for. The aim of this approach is to identify the specific neural
maturations that pave the way for the emergence of a milestone of human
cognition, namely, a mature representational ToM.
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Summary of
Background
In summary, a developmental breakthrough in ToM is achieved around
the age of 4 years when children start passing standard false belief tasks.
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To date, it is unclear what cognitive and neural developments precede and
determine this crucial step in human development. In recent years, novel
implicit or spontaneous tasks have shown that infants before the age of 2
years display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false
belief. The cognitive processes that underlie these early achievements, their
development beyond toddlerhood, and their relation to the later explicit
false belief tasks, however, are intensely debated. Moreover, the role of
other cognitive domains for the emergence of false belief understanding (in
particular of executive function and language) is not yet understood, and
might inform us on the relation of early-developing and later explicit false
belief abilities. Finally, the neural basis for the emergence of false belief
understanding is entirely unclear. Understanding the neural processes that
underlie di↵erent false belief tasks in development might give insight into
the underlying cognitive processes and their interrelation.
Research Questions
The guiding aims of the current thesis are to understand, (1), the nature of
the processes that underlie implicit false belief tasks, and, (2), the mecha-
nisms that determine the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief
reasoning around the age of 4 years. More specifically, the thesis aims at
addressing the following research questions:
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1. How robust is early success on implicit false belief tasks, and how does
performance develop beyond toddlerhood?
2. What is the relation between the abilities measured by implicit and by
standard explicit false belief tasks? Are the underlying processes the
same or di↵erent, and are the early-developing abilities important for
the emergence of later explicit false belief understanding in preschool
age?
3. How are the early-developing and later explicit false belief abilities
related to other cognitive domains, in particular, to language and ex-
ecutive function? What developments in these domains are important
for the emergence of an explicit understanding of false beliefs?
4. What is the brain basis of the emergence of a full-fledged represen-
tational ToM? The maturation of which brain structures gives rise
to the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief reasoning
around the age of 4 years?
5. Are the neural processes that underlie implicit false belief tasks the
same or di↵erent from those observed for the standard explicit false
belief tasks?
Approach
To address these questions the present thesis takes the following approach:
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(a) Study 1 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., submitted) investigates the devel-
opmental trajectory and robustness of performance on an implicit an-
ticipatory looking false belief task between the ages of 2 and 4 years
in a longitudinal setting.
(b) Study 2 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016) examines the intercorrelations
of di↵erent false belief tasks (two standard explicit false belief tasks,
an anticipatory looking task, and an indirectly-elicited task) and their
correlation with linguistic abilities (general language abilities, syntax,
and complement sentences) and executive function (cognitive flexi-
bilty, conflict inhibition, and reward delay) cross-sectionally in 3- and
4-year-old children.
(c) Study 3 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in press) investigates white
matter maturation (structure and connectivity, as measured by di↵usion-
weighted MRI) associated with the emergence of explicit false belief
reasoning in 3- and 4-year-old children.
Hypotheses
1. Developmental trajectory of implicit false belief performance:
Based on previous studies (Southgate et al., 2007), we expected 2-year-
olds to perform above chance on the implicit anticipatory looking false
belief task. Between the ages of 2 and 4 years, we hypothesized to either
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find an increase in performance (possibly paralleling the developmental
change in explicit false belief reasoning) or to observe stable performance.
2. Relation of implicit and standard explicit false belief tasks:
The correlation between performance on these tasks provides information
on the degree of continuity between the underlying abilities: A signifi-
cant correlation would speak for continuity (same or related processes),
whereas no correlation would speak for distinct and independent pro-
cesses.
3. Relation with other cognitive domains:
The correlations of the false belief tasks with language and executive
function depends on the role that these domains play for false belief un-
derstanding. The correlation pattern can therefore provide information
on the origin of the relation:
(a) The task-related account predicts a correlation of language and ex-
ecutive function with the verbal explicit false belief tasks, but not
with the non-verbal implicit task.4 Correlations are expected in par-
ticular with the inhibition measures (conflict inhibition and reward
delay) and with those language abilities required by the employed
false belief tasks.
4The implicit tasks might also be argued to show a significantly smaller correlation
with executive function rather than no correlation at all (Southgate, 2013).
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(b) The common conceptual demands account predicts a correlation of
false belief understanding especially with cognitive flexibility and
conflict inhibition in the executive domain, and with syntactic abil-
ities and complement sentences, but not non-syntactic measures, in
the language domain.
(c) The emergence account, in turn, predicts a correlation especially
with conflict inhibition in the executive domain, and general lan-
guage abilities and especially complement sentences in the language
domain.
For 2b and 2c, these patterns hold for explicit and implicit false belief
tasks in the case of continuity, whereas a distinct correlation pattern for
the implicit task is predicted in the case of independent processes.
4. Brain structures associated with the emergence of explicit false belief
understanding:
Locally, we expected performance in the standard explicit false belief
tasks to correlate with age-related changes in local white matter struc-
ture (as measured by FA) in the regions reported to be involved in false
belief reasoning in adults and older children, that is, the TPJ, MPFC,
precuneus, and along the MTG/STS.
Moreover, we expected the performance on these tasks to correlate with
the connectivity between these regions (as measured by streamline den-
sity obtained from probabilistic tractography), that is, in white matter
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pathways that connect frontal and temporo-parietal regions (i.e., the cin-
gulum, IFOF, SLF, and ILF), and in the CC, which connects the bilateral
regions of the ToM network. From Herbet et al. (2014), we predicted the
connectivity of the arcuate fascicle and the cingulum to correlate with
explicit false belief understanding.
5. Neural Processes involved in implicit false belief tasks:
The neural processes involved in implicit false belief tasks again depend
on the degree of continuity that is assumed between early-developing and
later explicit false belief abilities. If they reflect the same ToM processes,
we would expect at least in parts overlapping brain regions (e.g., the
TPJ). In contrast, if the two task types tap into di↵erent processes, we
would expect distinct brain regions. Moreover, independent processes
would predict that the maturation of brain structures involved in the
emergence of explicit false belief understanding should be independent
of the earlier-developing abilities.
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Abstract
A milestone of Theory of Mind development has long been assumed to occur around
the age of 4 years, when children start passing traditional false belief tasks. Recently,
however, infants younger than 2 years have been shown to display correct expectations
of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The developmental trajectory of these
early-developing abilities and their robustness remain a matter of debate. Testing
children longitudinally from 2 to 4 years of age with an established anticipatory looking
false belief task, we found a significant developmental change only between the ages of 3
and 4 years, at the same age when the developmental breakthrough in traditional false
belief tasks occurs. Children anticipated correctly only by the age of 4 years, and
performed at chance at the ages of 2 and 3 years. These findings point towards the
fragility of implicit false belief tasks in early childhood.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, False belief, Anticipatory looking, Longitudinal study,
Toddlerhood, Preschool age
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Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds’ but not 2- and 3-year-olds’ false belief-related
action anticipation
Highlights
• Longitudinal study of anticipatory looking false belief task from 2 to 4 years
• Significant improvement in belief-related anticipation between the ages of 3 and 4
• Children correctly anticipated belief-related actions only by the age of 4 years
• Correct anticipation only when agent believed object to be in its last location
Introduction
Successful human social interaction crucially depends on the ability to infer what
other individuals think and to predict their behavior based on this. This ability is
referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), and understanding that beliefs may di er from
reality is a critical test of ToM (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Premack & Woodru ,
1978). The false belief task has therefore become the standard paradigm to test ToM
abilities in developmental and comparative psychology. Decades of research had
converged on the view that ToM is uniquely human, and, in children, emerges around
the age of 4 years (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). In recent years, however,
novel implicit false belief paradigms have radically questioned this conclusion. Violation
of expectation and anticipatory looking tasks indicate that infants younger than 2 years
of age display correct expectations of how an agent with a false belief will act (e.g.,
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, 2016; Southgate,
Senju, & Csibra, 2007), and recently even apes have been shown to anticipate in
accordance with false beliefs (Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016). These
findings have caused a fundamental overhaul of our understanding of ToM abilities in
infants and primates, and have triggered one of the most controversial debates of
developmental psychology: Why do children consistently fail traditional false belief
tasks until the age of 4 years if expectations are already guided by other agents’ false
beliefs in infancy? The reasons for this discrepancy, the nature of the early abilities,
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and their relation to the later abilities measured by traditional false belief tasks have
been debated intensely (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010;
Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2014; Heyes, 2014; Perner & Roessler, 2012; Ru man,
2014; Sodian, 2016). These debates have been enriched by empirical findings that point
to a certain fragility of the implicit false belief tasks (He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2011;
Helming et al., 2014; Kulke, 2017; Low & Watts, 2013; Wang & Leslie, 2016). Thus,
small setup di erences can influence infants’ performance in the tasks, which has led to
di erent theoretical conclusions on the nature of implicit false belief abilities. More
research is needed to understand the exact circumstances under which children show
correct expectations of false belief-related actions and when they do not.
Moreover, so far, implicit false belief tasks have mainly been tested with infants
and toddlers between the first and third year of life, but older children have rarely been
tested on these paradigms. It remains unclear how performance on these tasks develops
in preschool age around 3 and 4 years, when children start passing the standard explicit
false belief tests. Only a few studies have shown anticipatory looking in preschoolers
(Clements & Perner, 1994; Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 2016; Low,
2010), mostly with verbal tasks, and, to our knowledge, no study has investigated how
the same task develops from infancy until preschool age. Understanding the
developmental trajectory of the early abilities from 2 years of age until 4, when children
start passing the traditional false belief tasks, however, would be crucial to understand
the nature of these abilities and their relation to the later-developing traditional false
belief tasks. To address this question, longitudinal research is required that tests the
development of children’s performance on the same implicit false belief task in the
course of this time period. In the present study, we therefore tested children
longitudinally from 2 to 4 years with an established anticipatory looking false belief
task. This allowed us to address whether performance on the implicit false belief tasks
remains stable once infants start passing these tests, or whether performance improves
in the course of early childhood, paralleling the performance breakthrough in the
traditional explicit false belief tasks.
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Moreover, in light of the recent debate about the fragility of implicit false belief
tasks (He et al., 2011; Helming et al., 2014; Kulke, 2017), the study allowed us to test
how robust belief-related anticipatory looking is in 2-year-olds and in preschoolers.
Understanding the exact conditions under which infants and toddlers pass false belief
tasks would help us understand the processes that underlie early success in these tasks.
Similarly, circumscribed performance limitations in toddlers but not in older children
that pass the traditional explicit false belief tasks could help bridge the gap between
infants’ early success in the implicit tasks and preschoolers’ failure in the traditional
tasks until the age of 4 years. Thus, both the developmental trajectory of implicit false
belief tasks between infancy and preschool age and the exact circumstances under which
infants pass these tasks can contribute to solving the puzzle why these tasks are passed
several years earlier than the traditional false belief tasks.
There have been a number of theoretical suggestions how to solve this puzzle.
Some authors have argued that younger children lack the executive abilities required by
the traditional tasks but unrelated to mental state reasoning per se (Baillargeon et al.,
2010; Wang & Leslie, 2016), or the pragmatic abilities to interpret the test question
correctly (Helming et al., 2014; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2016). These authors have
suggested that putting the focus on the object of belief rather than the agent who holds
the belief might disrupt participants’ tracking of the agent’s perspective, and lead
children to misinterpret the situation as referring to the actual scene rather than to the
agent’s belief. According to the authors, this explains why under certain circumstances
children pass traditional explicit false belief tasks earlier (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts,
2013, 2016), or fail in implicit false belief tasks (He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2012; Wang &
Leslie, 2016). To explain the discrepancy between performance on implicit and explicit
false belief tasks, other authors have suggested that di erent processes might underlie
performance on these tasks (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner & Roessler, 2012). This
view is supported by the lack of a correlation between implicit and explicit tasks
(Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016), by a dissociation of involved brain regions
(Grosse Wiesmann, Singer, Steinbeis, & Friederici, 2017; Schneider, Slaughter, Becker,
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& Dux, 2014) and in performance of patients with autism spectrum disorder (Senju,
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). The proponents of a two system account of implicit
and explicit ToM argue that signature limits in implicit ToM abilities might give insight
into the processes that underlie the two systems (e.g., Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Low,
Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2016; Low & Watts, 2013). Finally, again other authors
have gone even further and argued that infants pass the implicit tasks based on
statistically learned associations that are entirely unrelated to mental states (Heyes,
2014; Ru man, 2014). Crucially, in all these accounts, the exact circumstances under
which children pass or fail false belief tasks at di erent ages provide information about
the processes underlying the di erent tasks. Consequently, understanding which task
features make toddlers but not 4-year-olds fail false belief tasks can shed light on this
debate. Here, we address this question by studying the developmental trajectory of an
implicit false belief task longitudinally between 2 and 4 years of age.
Arguably the most stringent support for infants’ action anticipation based on
attribution of false beliefs came from a particularly well-controlled anticipatory looking
task by Southgate et al. (2007). In this study, 25-month-old children were shown to
correctly anticipate where an agent who falsely believed an object to be in one of two
empty boxes would search for the object. The authors constructed two false belief
conditions (FB1 and FB2) that were orthogonal with respect to simpler non-belief-
based strategies, such as gazing at the first or last box the object had been in or at the
last box the agent had attended to. Correct anticipation in both false belief conditions
therefore ensured that children passed the test based on belief attribution and not due
to these simpler associations. Similar anticipatory looking paradigms have been used at
di erent ages between 18 months and 3 years (Clements & Perner, 1994; Gliga, Senju,
Pettinato, Charman, & Johnson, 2014; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016; Low, 2010;
Meristo et al., 2012; Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011; Thoermer,
Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012; Wang & Leslie, 2016). In the present
longitudinal study, we therefore used this anticipatory looking false belief task
(Southgate et al., 2007). To increase the sensitivity of the measure, and to make sure
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that an individual child did not pass the test because of a simpler strategy, we
presented every child with both false belief trials, one trial of each of the two original
conditions FB1 and FB2. This also allowed us to compare performance between the two
conditions within subjects. Analyzing only the first trial, in turn, allowed us to compare
performance in our study to the original study where every child performed only a
single false belief trial, condition FB1 or FB2 respectively (Southgate et al., 2007).
By testing children longitudinally from 2 years until 4 years of age, we aimed at
addressing the following questions: (1) How does belief-related anticipatory looking
develop beyond the age of 2 years? Does performance remain stable throughout
preschool age, or is there an improvement on the implicit false belief tasks in the age
range where children start passing the traditional explicit false belief tasks? (2) In light
of the recent debate about the fragility of implicit false belief tasks (He et al., 2011;
Helming et al., 2014; Kulke, 2017), how robust is performance on implicit false belief
tasks in 2-year-olds, and does robustness of the tasks change with age? Is performance
robust across di erent task conditions?
From the previous literature, we hypothesized that children would perform above
chance at the age of 2 years. Further, we hypothesized no di erence in performance
between the two di erent false belief conditions FB1 and FB2. Concerning the
developmental trajectory of performance between the ages of 2 and 4 years, the pattern
was less clear from previous literature. Based on similar levels of performance in adults
compared to previous infant studies (Senju et al., 2009), we expected to find either
stable performance between the ages of 2 and 4 years or an increase in performance that
we might be able to detect due to the higher sensitivity in our within-subject
longitudinal design.
Methods
Participants
Eye-tracking data was acquired in three consecutive years, starting at the age of
2 years. In the first year, data was recorded from 52 toddlers (mean age: M = 2.55
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years, SD = .32, range: 2.08–3.20 years), from which 6 data sets had to be excluded
because the recording had to be interrupted before the first test trial (N = 3), data
quality was insu cient to be analyzed (N = 2), or because of inattentiveness of the
child on both test trials (N = 1). From these children, 26 returned in two consecutive
years. In the second year, children had a mean age of M = 3.64 years (SD = .29, range:
3.07–4.12 years), and in the third year M = 4.49 years (SD = .34, range: 3.89–5.09
years). The mean di erence between the measurement time points was 339 days (SD =
92 days). At the age of 3 years, one child had to be excluded because of insu cient data
quality, and at the age of 4 years one child dropped out because of technical problems
with the eye-tracker. Parental informed consent was obtained for every testing session,
in accordance with the approval from the local ethics committee (No. 236-10-23082010).
Previous studies that used similar anticipatory looking false belief tasks in infancy
and toddlerhood reported between 75% and 85% correct first saccades (Senju et al.,
2011, 2009; Southgate et al., 2007). A power analysis for a binomial test assuming 80%
correct anticipations showed that an error probability of 5% and a power of 90%
required a sample size of 23 participants. With our final sample size of 46 children at
the age of 2 years we therefore expected a power of 99.4% to detect a possible looking
bias in toddlers.
Procedure
Children were presented with the original stimuli from Southgate et al. (2007) on
the integrated monitor of a Tobii T120 eye-tracker using the Tobii Studio software
(version 2.0.8). Children were seated in a car seat approximately 60 cm from the
monitor, while their parents were standing behind them. Before the start of the
experiment, each child passed a five-point infant calibration available in Tobii Studio.
Each child was then presented with two familiarization trials (one left, one right) and
then a false belief test trial (condition FB1 or FB2 from Southgate at al., 2007),
followed by another two familiarization trials (in opposite order to the first two) and a
second false belief test trial. The test trials were presented in randomized order across
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participants (first FB1 and second FB2 in half of the participants, and the other way
round in the other half). Until the first false belief trial, the setup was exactly identical
to the setup in Southgate et al. (2007), with the exception of the sound that was lower
in our study (approximately 52–54 dB for the telephone ringing) compared to the
original study.
The stimuli by Southgate et al. (2007) showed a female agent behind a panel with
two windows, and an opaque box in front of each window. In all trials, a bear puppet
appeared and hid a colored ball in one of the two boxes. In the familiarization trials,
the bear then left again, the two windows were illuminated, and a bell sounded. After a
delay of 1750 ms after the lights turned o , the agent put her hand through the window
close to the box that contained the ball, and retrieved the ball from the box. The
familiarization intended to teach the child the agent’s goal and that one of the windows
was about to open after the bell sound and illumination of the windows.
In the false belief test trials, the bear moved the ball from the first box to the
other box while the agent was either watching (condition FB1) or turning her back to
the scene in response to the sound of a telephone ringing (condition FB2; see Figure 1).
The bear then left the scene, and, in condition FB1, the agent now turned away in
response to the telephone. Then, while the agent was turned away in both conditions
and the telephone kept ringing, the bear removed the ball from the box and left the
scene with it. The telephone then stopped ringing and the agent turned back to the
scene again, the windows were illuminated and the bell sounded. This marked the
beginning of the critical test period during which the children’s gaze was analyzed. In
the false belief trials, no outcome was shown to prevent children from learning from the
first false belief trial for the second. The two conditions FB1 and FB2 were orthogonal
with respect to simpler non-belief-based rules, such as gazing at the first or last box the
ball had been in or the last box the agent had attended to (see Southgate et al., 2007),
and therefore ensured that children did not pass the test based on these simpler cues.
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Analysis
Children’s looking behavior was coded within two Areas of Interest (AOI) each of
which covered one window and the lid of the box below that window during the critical
period of anticipation. This period was defined to start with the onset of the
illumination and ended 1750 ms after the end of the illumination, according to the delay
the children had been familiarized with until one window opened. Two measures of
action anticipation were coded. First, we coded the di erence in duration when looking
at the correct versus the incorrect AOI, divided by the total looking duration in both
AOIs. This measure scales from -1 to 1, and positive values indicate that children gazed
longer at the correct AOI. It is a well-established measure of looking bias and
considered to be highly reliable and sensitive (e.g., Gliga et al., 2014; Low, 2010; Senju
et al., 2009; Thoermer et al., 2012; Wang & Leslie, 2016). Second, the children’s first
saccade to one of the AOIs after the onset of the illumination was coded as a measure of
their anticipation where the agent would search for the ball (according to the principal
measure in Southgate et al. (2007).
The children’s attention was rated by two independent raters, and trials were
excluded on a trial by trial basis if children had missed out on important parts of the
course of action. This criterion led to the exclusion of 10 individual trials because of
inattentiveness in the first year, and no exclusions in the second or third year. The
raters agreed on 100 percent of the excluded trials.
Results
The children’s action anticipation was coded with two di erent measures. First,
their relative di erence in duration when looking at the correct versus the incorrect AOI
was analyzed during the critical period of anticipation following the illumination of the
windows. With this measure, children performed at chance level at the ages of 2 years
(M = -.03, SD = .51 ; one-sample t-test against 0: t(45) = -.386, p = .701) and 3 years
(M = -.05 , SD = .41 ; t(24) = -.592, p = .559; see Figure 2), and significantly above
chance at the age of 4 years (M = .30, SD = .36; t(24) = 4.094, p < .001). A repeated
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measures ANOVA with time point (2 years, 3 years, and 4 years of age) as within factor
showed that there was a significant di erence in performance between the di erent time
points (Greenhouse-Geisser test of within-subjects e ects: F(1.339) = 6.877, p = .011).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the children performed significantly better
at the age of 4 years than at the ages of 2 years (p = .008) and 3 years (p = .001), but
there was no significant di erence in performance between 2 and 3 years of age (p =
1.000).
We were then interested to see whether there was a significant di erence between
the two false belief conditions. For this we computed a repeated measures ANOVA with
two within-subject factors—time point (2 years, 3 years, and 4 years of age) and
condition (FB1 and FB2). This analysis confirmed the significant di erence in
performance with age (Greenhouse-Geisser test of within-subjects e ects: F(1.331) =
4.224, p = .049) and showed a significant main e ect of condition (F(1) = 8.812 , p =
.013) with better performance in condition FB1 than in condition FB2 (see Figure 3).
The interaction between time point and condition was not significant.
As a second measure we coded the children’s first saccade after the onset of the
illumination. This measure confirmed that children performed at chance level at the
ages of 2 (one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = .394) and 3 years (p = .564), and
significantly above chance only by the age of 4 years (p = .035; see Figure 4). However,
the di erence in performance between the time points was not significant (Friedman
test: Chi2(2) = .146, p = .929). In contrast, the di erence between the two conditions
was marginally significant with better performance in condition FB1 than FB2
(Friedman test: Chi2(1) = 3.314, p = .069). Only performance in condition FB1 was
significantly above chance collapsed across all 3 years (55 out of 88, i.e. 63 %, correct
first saccades binomial test: p = .025).
In sum, we found that children performed above chance in the anticipatory
looking task only at the age of 4 years, in contrast to the original study (Southgate et
al., 2007) that showed above chance performance at the age of 25 months. One reason
for this deviation could have been that in our version of the task, every child passed two
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false belief trials—the FB1 and the FB2 trial—whereas in the original study half of the
children passed FB1 and the other half FB2 in a between-subjects design. In order to
exclude this possibility, we performed a second analysis in which we only analyzed the
first false belief trial (either FB1 or FB2 depending on the trial order a child had been
presented with), exactly reproducing the procedure in Southgate et al. (2007). This
analysis confirmed our findings that toddlers and 3-year-olds did not perform above
chance in the false belief trials (see Appendix).
Discussion
In the present study, we aimed at studying how early ToM abilities observed in
infants’ anticipatory looking develop between 2 and 4 years of age, when children start
passing traditional explicit false belief tasks. To this aim, we tested 2- to 4-year-old
children with an established anticipatory false belief task in a longitudinal setting in
three consecutive years. Additionally, this design allowed us to test how robust implicit
false belief tasks are in 2-year-old children, and whether potential fragility of the task
changes in the course of preschool age. With our longitudinal approach, we found a
significant developmental breakthrough in the anticipation of the actions of an agent
with a false belief around the age of 4 years, at a similar age when they start passing
traditional explicit false belief tasks. That is, children only anticipated where an agent
with a false belief about the location of a ball would search for this ball by the age of 4
years and not yet at the ages of 2 and 3 years. This pattern was consistent across
di erent measures of anticipation (looking duration or first saccade to the correct
compared to the incorrect location), and in di erent subsamples of the data (in the total
sample as well as in a subsample of children who correctly anticipated the agent’s search
in a familiarization phase). Moreover, we showed a significant di erence in performance
between two di erent false belief conditions that respectively controlled for simpler
non-belief-related strategies, such as gazing at the last location that had contained the
ball. Children performed significantly better when the agent believed the ball to be in
the last location where it had been before it was removed from the scene (condition
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FB1) than when the agent believed it to be in a previous location (condition FB2).
Our results stand in contrast to previous anticipatory looking studies that showed
correct belief-related action anticipation at the age of 2 years with a very similar
paradigm (Gliga et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2007; Wang & Leslie,
2016) or with di erent paradigms (Meristo et al., 2012; Surian & Geraci, 2012;
Thoermer et al., 2012). Moreover, the only study that used the same two false belief
conditions FB1 and FB2 so far found no significant di erence between the two
conditions (Southgate et al., 2007). What could be the reasons for our deviation from
the original study by Southgate et al. (2007)?
One di erence in our study compared to the original study was that every child
performed two consecutive false belief trials, an FB1 and an FB2 trial in
counterbalanced order. To exclude the possibility that di erences in performance might
have resulted from carry over e ects from the first to the second trial, we additionally
analyzed only the first false belief trial. This replicated our results of a significant
increase in performance between the ages of 3 and 4 years with above chance
performance only by the age of 4 years. Furthermore, it replicated our finding of a
significant di erence in performance between the two false belief conditions. This
analysis therefore shows that the discrepancy of the results of our study compared to
Southgate et al. (2007) was not due to the fact that children performed multiple trials.
For the first false belief trial, the setup of our study was exactly as in Southgate et
al. (2007), except for the fact that the sound was lower in our study compared to the
original study. In particular, the sound of the telephone that was ringing while the
agent turned her back to the scene in the false belief trials was very low. The fact that
this deviation from the original study might have influenced 2-year-olds’ performance
gives insight into the circumstances under which infants anticipate false belief-related
behavior, and can therefore contribute to the discussion about the nature of early ToM
abilities. Thus, the telephone ringing might have enhanced infant performance in
several ways. First, it gave a plausible reason why the agent turned away, and
underlined that she did not pay attention to the scene and could not hear the relocation
14 False belief-related anticipation from 2 to 4 years of age
of the ball. In this interpretation, without the salient ringing of the telephone that
distracted the agent, younger children might not have understood that the agent did
not notice that the ball had been moved, and, consequently, had a false belief about its
location. It then remains unclear, however, why at the age of 4 years children started to
understand this. An alternative interpretation is that, before children reliably start to
reason explicitly about others’ mental states around the age of 4 years, children’s ability
to track another agent’s perspective is fragile and easily disrupted if their focus of
attention is pulled away from the agent (e.g., Helming et al., 2014; Rubio-Fernández &
Geurts, 2013, 2016). The salient ringing of the telephone in the original study
(Southgate et al., 2007) clearly centered the child’s attention on the agent rather than
the bear that was relocating the ball, and therefore might have helped the child to keep
track of the agent’s perspective. In contrast, in our study, without the salient ringing of
the telephone, children are likely to have focused more on the relocation of the ball, and
therefore might have gazed according to their own perspective on reality rather than to
the agent’s perspective. This would explain why in our study 2-year-olds failed to
correctly anticipate the agent’s actions in contrast to the original study. In this view,
only by the age of 4 years, when children start explicitly reasoning about false beliefs,
children’s tracking of others’ beliefs becomes robust and independent of these enhancing
factors. Finally, a third interpretation is that a very salient ringing of the telephone
might have entirely drawn the children’s attention to the agent so that the children
themselves might have missed the relocation of the ball. In this account toddlers could
have gazed correctly in the original study based on their own representation of the ball
rather than on their understanding of the agent’s false belief (similar to arguments by
Heyes, 2014). This view claims that false belief understanding only emerges when
children start passing the traditional tests, and would therefore predict that, without
the salient ringing of the telephone, only 4-year-olds pass the false belief trials. This
final account, however, is unlikely because in the original study children paid ample
attention to the bear and the ball while the telephone was ringing, and did not merely
gaze at the agent (Southgate, 2016). Taken together, in our view the most probable
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explanation therefore is that the telephone ringing might have enhanced infants’
performance in the original task by putting the focus of attention on the agent rather
than on the object of belief. This explanation is in line with previous findings of factors
that enhanced young children’s false belief performance by shifting the attention to the
agent rather than to the object of belief (Helming et al., 2014). For example, the
presence of the agent on the scene during the phase of false belief tracking and not
mentioning the target object in the test question enhanced young children’s performance
on false belief tasks (e.g., Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013, 2016). Similarly, a common
ground with an experimenter about the real location of an object impaired toddlers’
performance (e.g., He et al., 2012; Helming et al., 2014; Salter & Breheny, 2017).
Future research needs to follow up on the factors that enhance or decrease false belief
performance in infants and young preschoolers to further consolidate this view.
Another discrepancy in our results compared to the original study was the
significant di erence between performance in the two false belief conditions FB1 and
FB2 that were orthogonal with respect to simpler non-belief-based strategies. The
children anticipated significantly worse when the agent did not notice that the ball was
transferred to the other box before it was entirely removed from the scene (condition
FB2), in line with recent findings by Kulke (2017). Children performed at chance level
in condition FB2 at all ages. Even by the age of 4 years, they only anticipated above
chance level in condition FB1 (when the agent believed the ball to be in its last location
and only failed to notice that it was removed from there). This di erence in performance
was present within subjects as well as between subjects (when only analyzing the first
false belief trial). These results were in contrast with the original study that had found
no significant di erence between the two conditions (Southgate et al., 2007). However,
the sample size in the original study was too small to test whether performance in
condition FB2 individually was above chance (10 children per condition). The other
studies that used the same paradigm only tested one of the two conditions (Gliga et al.,
2014; Senju et al., 2009; Wang & Leslie, 2016) so that performance on the two
conditions could not be compared. Kulke (2017), in turn, found a very similar di erence
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between the conditions FB1 and FB2 in a large sample of 2- to 6-year-old children.
Why might condition FB2 have been more di cult than condition FB1? In condition
FB2, children had to remember the agent’s belief about the object for a longer period of
time while they were updating their own knowledge about the actual location of the
ball at least twice (transfer to the other box and removal from the scene). In contrast,
in condition FB1, children only had to remember that the agent believed the object to
remain in the last box while they updated their own knowledge that it was being
removed from the scene. It is therefore plausible that condition FB2 made higher
working memory and conflict inhibition demands to maintain the agent’s belief for a
longer time against one’s own conflicting perspective. Condition FB2 was constructed
to control for the simple non-belief-related strategy to gaze at the last location of the
ball. However, although 4-year-old children performed at chance level in this condition,
it is unlikely that they passed condition FB1 based on the simple non-belief based
strategy of gazing towards the last location of the ball. This is because such a strategy
would have led to below chance rather than chance level performance in condition FB2.
In fact, in both conditions together, 4-year-old children performed above chance, which
they could not have achieved with a simpler non-belief-based strategy. Moreover, at the
age of 4 years the majority of children pass traditional explicit false belief tests
(Wellman et al., 2001), which indicates that they did not fail in condition FB2 because
of di culties to attribute false beliefs. Instead, it is more likely that 4-year-olds failed in
this condition because of lacking working memory or executive abilities for the more
taxing condition. Future research should therefore try to reduce executive demands of
this second false belief condition to allow one to control for the simple strategy of
gazing at the last box that contained the ball. Nevertheless, as argued above, this did
not a ect the conclusion of a developmental change in belief-related anticipation
between the ages of 3 and 4 years in our study, because this pattern was present when
both conditions were taken together. Moreover, the developmental change between 3
and 4 years was present in condition FB1 individually as well, where children also only
performed above chance by the age of 4 years. This shows that the developmental
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pattern that we observed in our study was independent of the di culties that children
had with the more taxing condition FB2, and supports our conclusion of the fragility of
early false belief-related anticipatory looking. The exact circumstances that enhance
early success in implicit false belief tasks need to be followed up in future studies.
Conclusions
Our results show a developmental breakthrough in children’s anticipation of the
actions of an agent with a false belief around the age of 4 years, at a similar age when
children start passing the traditional explicit false belief tests. Furthermore, children
only anticipated correctly when the agent believed the ball to be in its last location
(condition FB1) rather than in the previous location (condition FB2), which was likely
due to high working memory demands of the latter condition. Previous studies had
shown anticipatory looking at the age of 2 years. A possible reason for the di erential
developmental trajectory compared to previous studies with the same task might have
been that performance in the original task was enhanced by the salient ringing of a
telephone while the agent was distracted from the scene and obtained a false belief.
This hints towards the fragility of early success on false belief tasks and indicates that
implicit false belief tracking might only become more robust and independent of
disrupting circumstances around the age of 4 years, when children start explicitly
attributing false beliefs in the traditional tasks. Understanding the exact circumstances
that enhance or disrupt early success on implicit false belief tasks can help to solve the
puzzle of early ToM.
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Figure 1 . Sequence of action in the two false belief conditions FB1 and FB2.
In condition FB1, the agent observed how a bear puppet transferred a ball from the left
to the right box, but turned away while the bear then removed the ball from the scene.
In condition FB2, the agent turned away before the bear transferred the ball from the
left to the right box, and only turned back after the bear had removed the ball from the
scene. The two conditions respectively controlled for simpler non-belief related
strategies, such as gazing at the first or last box the ball had been in or at the last box
the agent had paid attention to.
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Figure 2 . Mean Di erence in looking times in the correct compared to the
incorrect AOI (relative to the total looking time in both AOIs). Only by the
age of 4 years did children gaze significantly longer at the correct than the incorrect
AOI.
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Figure 3 . Mean Di erence in looking times in the correct compared to the
incorrect AOI for conditions FB1 and FB2 separately. Children performed
significantly better when the agent believed the ball to be in its last location (FB1)
than when he believed it to be in its previous location (FB2).
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Figure 4 . Percent of children who made a correct first saccade in 0, 1, or 2
out of 2 false belief trials. Only by the age of 4 years did children gaze significantly
above chance level.
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Abstract
The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental
breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than
2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their
relation to later-developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood.
Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children, relating their performance to
linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false
belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This
differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate.
Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false
belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later-
developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions
for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks.
Research highlights
• We provide comprehensive evidence for a dissociation
of explicit false belief understanding and earlier-
developing implicit anticipation of the actions of an
agent with a false belief in 3- and 4-year-old children.
• Wedemonstrate that performance on standard explicit
false belief tasks depends on syntax and executive
functions, while implicit false belief tasks do not.
• We show that explicit false belief tasks do not correlate
with implicit anticipatory looking false belief tasks.
Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to represent
the mental states of other agents – that is, their thoughts,
knowledge, and beliefs. The ability to understand others’
false beliefs is considered a crucial test of ToM (Bennett,
1978; Dennett, 1978), and the standard experimental
paradigm used to test this ability is the false belief task
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner,
1983). In this paradigm, children are typically presented
with a story in which a protagonist misses a piece of
information and thus, unlike the child, has a false belief
about the situation. The child is then asked to either
make an explicit statement about the belief of the
protagonist (e.g. what does the protagonist think?) or to
predict how the protagonist is going to act (e.g. where
will the protagonist look for an object?). Typically,
children do not pass these tests before the age of 4 years
(Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). It has therefore been
argued that between the ages of 3 and 4 years there is a
fundamental change in children’s understanding of other
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agents (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Flavell, Green &
Flavell, 1990; Perner, 1991), and that at this age children
start to build representations of others’ mental states,
which can thus differ from reality. Whether such explicit
false belief tasks are a valid measure of ToM abilities has
been called into question for a number of reasons
(Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Bloom & German,
2000). These authors have argued that responding
accurately in these tasks requires sufficient verbal and
executive control abilities, which might mask false belief
understanding in younger children.
In the past decade, it has been shown that already in
their second year of life, infants display looking behav-
iors that differentiate actions of agents, depending on
whether they have a true or false belief. Violation of
expectation paradigms (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) as
well as anticipatory looking tasks (Senju, Southgate,
Snape, Leonard & Csibra, 2011; Southgate, Senju &
Csibra, 2007) have served to argue that infants correctly
anticipate the actions of agents holding a false belief,
and, consequently, have an implicit understanding of
others’ false beliefs (Baillargeon et al., 2010). This calls
into question previous accounts concerning the develop-
mental trajectory of false belief understanding. However,
it has been debated whether these findings really reflect
infants’ access to others’ beliefs or can be explained
without referring to mental states, for example, by
reliance on behavioral cues (Perner & Ruffman, 2005)
or lower-level associations (Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 2014).
Further, even assuming that these implicit tasks reflect
an access to beliefs, the relation between early implicit
and later explicit false belief abilities remains unclear.
Whereas some argue for developmental continuity of
implicit and explicit false belief abilities (Baillargeon
et al., 2010), others have suggested distinct processes
subserving the two: Frith and Frith (2008), for instance,
suggest implicit and explicit processes, while Apperly and
Butterfill (2009) argue in favor of an early efficient, but
inflexible and a later more flexible, yet demanding
process. A longitudinal study (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori,
Perst & Kristen, 2012) supports developmental
continuity by showing that earlier performance on
implicit false belief tasks predicted later explicit false
belief understanding. Conversely, research on autism
(Senju, Southgate, White & Frith, 2009) and a neu-
roimaging study on implicit and explicit false belief tasks
(Schneider, Slaughter, Becker & Dux, 2014) support a
dissociation of the abilities measured by the different
task types. Research is therefore in need of studies
investigating the relation of implicit and explicit false
belief tasks in development to shed light on this debate.
Studying the differential relation of implicit and explicit
false belief tasks to other cognitive domains might help
to inform our understanding of the nature of the relation
between the abilities measured by implicit and explicit
tasks.
Relation to other cognitive domains
It is still unclear how these abilities relate to the
development of other cognitive domains. Language and
executive functions in particular have repeatedly been
shown to correlate with explicit false belief understand-
ing (Devine & Hughes, 2014; Milligan, Astington &
Dack, 2007). There are different theoretical accounts
concerning the nature of the relation between false belief
tasks and other co-developing abilities, the expression
and the emergence account (see e.g. Carlson, Claxton &
Moses, 2015; Devine & Hughes, 2014). The expression
account explains their correlation with the linguistic or
executive control demands needed to express false belief
understanding. These demands might result from super-
ficial task features. In the case of executive functions, for
example, standard explicit false belief tasks have been
argued to require inhibition of a more prepotent
response that corresponds to one’s own knowledge
about reality (Robinson & Mitchell, 1995; Baillargeon
et al., 2010). Alternatively, the correlation between false
belief understanding and other cognitive domains might
result from more essential common conceptual demands
of the underlying cognitive processes; for example,
inhibition might be required to handle different perspec-
tives in order to represent others’ beliefs. A correlation
due to superficial task features predicts that the strength
of the correlation with ToM tasks varies depending on
the specific demands of the task. According to this
account, standard explicit false belief tasks should thus
correlate more strongly with language and executive
functions than the non-verbal tasks, which have lower
executive demands. In contrast, according to the com-
mon conceptual demand account, the correlation should
be independent of online task demands. Finally, as
opposed to the expression account, the emergence
account assumes that executive functions or language
are necessary for the emergence of ToM abilities in
development; for example, inhibition might be crucial in
order to notice the existence of different perspectives and
thus develop an understanding of others’ beliefs (Carl-
son et al., 2015). Similar to the common conceptual
demand account, the emergence account predicts that a
correlation with language or executive functions does not
depend on online task demands.
A large number of studies have shown a robust
correlation between executive functions and explicit false
belief tasks (Devine & Hughes, 2014; Perner & Lang,
1999). In contrast, the relation with implicit false belief
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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tasks – which make low or no online executive task
demands – remains poorly understood. First studies have
found contradicting results in development: Low (2010)
reports no correlation of implicit false belief tasks with a
dimensional change card-sorting task in preschoolers.
Yet, in infants, Yott and Poulin-Dubois (2012) find a
correlation using a detour-reaching task. In adults, a
dual task study indicated that the abilities measured by
an anticipatory looking false belief task recruited exec-
utive functions at least to some extent (Schneider, Lam,
Bayliss & Dux 2012), but such findings might not apply
to a developmental context. In sum, whether executive
functions are necessary for the emergence of the abilities
measured by implicit false belief tasks remains an open
question.
In the language domain, a correlation between
standard explicit false belief understanding and linguis-
tic abilities in development is well established (Milligan
et al., 2007). In particular, it has been hypothesized
that the mastery of complement sentences is related to
false belief understanding (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). In
a complement sentence, the object is replaced by a
subordinate clause. This allows for a sentence structure
in which the whole sentence is true, although the main
clause is false. This, in turn, is precisely the linguistic
structure needed to express a false belief (e.g. Anaxi-
mander believed that the world is flat). In the task-
related expression account, the correlation of verbal
false belief tasks with complement sentences is
explained by the linguistic requirements of the tasks;
that is, their use of complement sentences and the need
to produce these sentences to answer correctly. This
account thus predicts that the correlation should vanish
for non-verbal false belief tasks. The common concep-
tual demand account in turn states that both process-
ing complement sentences and representing others’
belief require embedding content into a higher-order
context. In other words, both necessitate hierarchy
processing – also needed more generally for processing
syntax (Chomsky, 1956). This account therefore pre-
dicts that syntactic abilities in general, not only
complement sentences, should be related to false belief
understanding. Moreover, syntax should correlate with
false belief reasoning more strongly than non-syntactic
language abilities (e.g. as argued and shown by
Astington & Jenkins, 1999).
Empirically, several studies have indeed found a
relation of explicit false belief understanding with mem-
ory for complements (e.g. Cheung, Hsuan-Chih, Creed,
Ng, Ping Wang et al., 2014; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002;
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Low, 2010) as well as with
more general syntactic abilities (e.g. Astington & Jenkins,
1999; Milligan et al., 2007). The studies on complement
sentences, however, have not compared understanding
complements with other syntactic abilities. Furthermore,
the memory for complements task used so far does not
allow disentangling the role of syntactic and semantic
knowledge of complement sentences. In the present study,
we aimed at testing specifically how syntactic knowledge
about complementation related to false belief under-
standing. We therefore employed a repetition task of
complement sentences that specifically assessed the
mastery of the syntactic structure.
Furthermore, the relation of language to the novel
implicit false belief tasks has received little study to date.
Because these tasks are non-verbal, the task-related
expression account does not predict a correlation with
linguistic abilities. Indeed, a study investigating the
connection between memory for complements and an
anticipatory looking false belief task found no signifi-
cant correlation between the two (Low, 2010). In
contrast, a study by Meristo, Morgan, Geraci, Iozzi,
Hjelmquist et al. (2012) found that deaf infants of
hearing parents performed significantly worse on an
anticipatory looking false belief task than hearing
children. This indicates that early language input also
seems to be important for the abilities underlying early
non-verbal implicit false belief tests, pointing to an
emergence account of the relation with language. In
sum, the link between implicit false belief tests and
language remains equivocal, and further research is
needed to clarify their relation.
Goal of the current study
In sum, the overarching aim of the study was to obtain a
better understanding of the nature and relation of
implicit and explicit false belief abilities, by assessing in
a single study (1) the correlation between implicit and
explicit false belief tasks and (2) their respective relation
with co-developing abilities, that is, in particular lan-
guage and executive functions. We addressed these open
issues mentioned above in an integral way, using a
comprehensive battery of tests for each of the cognitive
domains of interest in order to cover the different aspects
of these domains. This was done with a cross-sectional
approach and while controlling for general cognitive
development.
Hypotheses
1 First, we expected to replicate the common findings of
significant developmental changes in explicit false
belief reasoning, syntactic abilities, and executive
functions between the ages of 3 and 4 years. We did
not expect age-related changes for the implicit false
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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belief task, which we expected to develop earlier
(Southgate et al., 2007).
2 Based on previous empirical studies, we hypothesized
to find a correlation of standard explicit false belief
tasks with linguistic, particularly syntactic, abilities
and different executive function tasks (Devine &
Hughes, 2014; Milligan et al., 2007).
3 The correlation pattern with implicit false belief tasks,
however, is less clear from previous literature. Differ-
ent accounts of the relation of the abilities underlying
implicit and explicit false belief tasks make different
predictions:
a
In the continuity account, both implicit and explicit
false belief tasks are considered to measure the same
ability of representing others’ mental states (e.g.
Baillargeon et al., 2010). This account thus predicts
a correlation between implicit and explicit false belief
tasks. In the case of a continuity of implicit and
explicit false belief tasks, a correlation of language
and executive functions with explicit false belief tasks,
but not with non-verbal implicit false belief tasks,
would speak in favor of superficial task features
driving the correlation.
b
The lack of a correlation between the two task types,
in contrast, would favor a dual process account. This
account assumes that distinct processes underlie
implicit and explicit false belief tasks (e.g. Apperly
& Butterfill, 2009). The processes underlying implicit
false belief understanding can, but do not need to, be
related to mental states.
The correlation pattern between different types of false
belief tasks as well as with their co-developing abilities
can thus shed light on the relation of the processes
underlying the implicit and explicit false belief tasks and
might explain the gap in their developmental trajectories.
Methods
Participants
For the study, 60 normally developed monolingual
German 3- and 4-year-old children were recruited from
local kindergartens and the institute’s database. From
these, three children had to be excluded from the
analyses: Two were excluded because they performed
well below average (T-value < 35) in a standardized test
of general language abilities (Sprachentwicklungstest f€ur
drei- bis f€unfj€ahrige Kinder, SETK 3–5; Grimm, 2001),
which indicates a speech development disorder. Another
child was excluded because of a neurological diagnosis.
This left us with 26 3-year-old children (mean age = 39.6
months, range = 36 to 43 months, 13 female) and 31
4-year-old children (mean age = 51.6 months,
range = 48 to 54 months, 16 female) for the analysis.
Unless stated otherwise, the reported results include this
sample. Parental informed consent was obtained for all
children before testing. The study was approved by the
local ethics committee.
Testing procedure and tasks
The children participated in a battery of implicit and
explicit false belief tasks, tests of language abilities,
general cognitive abilities, and executive functions on 3
days within an average period of 14.1 days (SD: 6.4
days). The order of the tests was randomized across
subjects. However, the implicit false belief task was
always performed before the explicit tasks.
Implicit false belief task
An anticipatory looking task served as an implicit test of
false belief understanding. In this task, children watched
short film clips on the integrated monitor of a Tobii T120
eye tracker (Stockholm, Sweden) while their gaze direc-
tion was recorded. The stimuli were presented on a
17-inch monitor using Tobii Studio software. Children
were seated in a car seat (Chicco, Neptune) at a distance
of approximately 60 cm from the screen. Parents stood
behind the children and were instructed not to interact
with them.
Every child was presented with a total of 10 familiar-
ization (FAM) trials, 12 false belief (FB) trials (two
different conditions of six trials each), and six true belief
(TB) trials (two different conditions of three trials each).
The film clips were compiled with Maxon Cinema 4D
by the agency Form & Drang (Leipzig). They depicted a
scene with a y-shaped tunnel and two boxes; one at each
exit of the upper tunnel arms (see Figure 1). In each
trial, a mouse entered the scene, followed by another
animal (one of six different larger animals), for example
a cat. The animal watched the mouse entering the tunnel,
exiting it again on one of the upper two tunnel arms and
hiding in the box at that exit. Continuation of the course
of action depended on the condition.
In the FAM trials, the animal followed the mouse
through the tunnel. After 2.5 seconds, it exited on the
side where the box with the mouse was and opened it. A
light illuminated the two exit areas above the tunnel
arms, including the two boxes (see Figure 2), and the
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animal’s cry (e.g. a meow) was played, 500 milliseconds
after the animal had entered the tunnel. This was
intended to help the children familiarize with the animal
exiting the tunnel after the effect. In addition, the effect
helped to capture the attention of the children and direct
it to the areas of interest in the critical phase in which
gaze direction was analyzed.
The course of action in the false belief trials followed
the same structure as the anticipatory looking false belief
task developed by Southgate et al. (2007): In condition
FB1, the animal watched the mouse crossing from one
box to the other. The animal then left the scene. While
the animal was away, the mouse left the box and the
scene. The animal came back, entered the tunnel and, as
in the FAM trials, the attention light and sound
occurred. However, the false belief trials then ended
after 2.9 seconds without the animal exiting the tunnel.
This was supposed to prevent children from learning
across the false belief trials. Condition FB2 was identical,
except for the fact that the animal left the scene before
the mouse crossed over to the other box. Both conditions
left the animal with a false belief about the location of
the mouse: in FB1 the last box in which the mouse had
been before leaving the scene, and in FB2 the first box to
Figure 1 Anticipatory Looking False Belief Task. Selected scenes from the two false belief conditions, FB1 and FB2, as well as the
two true belief conditions, TB1 and TB2, as described in the text. Arrows indicate the movement of the animal, check marks or
crosses underline whether the cat can see what happens or not. The cat watches how the mouse comes out of the y-shaped tunnel
and disappears into one of the boxes. Depending on the condition, the cat then leaves the scene and, while she is gone, the mouse
changes her location and, in the false belief conditions, leaves the scene. When the cat returns, it has either a true or a false belief
about the location of the mouse. The cat then enters the tunnel and the children’s eye-gaze is tracked.
Figure 2 Region of Interest (ROI) in the Anticipatory Looking
False Belief Task. The picture shows the scene with the
attention lights displayed in the anticipation phase as
described in the text. The dotted lines depict the ROIs in which
the children’s eye-gaze was analyzed.
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which the mouse had gone. Using these pieces of
information as clues, instead of the animal’s belief,
therefore led to chance-level performance. In both false
belief conditions the mouse was in neither of the two
boxes in the critical phase in which the gaze direction
was analyzed. This prevented misinterpreting gaze
directed to the mouse’s location instead of to the place
where the larger animal was expected to exit. Further-
more, because of the absence of the mouse, the children
did not have to overcome a reality bias (Robinson &
Mitchell, 1995).
The two true belief (TB) conditions were analogous to
the false belief conditions. However, in TB1, instead of
leaving the scene while the animal was gone, as it had
done in FB1, the mouse walked in the direction of the
exit but then returned to the box. Condition TB2 was
analogous to FB2, but instead of leaving the scene at the
end, the mouse walked back to the first box. In both TB
conditions, when the animal came back, the mouse was
thus in the box where the animal had seen it last. The
animal, therefore, had a correct belief about the location
of the mouse when she entered the tunnel. As in the
FAM trials, 2 seconds after the light and sound attention
effect, the animal exited the tunnel on the side where the
box with the mouse was.
The order of the trials was randomized. This was done
to prevent the children from being able to predict
whether the larger animal would actually exit the tunnel,
or whether the trial ended when the animal was still in
the tunnel, as was the case for the false belief trials.
However, before the first false belief trial with each of the
animals, the children saw two FAM or TB trials with the
same animal – one in which it exited on the right and one
on the left side. The intention of these trials was to
familiarize the children that the animal would go to
where the mouse was. The correct side was balanced for
each animal, within every condition, as well as across all
trials.
Explicit false belief tasks
The children participated in two standard explicit false
belief tasks: a false location (Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
and a false content task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner,
1986).
False Location task. In the False Location task, a hand
puppet mouse was introduced to the child. The child and
the mouse were shown a little bag with a gummy bear
and a small, empty box. The mouse then went to sleep
behind a room divider. While the mouse was away, the
experimenter moved the gummy bear from the bag to the
small box saying ‘Ssh! The mouse can’t see this, but
don’t tell!’ The mouse was then called back and the child
was told that it liked gummy bears and was asked three
probe questions: 1. Where will it look? 2. Does it know
where the gummy bear is? 3. Where does it think the
gummy bear is? Finally, the children were asked a control
question about the actual location of the gummy bear.
False Content task. In the False Content task, the mouse
went to sleep directly after having been introduced to the
children. The children were then shown a closed Kinder
chocolate bars box and were asked what they thought
was in the box. All the children expected the box to
contain chocolate. The experimenter then showed them
that the box contained pencils instead of chocolate bars,
while saying ‘I’ll show you something the mouse can’t
see, but ssh!’ The mouse was then called back, and the
children were asked three probe questions: 1. Does the
mouse know what is in the box? 2. What does it think is in
the box? 3. And what did you think was in the box at first?
Finally, the children were again asked a control question
about the actual content of the box.
In addition to the standard explicit false belief tasks,
the children performed two additional non-standard
elicited-response false belief tasks with low verbal and
executive demands (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra,
2010) reported in the Supporting Information (SI ‘A1.
Indirectly Elicited Response Sefo-Task’).
Language
To test for language abilities, children performed a
standardized general language test as well as a specific
syntax of complement sentences test.
Test of general language abilities. The standardized test
of general language abilities SETK 3–5 (Grimm, 2001)
included a specific syntax subtest containing complex
syntax, such as subject and object relatives and prepo-
sitional phrases, but no complement sentences. In
addition, it included tests for encoding semantic rela-
tions, phonological working memory for words and non-
words, as well as morphological rule building.
Repeating complement sentences. Children have been
shown to repeat correct sentences more accurately than
incorrect sentences and, moreover, to correct incorrect
sentences (Kidd, Lieven & Tomasello, 2006; Weis-
senborn, H€ohle, Kiefer & Cavar, 1998). This is taken to
reflect their knowledge about the correct syntactic
structure of these sentences (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011;
Kidd et al., 2006; Crain & Thornton, 2000). To test
children’s syntactic knowledge of complement sentences,
we therefore employed a repetition task of complement
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sentences with correct and incorrect word order, adapted
from Weissenborn et al. (1998). Given that we were
specifically interested in the children’s syntactic and not
in semantic aspects of their mastery of complement
sentences, we did not additionally test the children’s
comprehension of the sentences. In the repetition task
employed, children were asked to repeat complement
clauses with correct or incorrect word order either with
or without the German complementizer dass (see
Table 1). In German, the use of a complementizer is
optional, but verb and object take different word order
depending on the presence or absence of the comple-
mentizer. Both word orders could, therefore, be correct –
depending on the sentence structure. Hence, to produce
complement sentences using the correct word order,
children need to have knowledge of the correct sentence
structure of complementation. The accuracy in repeating
correct versus incorrect sentences and the tendency to
correct incorrect sentences were thus taken as an
indicator for mastering the correct syntax of complement
sentences. Taking into account that children, who in
general speak less accurately, would also repeat incorrect
sentences less accurately, we considered the quotient over
non-literal repetitions of all sentences. A female speaker
recorded the sentences in a child-directed manner. Only
correct sentences were recorded and the sentences were
then cross-spliced to produce the presented stimuli. The
children were asked to repeat the sentences that they
were told by a duck hand puppet, in order to help a deaf
mouse hand puppet. After every sentence, the mouse
asked them ‘What did Anna say?’ The 3-year-old
children were asked to repeat 16 sentences (i.e. four
different sentences, for each of the four conditions,
respectively). The 4-year-olds were asked to repeat 24
sentences (i.e. six sentences per condition). The sentences
were presented in pseudo-randomized order, taking care
that the order of the conditions was balanced across the
sentences. The children’s answers were coded into the
categories ‘complete’ or ‘incomplete’, ‘literal’ or ‘non-
literal’ repetitions. For the incorrect stimuli, a category
‘corrections’ was formed for non-literal but syntactically
correct repetitions. For an answer to be considered
‘incomplete literal’, it had to contain at least the object
and the verb of the complement clause, as well as for the
conditions with complementizer, the dass. The answers
were coded by two independent raters who agreed on the
categories in 98.1% of the cases.
Executive functions
To test the children’s executive functions, we adapted
three tasks from the literature: a Reverse Categorization
task (Carlson, 2005), a Go-NoGo task (Rakoczy, 2010),
and the standard Delay of Gratification task (Mischel &
Ebbesen, 1970). These tasks were chosen with the
intention of testing cognitive flexibility (the former task)
and inhibition (the latter two tasks). These were execu-
tive functions we considered to be of possible importance
for false belief understanding (Devine & Hughes, 2014)
and for our tasks.
Reverse Categorization task. In the Reverse Categoriza-
tion task, the children were asked to sort blue cubes into
a big blue box and red cubes into a small red box. Half
of the cubes from each color were small and the others
were big. After they had finished sorting the 20 cubes
(10 cubes of each color), the rule changed, and they were
asked to sort the blue cubes into the red box and the red
cubes into the blue box. Then, the rule changed again
and they had to sort the small cubes into the small box
and the big cubes into the big box. In the final round,
this rule was reversed again. After every rule change, the
new rule was explained and demonstrated to the
children with two cubes, and they were given feedback
on the first two trials. Furthermore, after half of the
trials, they were reminded of the rule. The children were
given the cubes in a pseudo-randomized order. The
mean performance in every round following a rule
change (i.e. the last three rounds) was encoded as
dependent variable.
Table 1 Stimuli the children were asked to repeat in the repeating complement sentences task: Complement clauses with correct or
incorrect word order of a transitive verb and its object, with or without the German complementizer dass. Literal translation in
squared brackets. In German, verb and object take a different order depending on the presence or absence of a complementizer.
Because we used sentences with and without complementizer, both word orders could therefore be correct, depending on the
sentence structure
Correct Incorrect
With complementizer dass Anna sagt, dass der Opa Blumen|object kriegt|verb.[Anna says,
that the grandpa flowers gets.]literal
*Anna sagt, dass der Opa kriegt|verb Blumen|object.
[Anna says, that the grandpa gets flowers.]literal
Without complementizer Anna sagt, der Opa kriegt|verb Blumen|object.[Anna says,
the grandpa gets flowers.]literal
*Anna sagt, der Opa Blumen|object kriegt|verb.
[Anna says, the grandpa flowers gets.]literal
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Go-NoGo task. In the Go-NoGo task, children sat in
front of a puppet theater and were told to do what a nice
duck asked them to (e.g. ‘Clap your hands!’), but not to
do anything when the nasty crocodile asked them to
make the movements. Before starting, we checked that
children understood all the prompts and were able to
perform the movements. They then received at least three
practice trials, with the duck and with the crocodile,
respectively, until they performed correctly in two
consecutive trials and were corrected otherwise. If they
failed to perform correctly in the crocodile condition
after four trials, the experimenter held the children’s
hands for the fifth and sixth trial and gave them positive
feedback. This was the case for three children. There
were a total of 24 trials (12 duck, 12 crocodile trials) with
six different hand movements (distinct from the three
movements in the practice trials), presented in pseudo-
randomized order.
Delay of Gratification task. In the Delay of Gratification
task, children were first allowed to choose what they
liked most: chocolate bars or gummy bears. Children
were then taught that ringing a bell that was placed on a
table in front of them would immediately bring the
experimenter back after he had left the room by
practicing this procedure three times. They were then
asked whether they preferred a plate with a small piece of
chocolate (one gummy bear) or with a whole chocolate
bar (seven gummy bears). All the children, except for
two, chose the bigger portion, and the other two did so
after a second check. The plate with the small portion of
their preferred sweets was then placed in front of them
and the plate with the bigger portion was placed in a
locked glass box next to it. The experimenter told the
children she had to leave for a while. She explained that
the children could have the small portion of sweets
immediately, but if they waited until the experimenter
came back without being called, they would get the big
portion. If they did not want to wait any longer, they
could ring the bell to summon the experimenter back,
but then they would only receive the small portion. Task
comprehension was checked with two control questions
before the children were left alone for a maximum of 5
minutes. The waiting time was taken as a measure of
inhibitory control.
General cognitive functions
As a test of general cognitive abilities, three subtests from
the subscale intellectual abilities of the Kaufmann
Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC, German
version; Melchers & Preuß, 2003) were performed: In
the subtest Magic Window, children were asked to
identify pictures they could only see partially through a
small slit on a turning disk. In the second subtest,
children were asked to repeat sequences of hand move-
ments, and the last subtest was a forward digit span test.
The first two subtests tested visual working memory and
selective attention as well as spatial representation
abilities; assets that we considered to be of importance
for our false belief tasks. The digit span accounted for
acoustic working memory.
Results
The results section of this paper consists of two parts: an
overview of the individual tasks, followed by the inter-
correlations between the tasks. Preceding analyses
revealed no effects of the order in which the tasks were
performed and no gender effects if not stated otherwise.
Results of the individual tasks
In the following, unless stated otherwise, we report the
mean percent of correct trials, two-tailed p-values. One-
sample t-tests were performed to test performance
against chance, and independent samples t-tests to test
for age group effects.
Implicit false belief task
In the anticipatory looking task, gaze data were analyzed
for a time of interest from the moment the larger animal
had disappeared into the tunnel until its reappearance in
the familiarization (FAM) and true belief (TB) trials (2.5
sec), or until the end of the trial in the false belief trials
(2.9 sec). Two regions of interest (ROI), each covering
one of the tunnel exits and the corresponding box, were
defined (as depicted by the dotted lines in Figure 2).
During the time of interest, the ROI that the child looked
at first (‘first look’) as well as the ROI with the longer
gaze duration (‘longer look’) was recorded. Trials in
which children looked at neither of the two ROIs were
excluded from the analysis, and the average percentage of
correct trials from all valid trials is reported here. Since
both measures yielded similar results (percent correct
trials: first look: M = 62.4%, SD = 8.7%; longest look:
M = 61.9%, SD = 8.9%, paired samples t-test:
t(55) = 0.45, p = .65), the measures were collapsed for
further analyses by taking the mean of the first and
longest look in every child. The average performance in
this mean value is reported in the following and is shown
in Figure 3a. This measure will be used in all subsequent
analyses, as well as in the correlational analyses. The
reported results and patterns of correlation also hold for
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the average correct first look and for the normalized
difference of looking durations in the correct and the
incorrect ROI (see SI ‘B2. Correlation Pattern of First
Look andDifference inLookingDuration’). For themean
of the correct first and longest looks, both age groups
performed significantly above chance in the FAM condi-
tion (3-yos:M = 69%, SD = 14%, t(25) = 7.16, p < .001;
4-yos: M = 69%, SD = 17%, t(30) = 6.27, p < .001) and
in the TB condition (3-yos: M = 71%, SD = 18%,
t(25) = 6.03, p < .001; 4-yos: M = 64%, SD = 20%,
t(30) = 3.97, p < .001). This result indicated that the
children understood the events displayed in the film clips
and showed correct anticipation when no false belief was
involved. There was no significant difference between the
age groups or between the two conditions. For the false
belief trials, as expected, both age groups were also
significantly above chance (3-yos:M = 54%, SD = 11%, t
(25) = 1.81, p = .04 (one-tailed); 4-yos: M = 54%,
SD = 11%, t(30) = 2.12, p = .04). Again, there was no
significant age difference. However, as expected, the
children performed significantly better in the FAM and
TB conditions than in the false belief condition (paired
samples t-test: 3-yos: t(25) = 4.86, p < .001; 4-yos: t
(30) = 3.66, p = .001).
Standard explicit false belief tasks
In line with our hypotheses, the 3-year-olds were
significantly below chance in both standard explicit false
belief tasks (False Location: M = 10%, SD = 21%,
t(25) = !9.8, p < .001; False Content: M = 18%,
SD = 25%, t(25) = !6.4, p < .001), whereas the 4-year-
olds were significantly above chance in the False Loca-
tion task (M = 70%, SD = 37%, t(30) = 3.0, p = .005)
and at chance level in the False Content task (M = 52%,
SD = 34%, t(30) = 0.26, p = .80). For both tasks, there
was a significant difference between the age groups
(False Location: t(55) = !7.7, p < .001; False Content: t
(55) = !4.3, p < .001; see Figure 3b).
There was a strong correlation between the two
standard explicit false belief tasks (r(57) = .760,
p < .001).
Language
Repeating complement sentences. The children’s per-
formance for the repeating complement sentences task is
shown in Figure 4. Since we considered corrections of
incorrect sentences to be an even more sensitive measure
for the mastery of the correct syntax of complementation
than non-literal repetitions, we report the results for the
quotient of corrections over total non-literal repetitions
in the further analysis. However, the reported results also
hold for an analyses with the other quotient (see
Figure 4). Both age groups performed significantly
above chance (one-sample t-test against test value 0.5:
3-yos: M = 1.03, SD = 0.49, t(25) = 5.55, p < .001;
4-yos: M = 1.49, SD = 0.39, t(30) = 14.2, p < .001) and
there was a significant increase of performance with age
(t(55) = 3.9, p < .001).
Figure 3 Results of the Implicit and Explicit False Belief Tasks. While both age groups were above chance in the implicit
anticipatory looking false belief task, 3-year-olds were significantly below chance on the explicit false belief tasks. Figure (a) shows
the mean rate of correct anticipations in the anticipatory looking false belief task (mean of correct first and correct longest look). Both
age groups were significantly above chance in the false belief condition (one-tailed for the 3-year-olds) and performed even better in
the familiarization (FAM) and TB conditions, which served as a control. Figure (b) shows the mean rate of correct answers in the two
standard explicit false belief tasks (as described in the text).
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Test of general language abilities. In the standardized
language test SETK 3-5, both age groups had compa-
rable mean T-values (3-yos: M = 56.7, SD = 6.5; 4-yos:
M = 58.3, SD = 6.9; age effect: t(55) = 0.91, p = .37).
Executive functions
Reverse Categorization task. In the Reverse Categoriza-
tion task, the mean percent of correct trials on the three
rounds after each of the rule changes was taken as a
measure of executive function (3-yos: M = 83%,
SD = 15%; 4-yos: M = 93.2%, SD = 7.5%; age effect:
t(54) = 3.1, p = .004). One child had to be excluded from
the test because he refused to participate in the last two
rounds. All the participating children performed above
90% on the first round before any rule change had taken
place.
Go-NoGo task. For the Go-NoGo task, a d-prime was
calculated, in which the correct NoGo-trials were
interpreted as hits and the incorrect Go-trials as false
alarms (3-yos: d’ = 0.74, SD = 0.31; 4-yos: d’ = 0.94,
SD = 0.10; age effect: t(54) = 3.1, p = .005). One child
had to be excluded because he refused to participate.
Delay of Gratification task. In the Delay of Gratification
task, the time until the end of the trial was taken as
measure of inhibitory control. The test was stopped
either when the children rang the bell (N = 15), when
they ate the small portion of sweets (N = 1), called the
experimenter (N = 4), or when they left the room on
their own (N = 4). The mean waiting time was M = 190
sec (SD = 120 sec) for the 3-year-olds (N = 25) and
M = 244 sec (SD = 96 sec) for the 4-year-olds (age
effect: t(54) = 1.9, p = .03 (one-tailed)). One child had to
be excluded because she had to go to the bathroom
during the trial. There was a main effect of gender on
this task (boys: M = 190 sec, SD = 120 sec, girls:
M = 253 sec, SD = 91 sec, independent samples t-test:
t(54) = 2.4, p = .02).
Total executive function score. The executive function
tasks correlated with each other (Reverse Categorization
and Go-NoGo: r(55) = .396, p = .003; Reverse Catego-
rization and Delay of Gratification: r(55) = .406,
p = .002), except for the Go-NoGo and the Delay of
Gratification task, which only showed a trend
(r(55) = .206, p = .065 (one-tailed)). For the further
analyses, we therefore aggregated the z-scores of the
three tasks to a total executive function z-score (3-yos:
M = !0.6, SD = 1.1; 4-yos: M = 0.46, SD = 0.55; age
effect: t(55) = 4.1, p < .001). All the children who
participated in at least two out of the three tests were
included in the aggregated score, which left us with the
full sample again.
General cognitive functions
In the selected subtests of the K-ABC, our sample was
comparable to the norm sample (scale values: 3-yos:
M = 10.1, SD = 1.4; 4-yos: M = 10.4, SD = 1.4) with
no significant difference between the age groups
(t(55) = !0.69, p = .49).
Correlations between the tasks
The intercorrelations between the false belief tasks are
shown in Table 2. The two standard explicit false belief
tasks were strongly correlated with each other; however,
they did not correlate with the implicit anticipatory
looking false belief task.
The correlations of explicit and implicit false belief
tasks with the other cognitive domains are shown in
Figure 4 Results of the Repeating Complement Sentences
Task. Children were asked to repeat complement sentences
with correct and incorrect word order. Both age groups
repeated correct sentences significantly more accurately than
incorrect sentences, indicating their knowledge about the
syntax of complement sentences. This can be seen from the
performance on the first quotient: rate of non-literal repetitions
of incorrect sentences over the rate of total non-literal
repetitions. Moreover, they even corrected the incorrect
sentences, as shown by the second quotient: rate of corrections
of incorrect sentences over rate of total non-literal repetitions.
There was a significant age difference on both quotients.
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Table 3. We found that the standard explicit false belief
tasks correlated with syntactic abilities and executive
functions, whereas the implicit task did not. To compare
these correlations, we aggregated the two highly inter-
correlated standard explicit false belief tasks by forming
the mean of their respective z-scores. The correlation of
the complement sentences test with the standard explicit
false belief score obtained differed significantly from the
correlation with the implicit false belief task (Williams’
t-test: t(54) = !3.39, p = .001) (Williams, 1959). The
same pattern was present for executive functions: The
correlation with the standard explicit false belief score
differed significantly from the correlation with the
implicit task (Williams’ t-test: t(54) = !2.41, p = .019).
The correlations were similar for each of the three
executive function tasks, as shown in Table 4.
Table 3 also shows that the correlation of explicit false
belief with repeating complements was not found to be
significantly stronger than with other syntactic abilities
tested in the SETK (Williams’ t-test: t(54) = 0.57,
p = .57). We therefore aggregated the two tasks in order
to form a total syntax score (mean of the z-scores) and
found that the standard explicit false belief score
correlated with the total syntax score (r(57) = .477,
p < .001), but not with the non-syntactic abilities tested
in the SETK (r(57) = .114, p = .40). Again, these
correlations differed significantly (Williams’ t-test:
t(54) = 2.73, p = .009).
Discussion
The present study aimed to clarify the nature and
relation of the processes underlying the implicit and
explicit false belief tasks as well as their relation to other
cognitive domains in development. For explicit false
belief understanding, we found a critical developmental
change between our two age groups, in which 3-year-olds
performed significantly below chance and 4-year-olds
significantly above chance – in line with previous
literature (Wellman et al., 2001). This development was
paralleled by significant age differences on syntactic
abilities and executive functions between the ages of 3
and 4 years. In contrast, for the implicit anticipatory
looking false belief task, both age groups performed
above chance and there was no significant age difference.
Moreover, we found no correlation between the explicit
and the implicit anticipatory looking false belief tasks.
Finally, studying the relation of the different false belief
tasks with other cognitive domains revealed the follow-
ing pattern: While standard explicit false belief tasks
correlated with syntactic abilities and executive func-
tions, the implicit anticipatory looking false belief task
did not.
Age effects
While we observed a critical age development for explicit
false belief understanding between the ages of 3 and 4
years, performance on the implicit false belief task was
equally above chance in both age groups. This is in line
with previous studies, which showed that correct antic-
ipation of actions of an agent with a false belief has
already developed by the age of 2 years (Senju et al.,
Table 2 Correlations between explicit false belief (FB) tasks
(1. & 2.) and the implicit anticipatory looking false belief task
(3.)
FB tasks 1. 2.
1. False Location –
2. False Content .760*** –
3. Implicit FB !.108 .044
N = 57. *p < .05; ***p < .001.
Table 3 Correlations of explicit false belief tasks (1. & 2.) and
implicit false belief (FB) task (3.) with the aggregated executive
function score (EF), the quotient of correcting complement
clauses (COMPs), the syntax part of the standardized test of
general language abilities (SETK-Syn), the part of the SETK
testing non-syntactic abilities (SETK-noS), and the test of
general cognitive abilities (K-ABC)
FB tasks EF COMPs SETK-Syn SETK-noS K-ABC
1. False Location .496*** .434** .233(*) .040 .146
2. False Content .320* .334* .365** .174 !.017
3. Implicit FB .057 !.187 .239 .046 !.142
N = 57. (*) < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 4 Correlations between different executive function
tasks and explicit and implicit false belief (FB) tasks: While
standard explicit false belief tasks showed a robust correlation
with all three different executive function tasks, neither of the
two implicit false belief tasks showed a correlation with any of
the executive function tasks
Tasks Rev. Cat. Go-NoGo Delay of Grat.
Explicit FB .333* .338* .305*
Implicit FB .014 .117 !.031
N = 57. *p < .05.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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2011; Southgate et al., 2007). Moreover, similar antici-
patory looking false belief tasks with adults have shown
that even adults do not perform at ceiling on these tasks
(Schneider et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). In Senju et al.
(2009), for example, neurotypical adults showed similar
performance levels (76% correct first looks) to infants for
the same task (Southgate et al., 2007). Together with
these findings, our results suggest that the abilities
measured by such implicit false belief tasks might
already be in place in infancy and might not improve
considerably thereafter. Indeed, even in adulthood per-
formance that is far from ceiling on these tasks might be
due to the spontaneous and automatic nature of the
responses.
Correlations of implicit and explicit false belief tasks
As expected, the standard explicit false belief tasks
correlated strongly with each other. However, the
explicit tasks did not correlate with the implicit antic-
ipatory looking false belief task. Our data thus suggest
that distinct cognitive processes underlie explicit false
belief reasoning and earlier-developing spontaneous
anticipation of the actions of an agent with a false
belief. The results are therefore compatible with a dual
process view of implicit and explicit ToM. This account
suggests an automatic, cognitively efficient possibly
unconscious belief-tracking system already present in
infancy, and an explicit more flexible but cognitively
more demanding belief processing system, which devel-
ops later (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Frith & Frith,
2008; Schneider et al., 2014). Alternatively, the abilities
underlying implicit spontaneous looking behavior might
also be lower-level processes unrelated to mental-state
processing, as argued for example by Heyes (2014) and
Ruffman (2014).
Relation with other cognitive domains
The relation of the different false belief tasks with other
cognitive domains also informs the relation between
implicit and explicit false belief abilities. While standard
explicit false belief tasks correlated with syntactic
abilities and executive functions, the implicit false belief
tasks did not, with a significant difference between the
correlations. The lack of a correlation between implicit
and explicit false belief tasks pointed to distinct
processes underlying these tasks. This correlation pat-
tern therefore seems to be neutral with respect to
whether syntactic knowledge and executive functions
are required for the expression or for the emergence of
explicit false belief understanding. However, the results
do not give any support for the need of linguistic
abilities and executive functions for passing implicit
false belief tasks.
False belief understanding and language
A closer look at the relation of explicit false belief
understanding with language revealed that the standard
false belief tasks correlated with syntactic abilities, but
not with the non-syntactic measures we acquired – that
is, semantics and phonological working memory. These
correlations differed significantly from one another.
However, the mastery of complement sentences corre-
lated with explicit false belief understanding no more
markedly than understanding other complex hierarchical
syntactic structures. These results are compatible with
the view that the correlation of explicit false belief
reasoning and syntactic abilities is driven by common
conceptual demands on processing complex embedded
structures (Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995). In this view, the
meta-representation of others’ beliefs as well as master-
ing syntactic hierarchy both require hierarchy process-
ing, driving a correlation between the two. The results
are also compatible with an account in which syntactic
abilities (but not other language abilities) are important
for the emergence of false belief understanding (Asting-
ton & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2014), a
view also supported by studies on language-delayed deaf
children who show delayed false belief understanding on
low-verbal tasks (Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers &
Hoffmeister, 2007). Non- or low-verbal false belief tasks
that show a correlation with the standard explicit false
belief tasks might help to clarify whether the correlation
of syntax and ToM is also driven by superficial task
demands (see SI A1 and e.g. Newton & de Villiers,
2007).
False belief understanding and executive functions
Similar to the correlation patterns with syntax, executive
functions also correlated with the standard explicit false
belief tasks, but not with the implicit anticipatory
looking task. This pattern of correlation held for all
three acquired tasks of executive functions, measuring
inhibition, re-description of task stimuli, and the use of
conflicting and conditional rules respectively (Table 4).
This suggests that the correlation between executive
functions and explicit false belief tasks is not merely
driven by specific common processes, such as reasoning
about embedded conditional rules (Frye et al., 1995), or
by specific task requirements, such as response inhibi-
tion. Instead, it suggests that executive functions are
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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needed more generally for the emergence or expression
of false belief understanding.
The absence of a correlation of any of the executive
function tasks with the implicit anticipatory looking
false belief task indicates that executive functions might
not be required for spontaneous anticipation of the
actions of an agent with a false belief. This is in line
with a study by Low (2010) employing a dimensional
change card-sorting task. The results, however, contrast
with a study by Yott and Poulin-Dubois (2012), which
found that infants’ performance on an implicit viola-
tion of expectation false belief task correlated with a
detour reaching task taken as a measure of inhibition.
Furthermore, they contrast with the reported interfer-
ence of a 2-back task and an anticipatory looking false
belief task in a dual task study with adults (Schneider
et al., 2012). Interestingly, in these studies the object
that the agent falsely believed to be in a different
location remained present in the scene in the test phase
in which the looking response was measured. This
might have introduced the need of inhibitory control to
suppress a looking response to the actual object
location (as argued for explicit tasks in Robinson &
Mitchell, 1995). In our task, in contrast, the object was
entirely removed from the scene before the response
phase started, thus possibly reducing executive function
demands. This suggestion needs to be tested in future
studies which examine the correlation of different
executive function tasks (including inhibition and other
executive function measures) with implicit looking-
behavior false belief tasks that vary the presence or
absence of the object in the scene.
Performance in the implicit false belief tasks
Although significantly above chance in both age groups,
the performance in the anticipatory looking false belief
task with on average 54% correct anticipatory looks was
somewhat lower than in previous studies of anticipatory
looking, where infants under the age of 2 years showed
between 77% and 85% of correct looks (Senju et al.,
2011; Southgate et al., 2007). Importantly, however, the
percentage of correct anticipatory looking in the famil-
iarization and true belief control trials in our study was
also lower than in previous studies, although very clearly
significantly above chance robustly across all trials (see
SI ‘B1. Time Course of the Performance across Trials’).
This indicates that our task reliably measured anticipa-
tory looking and that the lower absolute performance in
anticipatory looking in all conditions was probably
because of the visual setup of our task. In our task, the
scene was more center-oriented than in the task by
Southgate et al. (2007), and gaze direction could
frequently be observed along the arms of the tunnel
and not only in the ROIs that covered the tunnel exits
and boxes. Moreover, the top-view perspective of the
scene was more complex than in previous tasks. This
might have led to greater variance and a lower percent-
age of correct anticipation. Another possible reason for
the differences in performance is that in previous
anticipatory looking false belief studies a relatively high
number of participants had to be excluded due to
fussiness or similar reasons (around 45% in Southgate
et al., 2007, and 25% in Senju et al., 2011). This might
have led to a selection bias for the more attentive and
thus mature children, possibly with better ToM abilities.
Such a potential bias was reduced in the present study:
because of the larger number of trials, only single trials
had to be excluded, but all children were included in the
analysis.
Conclusions
Using a comprehensive task battery of implicit and
explicit false belief tasks, the present study finds critical
developmental changes on explicit false belief tasks
between the ages of 3 and 4 years, but not on the implicit
anticipatory looking task. This developmental break-
through is paralleled and seems to be fostered by
important improvements in executive functions and
syntactic, but not other linguistic abilities. In contrast
to the standard explicit false belief tasks, the implicit
false belief task does not depend on executive functions
or language. Moreover, later-developing explicit false
belief understanding appears to be independent of earlier
implicit action anticipation of an agent with a false
belief. These results support the view that distinct
cognitive processes underlie implicit and explicit false
belief tasks.
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Humans have the ability to represent what other peoplethink and believe. This implies that we are able tounderstand that beliefs may differ from reality and,
therefore, that people can have false beliefs about the world.
This ability allows us to predict how a person with a false
belief about the world will act so that we can adjust our own
actions accordingly. As such, Theory of Mind (ToM) constitutes a
key role for complex interaction between human individuals,
including behaviours such as cooperation, social communication
and morality1,2. Understanding that others can have false beliefs
is considered to be a crucial test for ToM3. In childhood, there is a
developmental breakthrough between the ages of 3 and 4 years,
when children start passing standard false belief tests4,5. In these
tests, subjects are asked to predict how an agent with a false belief
about an object, typically concerning its location, content or
nature, will act4–6. It has been argued that the breakthrough seen
in these tests reflects a fundamental change in children’s
understanding of other agents, and that at this age children
start to build representations of others’ mental states, which can
thus differ from reality6. The behavioural emergence of a
representational ToM has been studied and debated extensively.
The neural mechanisms that enable this crucial step in the
development of human social cognition, however, remain largely
unknown. In the present study, we therefore investigated
developmental changes in brain structure between the ages of 3
and 4 years that were related to the emergence of false belief
understanding.
In adults, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies have shown that ToM tasks recruit a bilateral network
including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, tempor-
oparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), temporal pole, precuneus (PC)
and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)7,8. Recent meta-analytic
evidence suggests activation in differential networks for different
types of ToM tasks, where false belief understanding specifically
recruits a fronto-temporoparietal network including the TPJ,
STS/MTG, PC and MPFC7. One drawback of such studies on
false belief understanding is that they have often used tasks that
have been developed for preschool-aged children in adults. It is
unknown if the maturation of these brain regions implicated in
false belief tasks in adults are associated with the emergence of
ToM in childhood. Given the distributed network of regions
involved in belief processing in adults, we hypothesized that the
structural maturation of this network and its connectivity should
be important for the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief understanding between the ages of 3 and 4 years.
To date, few developmental imaging studies have been
conducted and all of these were with older children aged
6–12 years, when false belief understanding is already
well-established9–12. The only studies that approximated the age
at which false belief understanding emerges were restricted to
electroencephalography (EEG)13,14. One of these studies13 found
individual differences in resting-state alpha oscillation related
to ToM performance in the right TPJ and the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, suggesting that the maturation of these regions
is relevant for the emergence of false belief understanding.
Although EEG signal recorded at the scalp only allows an
approximate localization of the observed effects, these findings
raise the hypothesis of the relevance of the connection between
these brain regions. The present neuroimaging study therefore
sets out to identify which brain structures support the emergence
of false belief understanding.
The consistent functional activation of a distributed network of
brain regions involved in belief processing indicates that the
structural connections between these regions are important for
mature ToM. The maturation of these connections should
consequently be critical for the emergence of the ability in
childhood. Moreover, understanding the functional role of these
connections in the development of ToM might give insight into
the interrelation of the different regions within the network. This
can help us understand the cognitive and neural steps that lead to
the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief under-
standing around the age of 4 years. Furthermore, it can shed light
on the functional building blocks of mature ToM and their
interaction in the developed brain network. Surprisingly, despite
its distributed consistent functional network, the structural
network involved in ToM has been studied very little to date.
Support for the relevance of structural connectivity for ToM
comes from studies with patients15,16. A study with patients with
resected gliomas along the associative white matter pathways
showed that impaired dorsal connectivity from posterior
temporal and parietal regions to the prefrontal cortex along the
arcuate fascicle and the cingulum correlated with ToM deficits15.
So far, however, connectivity has not been studied in the context
of false belief understanding, considered as the critical test of
ToM in development, and it remains an open question what role
the maturation of fibre connections plays for the developmental
breakthrough in ToM in early childhood.
In the present study, we therefore combined white matter
measures with behavioural performance in false belief tasks. This
was done by taking a developmental approach by studying
children with and without false belief understanding. We
hypothesized that the developmental breakthrough was related
to the white matter pathways connecting those regions that are
functionally involved in false belief reasoning in adults: (a) The
cingulum connects the PC and MPFC, (b) the corpus callosum
(CC) connects contralateral regions of the bilateral ToM network,
(c) temporoparietal-prefrontal connections link the TPJ with the
MPFC, ventrally via the inferior fronto-occipital fascicle (IFOF)
and dorsally via the superior longitudinal fascicle or arcuate
fascicle17,18.
The maturation of different long-range white matter pathways
during childhood is differentially related to cognitive develop-
ment in various domains19,20. A method that allows the
investigation of white matter is diffusion-weighted MRI
(dMRI), which measures the diffusion of water molecules in the
brain. This method provides parameters that reflect the structure
and organization of white matter because the diffusion depends
on tissue structure21. Fractional anisotropy (FA) is an index that
describes the directionality of diffusion. It is sensitive to axonal
organization and is modulated by fibre myelination and axonal
growth, especially during development22. During childhood FA
increases with age and, in the major fibre bundles, reaches its
maximum around the age of 20–40 years23. Tractography is a
method that allows the modelling of the fibre bundle pathways
and the resulting number of streamlines passing a given voxel is
interpreted as an index of connectivity strength24. In the present
study, we acquired dMRI data and computed FA as well as
streamline density from probabilistic tractography, which are
interpreted as measures of axonal organization and connectivity
strength, respectively. These measures were then set in relation to
behavioural performance on two standard false belief tasks4,5.
Children’s performance on standard false belief tasks has been
shown to correlate with their executive function25 and linguistic
abilities26. We therefore additionally assessed and controlled for a
battery of executive function and language tests27 to understand
to what extent the maturation of distinct brain structures
uniquely supported the emergence of false belief understanding.
Moreover, in the past decade, implicit false belief tasks have been
developed which showed that, already before the age of 2 years,
infants display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with
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a false belief in their looking behaviour28,29. However, whether
these early implicit expectations of false-belief-related behaviour
require representation of others’ mental states (as argued, for
example, by Baillargeon et al.30) is a matter of debate31,32. We
therefore additionally included an implicit task of belief-related
anticipatory looking27 to control for earlier-developing precursors
of explicit false belief understanding.
To summarize, the present study relates measures of white
matter organization and connectivity, gained from dMRI data of
43 children aged 3 and 4 years, to their performance on standard
false belief tests. At the same time, we controlled for co-
developing linguistic and executive functions, as well as earlier
developing implicit false-belief-related anticipation (see Meth-
ods). On the basis of functional studies with adults and older
children, we hypothesized age-related changes in white matter
structure near the TPJ, STS and MTG, PC, and MPFC, as well as
increased white matter connectivity between these regions to
correlate with children’s performance in the false belief tasks.
The present study shows an association of 3- and 4-year-olds’
false belief understanding with age-related changes in FA near the
TPJ, MTG, PC and MPFC, as well as with the age-independent
number of streamlines between temporoparietal and inferior
frontal regions. These associations were independent of co-
developing cognitive abilities. We conclude that the structural
maturation of regions that support belief processing in adults, and
their connection to the prefrontal cortex are important for the
emergence of ToM in early childhood.
Results
Behavioural results. The children performed two standard
explicit tests of false belief understanding. In a false location task4,
children were asked about the actions and belief of a puppet who
had a false belief about the location of a desired object. In a false
content task5, the children were asked about their own initial
belief and an ignorant puppet’s belief of the unexpected content
of a familiar box (for details see Methods). The performance on
an aggregate score of these tasks confirmed the well-documented
breakthrough in explicit false belief understanding to occur
around the age of 4 years: Three-year-old children performed
significantly below chance (M¼ 0.08, s.d.¼ 0.18, P¼ 0.0002, one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test against test-value 0.5), 4-year-
olds performed marginally above chance (M¼ 0.65, s.d.¼ 0.32,
P¼ 0.09), and there was a significant difference between the
age groups (P¼ 0.000002, Mann–Whitney U-test). To control
for co-developing abilities and early precursors of false belief
understanding, we assessed a standardized test of children’s
linguistic abilities33, a battery of executive function tests27 and
gaze anticipation of the actions of an agent with a false belief27
(see Methods).
Tract-based spatial statistics analysis. To see in which brain
regions white matter structure is implicated in false belief
understanding, we conducted a tract-based spatial statistics
(TBSS) analysis projecting the children’s FA values to a common
white matter skeleton (for details see Methods)34. This analysis
showed that higher false belief scores correlated with increased
FA values in the right TPJ and posterior MTG, the white matter
near the right vMPFC, right PC, left MTG, in medial portions of
the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and inferior temporal
gyrus (ITG), and in the left thalamus (see Fig. 1 and Table 1;
results are cluster size corrected at Po0.05).
The role of co-developing abilities. The reported correlations
of white matter structure and false belief scores remained sig-
nificant when controlling for executive functions, language and
belief-related anticipation as covariates in a multiple regression.
Only the clusters in the vMPFC and the thalamus were no longer
significant when controlling for all three executive function tests,
and the cluster in the pMTG/TPJ when controlling for sentence
comprehension. All other effects were specifically related to
explicit false belief understanding, independently of co-develop-
ing abilities and implicit precursors (for the correlations of FA
with executive functions, language and belief-related anticipation
see Supplementary Methods).
The role of age. Next, we wanted to find out whether the effects
were developmental, that is, due to age-related changes in FA, or
whether they stemmed from age-independent individual differ-
ences in FA. Including age as a covariate in the regression indi-
cated that the effects were age-related. To get a better
understanding of the role of age, we performed a voxelwise
commonality analysis, including FA and age as predictors for the
false belief scores. To make sure age-related changes in FA
specifically explained developments in explicit false belief
understanding and not in other cognitive domains, we addi-
tionally controlled for all other assessed cognitive measures as
covariates. Commonality analysis combines linear regressions on
the predictors of interest to allow the study of the unique and
shared linear contributions of intercorrelated predictors. This
analysis showed that the common effect of age and FA in the
reported regions significantly explained between 4 and 10% of the
variance in the false belief score, over and above the unique
contribution of age and of the other cognitive abilities (see
Supplementary Table 1). These results indicate that the effects
x = 38x = –47 x = 28 x = 47
0.01
 P
0.00
Figure 1 | TBSS analysis. Regions in which FA correlated with the children’s false belief score (N¼43, voxel-level P value colour coded in red-yellow, white
matter skeleton in blue): white matter close to the left MTG (x¼ "47), right vMPFC and PC (x¼ 28), right TPJ (x¼ 38), and right pMTG (x¼47), see also
Table 1. Reported coordinates are transformed to MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space. The results were significant at Po0.01 at voxel-level and
cluster size corrected at Po0.05 (two-sided). The effects remained significant when co-developing abilities were controlled for.
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were indeed driven by age-related changes in white matter
structure in these regions that specifically explained the devel-
opment of false belief understanding.
Connectivity analysis. To see within which tracts the regions
found in the TBSS analysis were located, probabilistic tracto-
graphy was seeded in these regions. The resulting tracts are listed
in Table 1 (for details see Methods). The three clusters in the right
posterior MTG and TPJ and in the left MTG projected to the
arcuate fascicle bilaterally, which connects posterior temporal
regions with the IFG dorsally, and to the extreme capsule fibre
system ventrally. Seeding in the two clusters in the more
medial white matter of the left STG and ITG and in the right
vMPFC yielded streamlines along the ventral left and right
IFOF. Finally, seeding in the two medial right clusters yielded an
inter-hemispheric connection between the bilateral vMPFC and
the bilateral PC through the CC.
Next, we wanted to specify how and where connectivity in
these tracts was related to the children’s false belief under-
standing. To this end, we correlated the streamline densities
obtained from tractography with the children’s individual false
belief scores, while controlling for FA in the respective seed
region (see Methods for details). This showed a significant
correlation of the false belief score with the streamline density at
the anterior tip of the left and right arcuate fascicle in the anterior
IFG (Brodmann Area [BA] 45) and within the right IFOF in the
MTG, (see Fig. 2 and Table 2; cluster size corrected at Po0.05
Table 1 | Correlations of false belief score with FA in TBSS analysis and WM tracts resulting from tractography when seeding in
these regions.
WM in/near MNI coordinates CoG Size in voxels P value Correlation coefficient r Tractography WM tracts
rTPJ 37 " 50 30 66 10" 12 0.43 AF, ECFS
rpMTG/TPJ 47 " 51 14 49 0.003 0.41 AF, ECFS
lMTG "48 " 18 " 20 63 0.0004 0.44 AF, ECFS, ILF
lITG " 33 " 13 " 13 63 0.0002 0.42 IFOF, ILF
lSTG " 38 " 32 2 35 0.01 0.40 IFOF
rvMPFC 28 46 "4 31 0.04 0.41 IFOF, CC
rSPL/PC 28 " 64 28 34 0.01 0.38 CC
lThalamus " 3 " 12 0 18 0.0004 0.42 aTR
a, anterior; AF, arcuate fascicle; CC, corpus callosum; CoG, centre of gravity; ECFS, extreme capsule fibre system; FA, fractional anisotropy; IFOF, inferior fronto-occipital fascicle; ILF, inferior longitudinal
fascicle; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; l, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; p, posterior; PC, precuneus; r, right; SPL, superior parietal lobule; STG, superior temporal
gyrus; TBSS, tract-based spatial statistics; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; TR, thalamic radiation; vMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; WM, white matter.
Seeds for tractography from TBSS analysisCorrelation of streamline density with false belief score
a b c
Figure 2 | Correlation of false belief score with streamline density. The streamline density correlated with the children’s false belief scores (N¼43,
correlating regions in red, cluster size corrected at Po0.05 (two-sided), Bonferroni corrected for the number of tracts, see also Table 2): (a) in the left IFG
at the anterior tip of the left arcuate fascicle; (b) in the right IFG at the anterior tip of the right arcuate fascicle; and (c) in the right MTG along the IFOF. The
effects were independent of age and of co-developing abilities.
Table 2 | Correlations of false belief score with streamline density.
WM tract Region of cluster MNI coordinates CoG Size in voxels P value* Correlation coefficient r
lAF IFG " 30 37 17 61 0.03 0.46
rAF IFG 33 31 25 67 0.002 0.45
rIFOF MTG 42 " 3 " 25 24 0.002 0.46
AF, arcuate fascicle; CoG, centre of gravity; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IFOF, inferior fronto-occipital fascicle; l, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; r, right; WM, white
matter.
*Adjusted according to Bonferroni for number of tracts (n¼ 8)
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and Bonferroni corrected for the number of tracts). The effect in
the arcuate fascicle remained significant when controlling for age,
executive functions, linguistic abilities and implicit belief-related
anticipation as covariates in a multiple regression. The effect in
the IFOF proved to be age-independent, but was no longer
significant when all three executive function tasks or the sentence
comprehension task were controlled for. An additional tractogra-
phy, restricted to dorsal pathways only, confirmed that the observed
effects in the IFG stemmed from streamlines of the arcuate fascicle
(see Methods). Stronger dorsal connectivity from the MTG/TPJ to
more anterior portions of the IFG thus specifically explained
explicit false belief understanding, independently of age and of co-
developing cognitive abilities.
Discussion
A milestone of human cognitive development is reached around
the age of 4 years, when children begin to understand others’ false
beliefs. Until now, however, no neuroimaging study had looked at
the neural mechanisms that underlie this crucial step in human
development. In the present study, we found that this behavioural
breakthrough in ToM was associated with age-related changes in
white matter in the regions involved in belief processing in fMRI
studies with adults and older children. More specifically, we
showed that 3- and 4-year-old children’s false belief scores
correlated with age-related increases in FA in the white matter
around the right TPJ, left MTG, right vMPFC and right PC. These
relations were independent of co-developing abilities known to
correlate with ToM, that is, of children’s linguistic and executive
functions and of their earlier-developing implicit anticipation of
belief-related actions. White matter maturation in the core ToM
network thus specifically explained the emergence of explicit false
belief understanding in early childhood. This complements first
indications from an EEG study13 on oscillation patterns from
temporoparietal and medial prefrontal regions in relation to false
belief understanding. Our results go beyond these previous
findings by focusing on the maturation of brain structure, and by
allowing a precise localization of the regions related to the
emergence of false belief understanding. A battery of cognitive
tests, moreover, allowed us to demonstrate the specificity of our
effects for ToM.
White matter maturation processes reflect developmental
change in the structural connections between brain areas.
Probabilistic tractography with seeds in the above regions yielded
a network connecting the regions functionally involved in ToM in
adults: this network included the arcuate fascicle, the IFOF and
the CC connecting the left and right vMPFC anteriorly and PC
posteriorly. We correlated the streamline density in the pathways
that resulted from tractography with the children’s false belief
scores to understand how the connectivity strength of these tracts
was related to the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief understanding. This approach underlined the importance
of two temporoparietal-prefrontal pathways for the development
of a mature representational ToM: a ventral pathway via the IFOF
and a dorsal pathway via the arcuate fascicle. In the right IFOF, a
correlation was found in a relatively small region in the MTG. For
the arcuate fascicle, false belief understanding correlated with the
streamline density at its anterior tip in IFG (BA 45) bilaterally.
This correlation was age-independent and proved to be
independent of language, and executive functions. This finding
points to a specific role of the connection to this anterior region
of the arcuate fascicle for mature false belief reasoning,
independently of co-developing abilities. These results suggest
that, in addition to white matter maturation in the classical belief
processing regions, the extent to which temporoparietal regions
are connected to anterior portions of the IFG via the arcuate
fascicle yields a mechanism for the emergence of mature human
ToM.
The classical view in which false belief understanding emerges
around the age of 4 years has been called into question by novel
implicit tasks which show that, already before the age of 2 years,
infants display different looking behaviours towards agents with a
false rather than with a true belief28,29. Whether this sensitivity to
others’ belief-related behaviour is a precursor of later verbal and
explicit false belief understanding has been debated intensely in
the past years30–32,35. Against this background, we compared our
findings for the standard explicit tasks of false belief
understanding with an implicit task of belief-related
anticipatory looking. This analysis revealed that FA only
correlated with the standard explicit false belief tasks and not
with the implicit task. Moreover, a commonality analysis for the
explicit false belief tasks, including the implicit task as a predictor,
showed that FA in the reported regions correlated with explicit
false belief understanding independently of the gaze anticipation
of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The association with
white matter development in the reported regions thus seems to
be specific for the emergence of mature explicit false belief
reasoning independently of earlier-developing anticipation of
belief-related behaviour. The observed independence of explicit
and implicit false belief tasks is consistent with behavioural data
that show that the implicit false belief tasks are passed
substantially earlier and dissociate from the explicit false belief
understanding in preschool-aged children27,36,37, as well as in
those with autism38. It is furthermore in line with an adult fMRI
study which suggests that explicit and implicit false belief tasks
recruit differential brain networks39. Future research will have to
follow-up on the brain regions and connections relevant for
mastering implicit false belief tasks. For this, a battery of different
implicit false belief tasks should be used, including anticipatory
looking as well as violation of expectation paradigms, so that the
robustness and reliability of different implicit measures can be
assessed. Moreover, such an approach would have to include
younger children at an age when implicit abilities emerge and a
developmental change in performance can be observed.
Considering the difficulties in performing MRI with infants,
this will remain a major challenge for future research.
In sum, the present neuroimaging results demonstrate that the
emergence of a mature explicit representation of mental states is
associated with age-related white matter maturation in the
core ToM network (that is, the TPJ, MTG, PC and MPFC),
independently of earlier implicit precursors and of other cognitive
abilities. Moreover, this crucial step in human social cognition is
specifically related to the extent to which temporoparietal regions
connect to the anterior IFG via the arcuate fascicle.
The arcuate fascicle is known to be involved in language
processing. It connects the posterior temporal region with Broca’s
area in the IFG, which have been described to support sentence
comprehension40,41. Here, however, the observed correlation of
the arcuate fascicle with false belief understanding was observed
for streamlines connected to more anterior parts of the IFG,
namely to BA 45 bordering BA 46 and was independent
of the children’s linguistic abilities. This more anterior part of
the IFG has been observed for the processing of abstract
hierarchies in non-language domains42,43. It has been argued
that mature explicit false belief reasoning compared with lower-
level ToM processes, such as anticipating others’ actions based
on their intentions or knowledge, requires one to build a
mental representation of others’ mental states6. Such a meta-
representation requires hierarchical embedding of belief contents
into the context of it being someone’s mental state. Abstract
hierarchy processing is therefore precisely the ability needed in
addition to belief processing in order to reason about others’ false
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beliefs. We therefore suggest a mechanism in which the
connection of the arcuate fascicle to more anterior portions of
the IFG allows the information transfer between temporoparietal
belief processing regions and hierarchical embedding of
beliefs as a meta-representation in the IFG, thus enabling the
developmental breakthrough in representational ToM. Future
longitudinal research will have to check to what extent the
relation of cognitive and brain development is causal and will
need to verify that our results are truly developmental and
not due to systematic individual differences between the age
groups.
Taken together, our results show that white matter maturation
in the brain regions associated with false belief processing (that is,
the TPJ, MTG/STS, MPFC and PC) as well as the extent to which
the TPJ is connected to anterior portions of the IFG via the
arcuate fascicle pave the way for the emergence of the mature
human ability to represent beliefs. Interestingly, in non-human
primates, who have recently been shown to pass an implicit false
belief task44, but not explicit ToM abilities46,47, the arcuate
fascicle is very weak45. The relevance of this pathway for a full-
fledged representational ToM thus points to a critical role of the
arcuate fascicle for the ontogeny and phylogeny of a core aspect
of human higher cognition.
Methods
Participants. MRI data and behavioural data of 43 normally developing 3- and
4-year-old children (17 children aged 3–3.5 years, M¼ 3.32, s.d.¼ 0.19, 10 female;
and 26 children aged 4–4.5 years, M¼ 4.29, SD¼ 0.17, 15 female) were analysed
for the present study. The data of another five 3-year-olds and one 4-year-old were
acquired but not analysed due to artifacts in the dMRI data set. Children were
excluded if more than 10 out of 60 acquired directions in the dMRI data set were
corrupted. Directions were removed due to intensity dropout caused by head
motion48 or due to artefacts detected in a visual inspection49,50. The sample size
was based on previous developmental dMRI studies with approximately 20
children per age group, assuming a dropout rate of 10–20% due to motion
artefacts. A power analysis with G*Power51 showed that the computed correlations
with N¼ 43, an effect size of r¼ 0.5, and an a-error of 5% had a power of
1-b¼ 97%. Parental informed consent was obtained for all children in accordance
with approval from the Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Medicine of the
University of Leipzig.
Cognitive assessment of the false belief score. The children performed two
standard tests of explicit false belief understanding27—a false location task4 and a
false content task5—on the same day as their MRI scans. In the false location task,
each child was introduced to a mouse puppet, and they were both shown a sweet in
a little bag and an empty box. The mouse then left the room, and the sweet was
moved from the bag to the box. When the mouse returned, the child was asked
three probe questions about where the mouse would look for the sweet, whether
she knew where it was and where she believed it was, along with a control question
to make sure the child remembered the actual location of the sweet. In the false
content task, the children were shown a familiar chocolate box and were asked
what they believed was inside the box. Every child expected chocolates to be inside
the box. They were then shown that the box actually contained pencils. The mouse
puppet then entered the scene and the children were asked three probe questions:
whether the mouse knew what was in the box, what she believed was in it, and what
the child itself had originally believed, along with a control question on the actual
content of the box. All children answered the control questions correctly in both
tasks. In each of the tasks, children could obtain a total of three points, one for each
of the three probe questions. The performance on the two tasks was highly
intercorrelated (Spearman’s r(43)¼ 0.879; P¼ 8# 10" 15). We therefore
combined them into a total false belief score with equal weight for each of the six
probe questions. This yielded a sufficiently varied and highly reliable measure
(Cronbach a¼ 0.894) suited to study correlations with other measures. The three
questions in each of the false belief tasks could have led to carry-over effects or
pragmatic pressure to give different answers to consecutive very similar questions.
To exclude the possibility that such effects might have influenced our results, we
replicated our analyses with a false belief score that only included the first question
of each of the two false belief tasks. This scoring yielded very similar results
(see Supplementary Tables 2 and 3).
Other cognitive abilities. To control for co-developing abilities, the children
additionally performed a battery of three executive function tasks27 as well as a
standardized test of language development (SETK 3-5, Sprachentwicklungstest fu¨r
drei- bis fu¨nfja¨hrige Kinder)33. Moreover, children’s implicit expectations of the
actions of an agent with a false belief—known to precede explicit false belief
reasoning in development—were tested with an anticipatory looking false belief
task27. These additional tests were conducted in two separate sessions before the
MRI scan, all within an average period of 14.7 days (s.d.¼ 6.8).
Executive functions. The children were tested on a battery of three executive
function tasks27—a Reverse Categorization task52, a Go-NoGo task53 and a
Delay of Gratification task54. The tasks were chosen to tap into the children’s
inhibitory control, response selection and cognitive flexibility, which have been
argued and shown to be particularly relevant for mastering standard false belief
tests25,27,28.
In the Reverse Categorization task, the children were asked to sort blue and red
cubes of two different sizes into a big blue box and a small red box with changing
rules: first matching the colours of cubes with the boxes, then the rule was reversed,
next according to the cube size, and finally reversed. The percentage of correct
trials in the three rounds following a rule change was encoded as dependent
variable (M¼ 89.9%, s.d.¼ 11.7%). This measure had a very high reliability
(Cronbach a¼ 0.899).
In the Go-NoGo task, children were asked to perform actions a duck puppet
asked them to do (for example, ’Clap your hands!’), but not to do anything the
nasty crocodile asked them to. It was checked before that children understood the
rules and were able to perform the movements. A d-prime value was calculated
Time
FB1
FB2
Figure 3 | Implicit belief-related anticipatory looking task. Selected scenes from the two false belief conditions FB1 and FB2. Arrows indicate the
movement of the animals, check marks or crosses underline whether the agent animal can see what happens or not.
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with correct NoGo-trials as hits and incorrect Go-trials as false alarms (M¼ 0.886,
s.d.¼ 0.172). This task was highly reliable (Cronbach a¼ 0.843).
In the Delay of Gratification task, children were seated in a small room with a
small portion of their preferred sweets (gummy bears or chocolate bars) and a bell
on a table in front of them. A bigger portion of the sweets was placed in a locked
transparent box next to it. The experimenter told the children that she had to leave
for a while, but if they waited until the experimenter came back without eating the
sweets or ringing the bell to call the experimenter, they would get the big portion of
sweets. Task comprehension was checked with two control questions before the
children were left alone for a maximum of 5min. The children’s mean waiting time
was M¼ 233 s (s.d.¼ 107 s).
We formed an aggregate executive function score for further analysis by
building the mean of the z-scores of all three tasks (3-year-olds: M¼ " 0.63,
s.d.¼ 1.16; 4-year olds: M¼ 0.33, s.d.¼ 0.76; age effect: t(42)¼ " 3.30, P¼ 0.002).
The aggregate executive function score explained a significant amount of variance
in the children’s false belief scores (Spearman’s r¼ 0.520***, P¼ 0.0004),
indicating that it indeed allowed us to control for the variance in false belief
understanding due to the children’s executive function abilities.
Language. As a measure of language abilities, we acquired the standardized test of
language development for 3- to 5-year-old children SETK 3-5 (Sprachentwick-
lungstest fu¨r drei- bis fu¨nf-ja¨hrige Kinder)33. The test included sentence
comprehension and production, vocabulary comprehension and production,
morphological rule building and phonological working memory. The mean
standardized T-value of all subtests served as independent variable to control for
children’s language abilities (M¼ 57.4, s.d.¼ 7.4). This measure was significantly
correlated with the false belief score (Spearman’s r¼ 0.306*, P¼ 0.046).
Belief-related anticipation. In an implicit belief-related anticipatory looking
task27, the children were presented with short film clips on a Tobii T120 eye-
tracker monitor showing an animal agent observing and following a mouse
through a y-shaped tunnel to one of two boxes at the two exits of the tunnel
(see Fig. 3). The children were first familiarized with the fact that the animal agent
would go to the box with the mouse. Then, the children were shown film clips in
which the agent had a false belief about the location of the mouse, which had
actually left the scene in the animal’s absence. The children’s anticipatory looking
a
Seeds for tractography
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Figure 4 | Streamline density maps resulting from probabilistic tractography seeded in the regions depicted in grey with significant correlation of FA
and the false belief scores in the TBSS analysis. Left hemisphere, (a) arcuate fascicle seeded in the MTG, (b) IFOF seeded in the STG, (c) ILF, IFOF and
fornix seeded in WM below the ITG. Right Hemisphere: (d) arcuate fascicle seeded in the pMTG/TPJ, (e) arcuate fascicle seeded in TPJ, (f) IFOF seeded in
vMPFC. Medial: (g) corpus callosum seeded in the right SPL (WM near PC), (h) left anterior thalamic radiation seeded in the thalamus.
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was evaluated as a measure of their expectations as to where the agent would look
for the mouse. There were two different false belief conditions (FB1 and FB2),
respectively controlling for different non-belief-related strategies27,29. Every child
was presented with a total of 10 familiarization (FAM) trials, 12 FB trials (six of
each condition), and six true belief trials (TB1 and TB2) analogous to the FB trials,
except that the agent held a true belief (TB) about the mouse’s location.
Gaze data were analysed for a time of interest from the moment when the agent
had disappeared in the tunnel until its reappearance in the FAM and TB conditions
or until the end of the trial in the FB conditions. Two regions of interest (ROI) were
defined, each covering one of the tunnel exits and the corresponding box. During
the time of interest, the ROI in which the child looked first (first look), as well as
the ROI with the longer gaze duration (longer look) was coded. Since both
measures were highly intercorrelated (r(43)¼ 0.444, P¼ 0.003), the measures were
collapsed to the mean of first and longest look for subsequent analyses27.
The children performed significantly above chance in the FAM and TB control
conditions (M¼ 67.8%, s.d.¼ 12.8%, t(42)¼ 9.09, Po0.001), confirming that they
had understood the events displayed in the film clips and showed correct
anticipation when no false belief was involved. The children also performed above
chance in the FB trials (M¼ 53.7%, s.d.¼ 11.2%, t(42)¼ 2.14, P¼ 0.038). As
opposed to the standard tasks of explicit false belief understanding, there was no
significant difference between age groups (3-year-olds: M¼ 54.1%, s.d.¼ 11.7%;
4-year olds: M¼ 53.4%, s.d.¼ 11.1%; t(41)¼ 0.214, P¼ 0.83). This is in line with
previous literature that shows that belief-related anticipation is already achieved
before the age of 2 years28,29.
MRI data acquisition. The dMRI data were acquired on a Siemens 3 T TIM Trio
scanner using the multiplexed echo planar imaging sequence55,56 with a resolution
of 1.9mm isotropic (TR¼ 4,000ms; TE¼ 75.4ms; b-value¼ 1,000 smm" 3; 60
directions; GRAPPA 2) reducing the scanning time to 5:32min. A field map was
acquired directly after the dMRI scan. Additionally, an anatomical scan was
acquired using the MP2RAGE sequence57 at 1.2# 1# 1mm resolution
(TR¼ 5,000ms; TE¼ 3.24ms; GRAPPA 3; 5:22min). Children were acquainted
with the scanning procedure by performing a mock scan a few days before the
actual scan and watched a movie of their choice on MR-compatible goggles during
the scan.
dMRI data analysis. Before preprocessing the dMRI data, volumes affected by
artefacts due to motion were removed manually, as described above. Motion itself
was corrected for by rigidly aligning all volumes to the last one without diffusion
weighting (b0) using flirt58 from the FSL software package59. The dMRI data were
then rigidly aligned to the anatomical image, which again had been rigidly aligned
to the Montreal Neurological Institute standard space and was interpolated to
1mm isotropic voxel space. Distortions were corrected using the corresponding
field map. All these transformations were combined before being applied to the
data to require only a single step of interpolation. The diffusion tensor was
computed in every voxel within the brain volume and FA maps were derived.
A common group template of the participants’ FA maps was created using ANTs
(Advanced Normalization Tools)60.
TBSS analysis. The participants’ FA maps were then correlated voxelwise with
their false belief scores using TBSS34. TBSS projects the individual subject’s
maximal FA values onto a common white matter skeleton, before applying
voxelwise cross-subject statistics. The skeleton was thresholded at an FA value of
0.2. The nonlinear registration was done using the group-specific template as a
target image. Voxelwise statistics were then carried out with a non-parametric
permutation test61 implemented in FSL59 with the false belief score as the
dependent variable, taking into account the non-normal distribution of the data. In
a next step, we controlled for the language and executive function scores, as well as
for implicit belief-related anticipation by including them as covariates in the linear
model61. In addition, we computed linear regressions where we controlled for each
of the executive function tasks separately, and for all the language subtests of the
SETK as separate covariates. This was done to make sure that we did not miss out
on variance that was only explained by one of the subtests due to the aggregate
scores. Reported clusters on the skeleton were significant at Po0.01 at voxel-level
and exceeded a cluster size significant at Po0.05 based on local smoothness
estimation on the skeleton with AFNI (3dClustSim and 3dLocalstat)62. In addition,
a similar TBSS analysis was performed for the other cognitive domains. The
correlation of FA with the executive function score and the standardized language
test are reported in the Supplementary Methods. No regions of significant
correlation of FA with the implicit anticipatory looking false belief task were
found..
Commonality analysis. To get a better understanding of the role of developmental
change in the effects found in the TBSS analysis, a commonality analysis63
was computed voxelwise on the skeleton including age and FA as predictors
for the false belief score. A commonality analysis allows the decomposition
of the contributions of several, possibly intercorrelating, linear predictors into
subcomponents explained by the unique variance of the individual predictors,
as well as subcomponents explained by the shared variance of all possible
combinations of the predictors. Our commonality analysis thus allowed us to
determine whether the children’s false belief scores were explained by age-related
increases in FA in a given voxel (common contribution of age and FA) or by age-
independent individual differences in FA (unique contribution of FA), while in
both cases the variance explained uniquely by age (unique contribution of age) was
controlled for. In addition, the children’s language, executive function and belief-
related anticipation scores were included as covariates in the commonality analysis
to ensure that differences in FA were specifically related to false belief
understanding, independently of more general cognitive development. This
analysis revealed that age-related increases in FA in the respective regions
significantly explained between 4 and 10% of the variance in the false belief score,
over and above the unique contribution of age and of the other cognitive abilities
(details see Supplementary Table 1).
Connectivity analysis. To see within which tracts the significant clusters from the
TBSS analysis were located, these regions were taken as seeds for probabilistic
tractography with MRtrix64 using Constrained Spherical Deconvolution as a local
model65 with the default parameters. Streamlines were started in randomly selected
initialization points within the seed regions until 100,000 streamlines with a
minimum length of 10mm were obtained. The tracking followed directions with a
maximum fibre orientation density (FOD) value of 0.1 and a curvature radius of at
least 1mm. The tractography was restricted to white matter. This analysis yielded
the tracts shown in Fig. 4.
Streamline density maps of the individual subjects’ resulting tracts were masked
in the common template space by imposing that at least half the subjects have
nonzero values in every voxel. This was done to ensure that correlations were not
outlier-driven. The individual subjects’ streamline density maps were then
correlated with their false belief scores using FSL randomize61, while controlling for
the mean FA in the seed region of the tractography. This was done in order to
ensure that correlations with streamline density were not driven by the correlation
of the false belief score and FA found in the TBSS analysis. We then controlled for
age, the language, executive function, and implicit belief-related anticipation scores
by including them as covariates in the linear model. In addition, we computed
linear models where we controlled for each of the executive function tasks
separately, and for all the language subtests of the SETK as separate covariates.
Reported clusters in the tract volumes were significant at Po0.001 at voxel-level
and exceeded a cluster size significant at Po0.05, in addition taking into account
the number of streamline density maps according to Bonferroni correction.
To confirm that the effect observed in the anterior IFG stemmed from dorsal
streamlines of the arcuate fascicle, we computed an additional tractography from
the seed regions in the left MTG and right TPJ, which we restricted to dorsal
pathways. For this, a termination mask was defined as a plane parallel to the
Sylvian fissure (see Supplementary Fig. 1).
We localized and named the clusters and tracts based on the MRI Atlas of
Human White Matter17.
Data availability. Data, in anonymized format (according to data protection
policy in the ethics agreement), is available upon request. The publication of the
script for the voxelwise commonality analysis is in preparation, and the script is
available from the authors on request.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
The ability to attribute mental states to other individuals - that is, to have
a Theory of Mind (ToM) - is a hallmark of human cognition. A critical
test of this ability is understanding other individuals’ false beliefs about the
world. In development, a milestone is achieved around the age of 4 years
when children start passing the standard false belief tasks. Moreover, in
recent years novel implicit false belief tasks have shown that, already before
their second year of life, infants display correct expectations of the actions
of an agent with a false belief (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010). The processes
that underlie these expectations and their relation to the later standard
explicit false belief tasks, however, is currently unclear. The present the-
sis addressed the question which cognitive and neural developments pave
the way for the emergence of a mature ToM. What determines the devel-
opmental breakthrough in the standard explicit false belief tasks? Which
developments in other cognitive domains and the maturation of which brain
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structures support this step? And, finally, what is the nature of potential
precursors measured by implicit tasks? These questions were addressed in
three studies.
First, we tested children longitudinally from 2- to 4-years of age with
an implicit anticipatory looking false belief task (Southgate et al., 2007)
to investigate how robust false belief-related expectations are in toddlers,
and how they develop beyond toddlerhood in the age range where explicit
false belief reasoning develops. In a second cross-sectional study, we ac-
quired behavioral and eye-tracking data from two standard explicit false
belief tasks, an implicit anticipatory looking, and an indirectly-elicited false
belief task, and studied their interrelations in 3- and 4-year-old children.
Additionally, we acquired a battery of three executive function tests and
of di↵erent linguistic measures, which we correlated with the false belief
tasks. Finally, in study 3, we assessed indices of children’s white matter
structure with di↵usion-weighted MRI, and correlated these with children’s
false belief performance, while controlling for other cognitive abilities. This
approach allowed us to address the above questions behaviorally, by study-
ing the developmental trajectory of false belief tasks and their correlations
with other tasks, as well as neurally, by studying the maturation of brain
regions associated with false belief tasks.
In the longitudinal study (study 1, Grosse Wiesmann et al., submitted),
we found that children only anticipated correctly where an agent with a
false belief about the location of an object would search for this object by
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the age of 4 years, but not yet at the ages of 2 and 3 years. The employed
implicit false belief task showed a significant developmental change between
the ages of 3 and 4 years, at a similar age when children start passing ex-
plicit false belief tasks. In study 2 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016), we then
investigated the relation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3- and
4-year-old children with a cross-sectional design. This approach revealed a
dissociation of performance on the di↵erent task types reflected by a di↵er-
ential developmental trajectory and the lack of a correlation between the
implicit and explicit tasks. Furthermore, the explicit false belief tasks corre-
lated with executive and syntactic function, while the implicit tasks did not.
This behavioral dissociation of the implicit and explicit false belief tasks was
confirmed by a dissociation on the neural level in study 3 (Grosse Wiesmann
et al., 2017, in press), where we identified white matter di↵erences that re-
lated to the explicit false belief tasks, independently of performance on the
implicit task and in other cognitive domains. The emergence of explicit
false belief understanding was supported, firstly, by white matter matura-
tion near the adult belief-processing regions (i.e., TPJ, MTG, MPFC, and
precuneus), and secondly, by the connectivity from temporoparietal regions
to the IFG through the arcuate fascicle. In the following, we will discuss in
detail how these results inform about our research questions.
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5.1 Is there a continuity from early-developing
to later explicit false belief abilities?
Behavioral
dissociation
We assessed explicit false belief abilities with two standard false be-
lief tests – a false location and a false content task – and early-developing
abilities with an implicit anticipatory looking false belief task (study 2,
Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016). With these measures, our behavioral and
brain data clearly speak for a dissociation of the abilities underlying implicit
and explicit tasks. Behaviorally, we confirmed the di↵erential developmental
trajectory of the standard explicit false belief tasks and the implicit antici-
patory looking false belief task. While we replicated the consistent develop-
mental performance breakthrough reported in previous research (Wellman
et al., 2001) with two di↵erent standard explicit tasks between the ages of
3 and 4 years, the pattern was less clear for implicit anticipatory looking
false belief tasks. Depending on the task settings, children performed above
chance at the age of 3 years (study 2) in line with previous literature (e.g.,
Southgate et al., 2007; Clements and Perner, 1994; Ru↵man et al., 2001;
Low, 2010) or only by the age of 4 years (study 1). The dependence of
2- and 3-year-olds performance on the precise task settings points to the
fragility of early false belief-related anticipatory looking, in contrast to the
consistent intra-individual performance across quite di↵erent standard ex-
plicit false belief tasks with a performance breakthrough around the age of 4
years. This dissociation in the developmental trajectory of implicit and ex-
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plicit false belief tasks was reflected by the fact that children’s anticipatory
looking did not correlate with their performance in the explicit false belief
tasks. These findings speak for distinct and independent processes involved
in standard explicit and implicit anticipatory looking false belief tasks. This
is in line with research on ASD which shows a dissociation of performance
on implicit and explicit false belief tasks in autistic patients (Senju et al.,
2009), and in line with a dissociation on the brain level (Schneider et al.,
2014) that will be discussed in more detail below.
Relation to
previous
studies
In contrast to our results, Low (2010) found a correlation between an-
ticipatory looking and explicit verbal responses in a verbal false belief task
(by Clements and Perner, 1994) in 3- and 4-year-old children. The task used
by Low, however, was verbal and anticipatory looking was verbally elicited
by a prompt “I wonder which slide [the protagonist] will come down to
look for his car”. This might have caused the processes underlying correct
anticipatory looking to be more similar to the processes involved in chil-
dren’s explicit verbal responses. Moreover, the correlation reported by Low
was between two measures acquired within the same task, and may therefore
merely have reflected the task-related variance. These factors might explain
why Low found a correlation between implicit and explicit false belief tasks,
while we did not. A second challenge for our conclusion of the independence
of early-developing and later explicit false belief abilities are the findings
from a longitudinal study that false belief-related anticipatory looking at
18 months predicted later explicit false belief understanding between 4 and
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6 years of age (Thoermer et al., 2012; Sodian et al., 2016). The presence of
a longitudinal prediction from infancy to preschool age but absence of any
cross-sectional correlation in preschool age can best be explained by distinct
but developmentally related processes underlying implicit and explicit false
belief tasks. That is, earlier implicit abilities might be relevant for the emer-
gence of later explicit false belief understanding, but not for its expression
in preschool age. Thus, our behavioral results speak for a dissociation of
implicit and explicit false belief tasks in preschoolers. However, although
the underlying processes might di↵er, early anticipation of belief-related be-
havior in infancy might help developing an explicit understanding of beliefs
later in childhood. This view reconciles empirical evidence so far, that is, a
dissociation in 3- and 4-year-olds (study 2, Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016),
neurally in adults (Schneider et al., 2014), and in ASD patients (Senju et al.,
2009), with the longitudinal prediction of explicit false belief understand-
ing from implicit abilities in infancy (Thoermer et al., 2012; Sodian et al.,
2016).
Dissociation
in the brain
The behavioral dissociation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in
3- and 4-year-olds was also confirmed by a dissociation of brain regions that
supported the development in the explicit false belief tasks, but not the im-
plicit anticipatory looking task (study 3 Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in
press). In particular, we found that the maturation of white matter struc-
ture near the TPJ, MTG, precuneus, and MPFC supported the emergence
of explicit false belief understanding in preschoolers, independently of the
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children’s belief-related anticipatory looking. These cortical regions have
consistently been reported to be involved in explicitly processing false be-
liefs in adults (e.g., Schurz et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2016) and in older
children (Saxe et al., 2009; Gweon et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2010). Our
neural results therefore also support our conclusion of distinct processes un-
derlying implicit and explicit tasks, where the developmental breakthrough
in the standard explicit false belief tasks reflects the emergence of mature
metarepresentational ToM. The implicit task, in turn, seems to measure
a distinct ability, which, during infancy, might facilitate the development
of later full-fledged mental state representation as marked by explicit false
belief reasoning.
5.2 What is the relation of implicit and ex-
plicit false belief tasks to other cognitive
domains?
The dissociation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks is further com-
plemented by the finding that explicit false belief performance correlated
with executive functions and syntactic abilities, whereas the implicit false
belief task did not (study 2, Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016). Together with
the lack of a correlation between implicit and explicit tasks, this correla-
tion pattern supports the view of distinct processes underlying the di↵erent
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false belief tasks. The correlation of the explicit tasks with language and
executive functions then speaks for common conceptual demands of explicit
false belief understanding with language and executive functions, or for their
relevance for its emergence.
Correlation
with
executive
function
The correlation patterns with the di↵erent executive function tasks and
linguistic domains give further insight into the sources of the correlations (as
described in Chapter Sections 1.2 and 1.4). The comparable significant cor-
relations with each of the three di↵erent executive function tasks suggests
that the correlation of explicit false belief reasoning and executive func-
tion is driven by a combination of the di↵erent accounts. The correlation
with cognitive flexibility and conflict inhibition (as measured by the reverse
categorization and Go-NoGo task) speaks for common conceptual demands
(Zelazo and Frye, 1998), possibly complemented by an additional relevance
of these processes for the emergence of explicit false belief understanding
(e.g., Carlson et al., 2002). The correlation with simple inhibition (delay
reward task) might result from additional task-related response-inhibition
demands (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010). Clearly, however, a correlation with
all three tasks speaks for a deeper relation of ToM and executive functions
beyond mere task-demands, in line with the results from previous studies
(Devine and Hughes, 2014; Carlson et al., 2015).
Correlation
with
language
In the language domain, we found a correlation of the explicit false be-
lief task with children’s mastery of the syntax of complement sentences and
with general syntactic abilities, but not with non-syntactic language abil-
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ities (study 2, Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016). This correlational pattern
clearly supports a common conceptual demand account in which both, ToM
and syntax require hierarchical processing. Additionally, specific linguistic
abilities, that is, knowledge of the linguistic structure of mental state lan-
guage, might contribute to the emergence of false belief understanding. A
common conceptual demand account is also supported by the impact of
language shadowing on a non-verbal explicit false belief task in a dual task
study with adults (Newton and de Villiers, 2007) and by ToM deficits of
deaf children with reduced language input (Schick et al., 2014).
Taken together, the correlation of explicit false belief reasoning with
syntactic abilities and with the cognitive flexibility task, which requires
processing embedded rules (Zelazo and Frye, 1998), can be explained in
a common framework with the hierarchy account introduced in Chapter
Sections 1.1.4 and 1.2. According to this account, metarepresenting men-
tal states, processing embedded conditional rules, and syntactic structure
all three require hierarchical processing, and this common conceptual de-
mand explains the correlation between the tasks. In order to tell apart
whether additional linguistic and executive abilities are already required for
the emergence of explicit false belief understanding, similar tasks should
be assessed in a longitudinal or training study in order to determine the
direction of e↵ect of the relation.
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Superficial
task features
as alternative
explanation?
Could our finding of a correlation of language and executive functions
with the standard explicit tasks but not the implicit task also be explained
by a mere task-related continuity account in the sense of Baillargeon et al.
(2010)? Our lack of a correlation between implicit and standard explicit
false belief tasks challenges a continuity between the abilities measured
by these tasks. It could only be explained if, in contrast to the implicit
tasks, performance in the standard explicit tasks is not related to ToM
but mainly driven by merely task-related linguistic and executive demands
(Baillargeon et al., 2010), or pragmatic task demands (Helming et al., 2014).
This is, however, very improbable given the convergence between very dif-
ferent types of explicit false belief tasks (Wellman et al., 2001), which is
confirmed by our strong correlation between the explicit tasks indepen-
dently of linguistic abilities and executive functions. Moreover, findings
that performance on standard explicit false belief tasks were predicted by
earlier understanding of agency also strongly support that these tasks mea-
sure ToM abilities (for a review of these findings see Sodian, 2016, and
references therein: Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2008, 2004;
Yamaguchi et al., 2009). Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by our
white matter results (study 3, Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in press) in
typical belief-processing regions, which are engaged in very di↵erent types
of ToM tasks in adults (Schurz et al., 2014). These results as well as the
connectivity to the anterior IFG through the arcuate fascicle were indepen-
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dent of linguistic and executive abilities (study 3). This indicates that the
developmental breakthrough in the standard explicit false belief tasks was
indeed driven by improvements in ToM and not in linguistic or executive
function. Finally, as explained above, the correlation patterns with the dif-
ferent executive function tasks and linguistic domains clearly speak against
a mere task-related account. Considering these converging findings from
di↵erent domains and studies, it is highly unlikely that the correlation of
false belief understanding and other cognitive domains is merely driven by
superficial task features.
Correlations
with implicit
false belief
The implicit anticipatory looking task did not correlate with any of the
executive function or language tests. This indicates that early-developing
anticipation of the actions of an agent with a false belief do not rely on
linguistic abilities, inhibition, or cognitive flexibility. Studying the rela-
tion to other cognitive abilities in future studies might give insight on the
processes that underlie implicit false belief tasks. For example, a corre-
lation with domain-general statistical learning abilities would point to a
low-level domain-general account of early false belief abilities (as, e.g., in
Heyes, 2014), whereas a correlation with early social abilities, such as, gaze
following or goal-directed action understanding would speak for social pro-
cesses underlying the implicit tasks. Recent evidence from a longitudinal
study supports a social account of early implicit abilities (Sodian, 2016; So-
dian et al., 2016). This is a promising direction of future research to get a
better understanding of the processes that underlie these tasks.
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5.3 What is the neural basis of the emer-
gence of ToM? And what does this tell
us about the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses?
Maturation
in belief-
processing
regions
In study 3 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017, in press), we showed that
performance in the explicit false belief tasks in preschoolers correlated with
age-related changes in white matter structure (i.e., FA) near the right TPJ,
left MTG, MPFC, and precuneus. These are the regions that are consis-
tently activated when adults and older children reason about beliefs (e.g.,
Schurz et al., 2014; Saxe et al., 2009). The maturation of white matter
structure near these regions is therefore likely to reflect the emergence of
belief attribution through improved structural connectivity of these regions
to the rest of the belief processing network.
Arcuate
fascicle favors
hierarchy
account
Probabilistic tractography showed that the regions with a white matter
correlation with false belief understanding connected to the arcuate fascicle,
IFOF, splenium and genu of the CC, and ILF. A closer look at these tracts
showed that streamline density in a small region in the IFOF within the
MTG and at the anterior tip of the left and right arcuate fascicle in the
anterior IFG (BA 45) correlated with preschoolers’ false belief performance.
The arcuate fascicle connects posterior temporal regions with Broca’s area in
the IFG - two regions involved in sentence comprehension (Friederici, 2011;
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Price, 2012). It has therefore been suggested to support syntactic hierar-
chy processing (Friederici, 2012; Friederici and Gierhan, 2013; Catani and
Mesulam, 2008). This view is also supported by developmental as well as by
patient data (Skeide et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2011). In our study, however,
false belief understanding correlated with the connectivity of the arcuate fas-
cicle between temporoparietal regions and a portion of the IFG (i.e., BA 45
bordering BA 46) that was more anterior than the region involved in syntax
processing (BA 44). Moreover, the correlation was independent of the chil-
dren’s syntactic or general linguistic abilities. The observed anterior region
of the IFG has been shown to be involved in the hierarchical processing
of abstract relations in non-linguistic domains (Koechlin and Summerfield,
2007; Badre, 2008; Jeon and Friederici, 2013). This interpretation of our
e↵ect is in line with the hierarchical processing account of ToM presented
in Chapter 1.1.4. According to this account, a full-fledged ToM, that is, the
ability to flexibly represent others’ mental states requires metarepresent-
ing mental representations, that is, hierarchically embedding the content of
others’ beliefs into the context of them being their belief. Accordingly, in
addition to accessing others’ mental states, false belief understanding would
require hierarchical processing of abstract relations. In study 3, we therefore
suggested a developmental mechanism according to which increased connec-
tivity of the arcuate fascicle to the anterior IFG allows an exchange between
belief-processing regions in the TPJ and hierarchical processing regions in
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the IFG, thus enabling the developmental breakthrough in representational
ToM.
This interpretation is also supported by the behavioral correlation pat-
tern that we reported in study 2 (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016). There,
we found a correlation of explicit false belief understanding with syntac-
tic but not non-syntactic language abilities and with an executive function
task that required reasoning about embedded conditional rules. All these
abilities require hierarchical processing. Similarly, the tasks that showed
activation in the region of our e↵ect in anterior IFG (e.g., Koechlin et al.,
2003; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Jeon and Friederici, 2013) all require
hierarchical processing of embedded conditional rules. These converging
neural and behavioral results therefore support the view in which hierarchi-
cal processing plays a critical role for the emergence of ToM.
The role of
inhibition
The region of significant connectivity in the right anterior IFG has also
been reported to be involved in inhibition (e.g., Aron et al., 2014). In our
study the connectivity from the right TPJ to this region correlated with
false belief understanding independently of children’s inhibitory control in
non-social domains (as assessed with a Go-NoGo and a delay of gratification
task). Nevertheless, children’s ability to inhibit their own perspective while
representing the other’s conflicting beliefs due to enhanced connectivity be-
tween the right TPJ and IFG might contribute to the emergence of explicit
false belief reasoning in addition to hierarchical processing abilities.
116
Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann The Emergence of Theory of Mind
Alternative
accounts of
ToM
emergence
The hierarchy account of the emergence of ToM can be considered as a
generalization of the metarepresentation account that suggests that children
start passing standard explicit false belief tasks as soon as they are able to
metarepresent others’ beliefs. Similarly, the mental file account introduced
in Section 1.1.4 proposes that ToM emerges with the ability to form verti-
cal links between mental files. Because vertical links connect mental files at
di↵erent levels, this process would also require processing mental files hier-
archically. In both of these accounts, the metarepresentation as well as the
mental file account, the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief
understanding might therefore also be explained by emerging hierarchical
processing abilities. Our e↵ect in a region involved in the hierarchical pro-
cessing of abstract relations supports the more general hierarchy account
according to which the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief
understanding is driven by the emergence of the ability to process mental
representations hierarchically due to an increased connectivity of the arcu-
ate fascicle between the TPJ and the anterior IFG. This account should
be verified with future studies that test whether the emergence of false
belief understanding is linked to hierarchical processing in other cognitive
domains, and to what extent these recruit the anterior IFG.
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5.4 What processes underlie implicit false be-
lief tasks?
No metarep-
resentation
for implicit
false belief
In contrast to the explicit false belief tasks, the implicit anticipatory
looking task neither correlated with connectivity of the arcuate fascicle
nor with hierarchical processing in other cognitive domains (i.e., syntax
or executive function). The neural e↵ects reported for explicit false belief
understanding were independent of the implicit task. This indicates that,
in contrast to explicit false belief understanding, the early-developing an-
ticipation of the actions of an agent with a false belief does not require
hierarchical processing or metarepresentation. Furthermore, in contrast to
the explicit false belief tasks, belief-related action anticipation was indepen-
dent of tasks that measure inhibitory control (i.e., the delay of gratification
and the Go-NoGo task). This suggests that these abilities do not require
inhibition of one’s own conflicting perspective. We therefore propose that
early-developing belief-related action anticipation does not involve metarep-
resenting others’ beliefs as mental representations and simultaneously rep-
resenting one’s own view of reality. Instead, we suggest that, before the age
of 4 years, children pass implicit false belief tasks by adopting the agent’s
perspective without being aware that it is another individual’s representa-
tion of the world, and without simultaneously keeping up and having to
suppress their own conflicting representation of the world. According to
this suggestion, early abilities, therefore, do not comprise the metarepre-
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sentation of mental states, as for example defined by Perner (1991). This
account would also explain the fragility of early success on implicit false
belief tasks (as reported in study 1; He et al., 2012; Kulke et al., submitted-
a, submitted-b) and that performance is enhanced by factors that direct
the children’s attention to the agent rather than to the conflicting reality
(Helming et al., 2014; Rubio-Ferna´ndez and Geurts, 2013, 2016) or to the
conflicting experimenter’s perspective (He et al., 2012; Helming et al., 2014;
Salter and Breheny, 2017).
Neural
processes for
implicit false
belief
The neural processes involved in implicit false belief tasks could provide
further information about the processes that underlie early success on im-
plicit false belief tasks. They could help disentangling lower-level domain
general accounts (e.g., Heyes, 2014) from social or agency-specific dual sys-
tem accounts (e.g., Butterfill and Apperly, 2013). Lower-level domain gen-
eral accounts would predict areas involved in statistical learning, such as,
the hippocampus. Social accounts, in turn, might predict an involvement
of regions sensitive to gaze or biological motion, such as, the STS (e.g.,
Grossman and Blake, 2002; Carlin and Calder, 2013), or of regions involved
in simulation, such as, the anterior insula (e.g., Decety and Gre`zes, 2006;
Singer, 2006). Schneider et al. (2014) found activation in the STS and a
small region in the anterior insula for implicit false belief reasoning, which
might give a first indication in support of our suggestion that infants pass
implicit false belief tasks by adopting or simulating rather than metarepre-
senting others’ mental states. A social dual system account of ToM might
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thus be reflected by a ventral stream of STS and anterior insula for early-
developing implicit false belief abilities, and the observed dorsal stream
through the arcuate fascicle for later explicit mental state reasoning. Fu-
ture research will need to test these hypotheses, for example, by combining
functional and structural MRI from early childhood until adulthood.
5.5 Future Research and Limitations
As argued above, the neural structures involved in implicit false belief tasks,
and the correlation of these tasks with other cognitive domains not tested
in the current thesis could give more insight on the processes that underlie
implicit false belief tasks. In the current thesis, we showed that success on
these tasks does not depend on linguistic abilities or executive function and
is independent of the maturation of white matter structure involved in the
emergence of explicit false belief understanding. However, we did not iden-
tify cognitive domains associated with performance on implicit false belief
tasks, nor did we identify related di↵erences in white matter structure. The
reason for the lack of a correlation with white matter structure might be
that we studied an age range in which no developmental change occurred in
belief-related anticipatory looking. In order to identify maturation of brain
structures that support its development, a similar approach might need to
be taken with younger children at an age when this ability emerges. An-
other reason why we did not find white matter correlates of belief-related
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anticipatory looking might be that the ability only relies on individual local
cortical areas and not on a distributed network. We would then expect local
gray matter changes to be associated with anticipatory looking rather than
di↵erences in white matter connectivity. Another way to address the ques-
tion of the neural processes that underlie implicit false belief tasks would be
to study the online neural processing of implicit false belief tasks with fMRI
or functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) in children or in adults.
First neuroimaging studies on the online processing of implicit false belief
tasks in adults su↵er from a number of short-comings and have yielded
inconclusive results. While two fMRI studies have reported di↵erent acti-
vation patterns in implicit compared to explicit false belief tasks (Schneider
et al., 2014; Kova´cs et al., 2014) in line with our results, an fNIRS study
found activation di↵erences on the same right temporoparietal channel for
an implicit and an explicit task (Hyde et al., 2015). Crucially, however,
two of the three studies only looked at e↵ects within the regions activated
for explicit false belief understanding, and were therefore not able to iden-
tify independent brain correlates. The third study (Schneider et al., 2014)
found a small region of activation in the anterior insula at whole brain level,
which, however, did not survive multiple comparison. Future research will,
therefore, have to follow up on the neural processes that underlie implicit
false belief tasks by studying the relation with brain structure (i.e., white
matter and gray matter) in infants at an age when the implicit abilities
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emerge, and by studying the online processing of implicit false belief tasks
in children and adults.
Moreover, future studies should try to identify which other cognitive
measures correlate with implicit false belief tasks. Such studies should in-
clude early social abilities, such as, early goal encoding or gaze following (as
in Sodian et al., 2016) as well as domain-general abilities, such as, statistical
learning and visual attention to disentangle between the di↵erent accounts.
Moreover, in light of the recent findings of fragility of implicit false belief
tasks (study 1; He et al., 2012; Kulke et al., submitted-a, submitted-b) and
the discussion on their concurrent validity (Kulke et al., submitted-b), the
correlation between di↵erent implicit false belief tasks should be studied.
Furthermore, more longitudinal research is needed to follow up on our sug-
gestion how to reconcile the observed lack of a correlation between earlier
implicit and later explicit false belief tasks (study 2) with the prediction
from early implicit to later explicit false belief performance (observed in
Thoermer et al., 2012). For this, one would have to test whether such a
prediction is confirmed with our and other implicit false belief tasks. More-
over, in addition to the concurrent validity and robustness of performance
on implicit false belief tasks, their reliability within subjects needs to be
tested. This is particularly important for correlational approaches like the
one taken in the present study, because measures can only correlate if they
are reliable.
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Besides neural and behavioral correlation studies, a better understand-
ing of the exact circumstances that influence infants and children’s perfor-
mance on implicit false belief tasks is required as argued in study 1. Our
hypothesis that the ringing of a telephone in study 1 might have disrupted
young children’s anticipatory looking needs to be verified by systematically
varying the sound. More generally, it should be tested systematically with
di↵erent tasks and task settings whether factors that direct attention to
the agent enhance performance, while directing the attention to the situa-
tion or an experimenter knowledgeable about the situation decreases per-
formance. Furthermore, experimental predictions from the theoretical sug-
gestion that infants might pass implicit false belief tasks by adopting rather
than metarepresenting others’ beliefs need to be developed and tested. One
prediction could be that, if infants anticipate where an agent will search for
an object based on adopting the agent’s perspective without maintaining
their own perspective of reality, they should not be surprised to find the ob-
ject in the location where the agent falsely believed it to be. The findings of
Kova´cs et al. (2010) might point in this direction. Empirical research clearly
needs to follow up on such questions to confirm our theoretical suggestions.
Concerning explicit false belief reasoning, the hierarchical processing ac-
count of the developmental breakthrough requires further confirmation. For
this, it should be tested whether the breakthrough is related to hierarchical
processing in other cognitive domains, and to what extent these also recruit
the anterior IFG. Moreover, the role of self perspective inhibition for the
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emergence of explicit false belief reasoning requires further investigation.
Furthermore, it remains unclear how the relevance of the IFG and arcuate
fascicle for ToM changes with age from childhood to adulthood. Does an in-
creased automaticity of the metarepresentational process lead to a decrease
of IFG activation in false belief reasoning? And do higher-order false belief
tasks, in turn, lead to higher IFG activation in adults and older children
because of increased hierarchical processing demands? Future studies need
to follow up on these questions, for example, with fMRI in children aged 3
to about 10 years, when false belief reasoning is fully established, also at
higher orders. To get a clearer understanding of the role of developmental
changes in brain structure compared to age-independent neural di↵erences,
longitudinal research is required to avoid that observed age-related di↵er-
ences might result from cohort e↵ects or age-dependent sampling biases
(Lindenberger et al., 2011). Furthermore, the cross-sectional correlational
approach taken in study 2 and 3 of this thesis does not allow conclusions
about the direction of e↵ects. For this, longitudinal or training studies would
be required. It would also be interesting to see what age-related changes in
functional activation and connectivity correspond to the structural connec-
tivity e↵ects that we reported. Considering the di culties in performing
fMRI with preschool-aged children, this will continue to be a challenge for
future research. Finally, the relation of false belief performance and gray
matter maturation is an interesting future avenue that might complement
our findings on the white matter structures important for ToM development.
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5.6 Conclusions
In sum, our results show a dissociation of early-developing false belief-
related anticipation and later explicit false belief understanding at the be-
havioral as well as at the brain level. Together with previous longitudinal
findings (Thoermer et al., 2012; Sodian et al., 2016), our findings speak
for distinct and independent processes underlying the two in preschool age,
but for a relevance of earlier belief-related anticipation in infancy for the
later development of explicit false belief understanding. The brain results
reported in study 3 as well as the correlation pattern with syntactic but
not general linguistic abilities and with executive function (study 2) favor
a hierarchical processing account of the emergence of mature ToM. Accord-
ing to this account, the hierarchical processing of belief contents enables
a metarepresentation of others’ mental states, and thus, paves the way for
the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief understanding. Ad-
ditionally, this breakthrough seems to be related to the development of
inhibitory control that might allow children to suppress their own conflict-
ing perspective. The brain structure that subserves this critical step is the
arcuate fascicle, which connects temporoparietal belief-processing regions
with the left and right anterior IFG that have been found to be involved
in hierarchical processing (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008)
and inhibition (Aron et al., 2014). Interestingly, the arcuate fascicle is very
weak in non-human primates (Rilling et al., 2008), which seem to fail con-
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sistently in explicit false belief tasks (Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Martin and Santos, 2016) and lack syntactic and hierar-
chical processing abilities in other cognitive domains (Fitch, 2014). The
relevance of this pathway for a mature representational ToM, in addition to
syntactic processing, hence, points to a critical role of the arcuate fascicle
for the ontogeny and phylogeny of a core aspect of higher human cognition.
In contrast, the connectivity of the arcuate fascicle to the IFG was
independent of belief-related anticipation in the implicit false belief task.
Moreover, performance in the implicit false belief task did not correlate
with syntactic or executive function. Both findings support the view that
the false belief-related expectations observed in infants and apes (Krupenye
et al., 2016) do not rely on hierarchical processing or inhibition. This sug-
gests that these expectations do not require metarepresentation of beliefs
or inhibition of one’s own perspective. Moreover, study 1 shows fragility of
success on the implicit false belief tasks before the age of 4 years. Factors
that direct the attention to the agent who has a false belief might enhance
early performance, whereas a focus on the object of belief seem to disrupt
early belief tracking (He et al., 2012; Helming et al., 2014; Rubio-Ferna´ndez
and Geurts, 2016, 2013; Salter and Breheny, 2017). We therefore propose
that infants and toddlers pass implicit false belief tasks by adopting rather
than metarepresenting other individuals’ beliefs. This suggestion needs to
be tested with further studies on the exact factors that enhance or decrease
performance on implicit false belief tasks and the brain structures involved
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in these tasks. Neural data from adults (Schneider et al., 2014) provide
first indications that false-belief related anticipation might be subserved
by a ventral stream in the brain. This hypothesis should be followed up
by combining fMRI with di↵usion-weighted MRI in adults, or by studying
the brain maturation associated with the development of early false belief-
related expectations in infants and toddlers.
Our approach of combining structural neuroimaging with behavioral
methods of early cognitive abilities is a very promising approach to ad-
dress these questions. Applied to various cognitive domains, this approach
can reveal the neural architecture that underlies innate cognitive capacities
and the maturational changes that pave the way for the complex cognitive
achievements of human development. This approach, thus, has the potential
to unveil the neural building blocks for the emergence of uniquely human
cognition.
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Appendix A
Supplements Study 1
In a second analysis, we reproduced the circumstances of the original study
(Southgate et al., 2007) by analyzing only the first FB trial, which was
either an FB1 or an FB2 trial. Only children who had passed the sec-
ond familiarization trial based on their first saccade were included in this
analysis, following the procedure of Southgate et al. (2007). Based on
this criterion, the sample size was reduced to N = 27 children at the age
of 2 years (N = 15 for FB1 and N = 11 for FB2), N = 21 children at
the age of 3 years (N = 11 for FB1 and N = 10 for FB2), and N = 16
children at the age of 4 years (N = 8 for FB1 and N = 8 for FB2). A re-
peated measures ANOVA confirmed the significant di↵erence between the
years (F (2) = 7.165, p = .012), where performance at the age of 4 years
was significantly better than at the age of 3 years (p = .021). The per-
formance at the age of 4 years was marginally above chance (M = .33,
SD = .77, t(15) = 1.73, one-sample t-test p = .10), and on chance level in
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the other years (at 2 years: M = .10, SD = .65, t(26) = .797, p = .43; at
3 years: M =  .13, SD = .61, t(20) =  .980, p = .34). A repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with time point as a within factor and false belief condition
as a between factor confirmed a main e↵ect of time point (F (2) = 5.885,
p = .027) and of condition (F (1) = 8.378, p = .044). Performance was
significantly better at the age of 4 years than at 3 years (p = .045), and
significantly better in condition FB1 than FB2 (p = .044). As before, the
children only performed significantly above chance in condition FB1 at the
age of 4 years (t(7) = 17.074, p < .001), and were at chance level at all
di↵erent time points and in condition FB2. Our second measure, the first
saccade, showed a similar trend with marginally above chance performance
only at the age of 4 years (12 out of 16 correct first looks, binomial test:
p = .077), but chance level performance at the ages of 2 (16 out of 27 correct
first looks, p = .442) and 3 years (13 out of 21 correct first looks, p = .383).
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Supplements Study 2
B.1 Additional False Belief Tasks
In addition to the standard explicit false belief tasks, which directly elicited
a response, and the implicit anticipatory looking task that measured a spon-
taneous response, we acquired an indirectly elicited response task and an
explicit version of the anticipatory looking task with a directly elicited re-
sponse. Both tasks made substantially lower linguistic demands by reducing
verbal interaction to a simple probe question.
B.1.1 Indirectly Elicited Response Sefo-Task
Methods
In the indirectly elicited response false belief task, referred to as the Sefo-
task, children had to interpret the referential communication of the experi-
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menter with a false belief by choosing one of two boxes each containing an
unknown toy as in Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra (2010). The setup was
the same as in the original study, except that a second experimenter was
present in the room throughout the whole experiment. To familiarize the
children with the setup, before the actual test trial, the experimenter put
two toys whose names were familiar to the child (e.g., a ball and a car or a
mouse and an elephant) into two neighboring boxes (a blue and a red one).
The experimenter then opened the lids of the boxes and asked the child
to give her one of the two objects referring to it by its name, for example,
“Let’s play with the car. Can you give me the car please?”. After the child
gave the experimenter the object two consecutive times, the actual test trial
started. In this trial, the experimenter again placed two toys into the two
boxes respectively - this time with stu↵ed animals that were unfamiliar to
the child. The experimenter then left the room saying they needed to get
something and would come back soon. In the meantime, the second exper-
imenter approached the boxes and exchanged the two toys while the child
was watching. As opposed to the original study, experimenter 2 had not
been hiding behind a curtain beforehand, but was present and visible in
the room throughout the whole task. To emphasize the deceptive nature of
exchanging the objects, in the present study he gestured, “shush” and said,
“Don’t tell!” When experimenter 2 had returned to his original spot at the
back of the room, experimenter 1 returned and, whilst pointing to one of
the two boxes, she asked, “Do you still know what is in this box? There
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is a Sefo in here.” She then opened both boxes simultaneously in a way
that only the child could see the objects, but she could not. Looking at the
child, she said, “Let’s play with the Sefo. Can you give me the Sefo please?”
The box that the child first touched or pointed to was coded as the child’s
answer. If the children correctly tracked that experimenter 1 did not know
the objects had been exchanged, we expected them to understand that she
was referring to the toy in the box she had not pointed to and, therefore,
approach this box. The box she had not pointed to was therefore encoded
as the correct response. Accordingly, children could score 1 (correct box)
or 0 (pointed-to box) on this task.
After observing the child’s choice of box, experimenter 1 directly asked
the child which one of the two toys was the Sefo, and which one she had
wanted to play with. Each of these two questions was again coded 1 for the
correct box or 0 for the incorrect box.
Results
For the indirectly elicited choice, both age groups performed at chance level,
and the 3-year-olds showed a trend to perform below chance (binomial test:
3-yos: M = 31%, p = .08; 4-yos: M = 58%, p = .47). The 4-year-olds
performed significantly better than the 3-year-olds (t(55) =  2.1, p = .04).
For the two directly elicited questions, the 3-year-olds were on chance
level (M = 44%, SD = 45%, t(25) =  0.65, p = .52), whereas the 4-
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year-olds performed significantly above chance (M = 73%, SD = 43%,
t(30) = 2.96, p = .006). As for the implicit choice, there was a significant
age di↵erence (t(55) =  2.43, p = .02).
Correlation with other false belief tasks. The indirectly elicited
choice and the directly elicited queries strongly correlated with each other
(r(57) = 0.660, p < .001). Moreover, both parts of the Sefo-task correlated
with the standard explicit false belief tasks, but do not correlated with the
implicit anticipatory looking task (see Table B.1).
Sefo-Task: Stand Expl FB Impl FB
indirect choice .248(*) .158
direct question .297* .103
N = 57. (*)p < .10; *p < .05.
Table B.1: Correlation coe cients of indirectly elicited choice and direct
questions in the Sefo-task with standard explicit false belief (FB) tasks and
the implicit anticipatory looking false belief task.
Correlation with other cognitive domains. As opposed to the
standard explicit false belief tasks, neither the indirectly nor the directly
elicited response parts of the Sefo-task correlated with executive functions,
language, or other general cognitive development (see Table B.2). Only
the direct questions marginally correlated with one of the three executive
function tasks (the Go-NoGo task).
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Discussion
In the original study by Southgate, Chevallier et al. (2010), 17-month-old
infants were shown to correctly interpret the communication of an agent
with a false belief and choose the correct box above chance level. It was,
therefore, unexpected that in our study 3- and 4-year-old children did not
perform above chance level on the indirectly elicited choice. There are
di↵erent possible explanations for this finding.
One possibility is that small variations of the task, compared to the
original study, might have influenced the children’s performance. A pos-
sibly critical di↵erence in our setup, compared to the original study, was
the presence of experimenter 2 throughout the entire task. In the original
study, experimenter 2 hid behind a curtain and only made an appearance
to secretly exchange the two toys in the absence of experimenter 1 - then
holding a false belief. This was done to emphasize the conspiratorial nature
of the object exchange. ToM studies, as well as a meta-analysis, have shown
that conspiratorial behavior significantly enhanced performance in false be-
lief tasks (Sodian, Hiilsken, Tho¨rmer, and Melot, 1999; Wellman, Cross,
and Watson, 2001), and Perner (2014) suggested this to be the reason why
it might have been di cult to replicate a false belief helping-paradigm by
Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009). It is thus plausible that the
lack of conspiratorial hiding of experimenter 2 in the present study might
have caused the low performance on our version of the task. Another di↵er-
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ence from the original study was the precise phrasing of the probe question.
While in the original study, the children were asked, “Do you remember
what I put in here? There is a Sefo in here.” we asked, “Do you still
know what is in this box? There is a Sefo in here.” The original phrasing
might have led children to interpret the Sefo as referring to the object that
was originally put in that box (correct object), whereas the phrasing in our
study might have led them to choose the object that was in that box now
(incorrect object). Future studies will have to examine to what extent these
variations in the setup influence children’s performance on the task.
A second possible explanation for 3- and 4-year-olds low performance
on the indirectly elicited choice is that, in contrast to standard explicit
false belief tasks with directly elicited response, performance on the Sefo-
task declines between the second and the fourth year of life. To test this
possible explanation, future research will have to study the developmental
trajectory of the task. For this, studies will first have to replicate the results
in 17-month-old infants and, crucially, then examine the development of
the performance in 2- to 5-year-old children. Considering these unresolved
questions, we acknowledge that the pattern of correlations of the indirectly
elicited choice with the other tasks have to be considered with caution.
For the direct questions, conversely, the children’s performance corre-
sponded to the classical pattern of standard explicit false belief tasks: While
3-year-olds were on chance level, 4-year-olds performed significantly above
chance. Moreover, the direct questions (as well as the indirectly elicited
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choice of box) clearly correlated with the standard explicit false belief tasks.
This indicates that common processes underlie the standard explicit false
belief tasks and the Sefo-task. As opposed to the standard tasks, however,
the Sefo-task does not correlate with executive functions or language, sug-
gesting that the correlation between the two false belief task types is not
driven by common demands on these other cognitive domains. A possi-
ble explanation for the fact that the Sefo-task, as opposed to the standard
explicit false belief tasks, does not correlate with language and executive
functions might be that the task makes lower demands on these domains.
The fact that the Sefo-task does not correlate with the implicit anticipatory
looking false belief task, in turn, gives additional support for the conclusion
that the abilities measured by implicit false belief tasks are di↵erent from
the processes underlying explicit false belief reasoning.
B.1.2 Explicit Version Anticipatory Looking False Be-
lief Task
A directly elicited response version of the implicit anticipatory looking task
was developed for comparison against standard explicit false belief tasks.
The aim was to clarify whether the later developmental breakthrough on
the standard tasks, as well as their correlation with language and executive
functions, was mainly due to superficial features of the standard tasks, or
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was also present in false belief tasks similar to the implicit tasks but with a
directly elicited response.
Methods
For this purpose, on the last day of testing, the children were asked to watch
the film clips again that they had watched on the eye-tracker in the previous
two sessions, together with the experimenter. They were presented with two
familiarization (FAM) trials; one left, one right, followed by two false belief
trials for each of the six larger animals - that is, a total of 12 FAM and
12 false belief film clips. At the end of every film clip, the children were
explicitly asked: “Show me: Where is the cat/dog/... going? Where does
the cat/dog/... come out?” whilst trying to keep language requirements as
low as possible. At the end of the FAM film clips, the children were then
shown the correct outcome while the experimenter commented (German
original): “Guck mal! Die Katze/Der Hund/ geht zur Maus.” (Literal
translation: “Look! The cat/dog/... is going to the mouse.”). The false
belief film clips ended with the probe question to avoid a learning e↵ect.
Results
In the explicit version of the Tunnel-task, both age groups were at chance
level (3-year-olds: M = 49.4%, SD = 5.4%, t(13) =  0.41, p = .688; 4-
year-olds: M = 46.2%, SD = 13.1%, t(27) = 1.57, p = .127), and there
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was no significant di↵erence between the age groups. The motivation and
attention levels on this task were very low, because children had already
watched many repetitions of very similar film clips in the implicit task. We
excluded all trials in which children had missed scenes important to the
experiment, and only included children in our analysis who had more than
eight valid trials (66%). For this criterion, we had to exclude a total of
17 children (twelve 3-year-olds and five 4-year-olds): three because they
refused to participate entirely, 13 because they had less than eight valid
trials, and one child because it was always pointing to the same side for all
trials (FAM as well as false belief-trials).
Discussion
The low levels of attention and motivation might explain the chance level
performance on this task for both age groups, where we expected 3-year-olds
to perform below or at chance and 4-year-olds significantly above chance.
In particular, we expected a significant improvement with age. In view of
the di culties in carrying out this task and the subsequent high number
of excluded children, it is evident that the task needs further refinement
and validation. We therefore dropped the task from further analyses and
have not reported correlation patterns, which we believe would be di cult
to interpret. A child-friendlier version of the task might have been more
interactive, taking into account that performance in young children is usu-
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ally lower for video presentations than for live interactions (Anderson and
Pempek, 2005). Moreover, fewer trials in the implicit as well as the explicit
version of the task should be used. Conceiving such an explicit version of
an implicit looking behavior task in order to directly compare analogous
implicit and explicit false belief tasks thus remains a challenge for future
research.
B.2 Time Course Anticipatory Looking False
Belief Task
Because our task is the first false belief task to measure anticipatory looking
across multiple trials, we tested for potential changes in the time course of
the performance across the trials. For this, we conducted repeated measures
MANOVAs across the 10 FAM trials, the 6 TB trials, as well as across the 12
FB trials for the children’s correct first look and correct longest look. The
age group was included as a between-subjects factor. This analysis showed
that the performance did not significantly change over time, that is, there
was no significant e↵ect of the trial number on correct first or longest look for
any of the trial types: For the FAM trials, F (18, 684) = .57, p = .92; for the
TB trials, F (10, 400) = .58, p = .83; and for the FB trials, F (22, 704) = .54,
p = .96. Univariate tests also indicated that the trial number had no e↵ect,
neither on correct first looks (FAM trials: F (9, 342) = .48, p = .88; TB
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trials: F (5, 200) = .62, p = .69; FB trials: F (11, 352) = .25, p = .99)
nor correct longest looks (FAM trials: F (9, 342) = .85, p = .57; TB trials:
F (5, 200) = .90, p = .48; FB trials: F (11, 352) = .61, p = .82). The
stability of the performance across trials is also illustrated in Figure B.1.
It should be noted that in both age groups, the mean percentage of
correct first and correct longest looks in the FAM and TB trials were signif-
icantly above chance for every trial (binomial test, all p-values ranging from
p < 0.10 to p < 0.001 with the exception of the percentage of correct longest
looks on the eighth FAM trial (M = 60%, p = .21) and the second TB trial
(M = 60%, p = .21)). This demonstrates that the children reliably showed
correct anticipatory looking in the control conditions across all trials.
While clearly significantly and robustly above chance, the somewhat
lower percentage of correct anticipation than in the study by Southgate,
Senju, and Csibra (2007), might be due to the setup of our task with a more
center-oriented scene in which gaze direction could frequently be observed
along the arms of the tunnel and not only in the ROIs which cover the
tunnel’s exits, and the boxes in which the mouse was hiding. Moreover,
the presence of two agents (the hiding and the searching animal) as well
as the top-view perspective might have added additional complexity and
contributed to lower performance levels. Nevertheless, the fact that the
children performed clearly and robustly above chance across all FAM and
TB trials shows that this task reliably measures anticipatory looking. This
is consistent with the lower percentage of correct looks on the FB trials as
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Figure B.1: Anticipatory looking task: Time course of the performance
across the 10 familiarization trials (a and b), the 6 true belief trials (c and
d), and the 12 FB trials (e and f) of the anticipatory looking task.
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well. Importantly, however, both age groups performed significantly above
chance.
B.3 Correlation pattern with other anticipa-
tion measures
As an alternative measure for the children’s correct anticipation of the action
of an agent with a false belief, we looked at the normalized di↵erence of
looking durations by subtracting the looking duration to the correct ROI
from the looking duration to the incorrect ROI and divided this by the total
looking duration in both ROIs, which is considered to be a highly reliable
measure of looking bias (Senju, Southgate, White, and Frith, 2009). Due to
the higher possible variance of this measure than of the binary correct first
or longest looks, this measure has been suggested to be more sensitive in
detecting possible correlations (Low, 2010; Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst,
and Kristen, 2011). On this normalized di↵erence, the children again scored
highly significantly above chance in the FAM condition (mean performance:
M = .32, SD = .29, one-sampled t-test: t(56) = 8.29, p < 0.001) and in the
TB condition (M = .29, SD = .32, t(56) = 6.79, p < 0.001), and marginally
above chance in the FB condition (M = .04, SD = .16, t(56) = 1.75,
p = 0.042 one-tailed). Again, there was no age di↵erence between the 3-
and the 4-year-olds (independent samples t-test: FAM: t(55) = .21, p = .83;
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TB: t(55) = .46, p = .47; FB: t(55) = .16, p = .88). Using the normalized
di↵erence, the correlation patterns were replicated compared to the mean
of the correct and first look reported in the results. With this measure,
anticipatory looking did not correlate with the explicit false belief tasks
(Table B.3), nor did it correlate with any of the language or the executive
function measures (Table B.4).
Anticipation Measure: False Location False Content
Di↵erence duration -.106 .011
First look -.061 .117
N = 57. (*)p < .10; *p < .05.
Table B.3: Correlation coe cients of the implicit anticipatory looking false
belief task with the standard explicit false belief tests, using the normalized
di↵erence of the looking duration in correct and incorrect ROI and the
average correct first look as measures of anticipation.
In Tables B.3 and B.4, we also report the correlations of the children’s
average correct first look. Here again, the pattern of correlations remains
as before with the exception of a significant correlation of the children’s
correct first look and the syntax part of the standardized language test
SETK. In our dataset, however, this correlation does not seem to be robust,
considering that it is only found for the correct first look and neither for the
mean of the correct first and longest look nor for the normalized di↵erence
of the durations. Moreover, such a correlation does not seem to be present
with the other syntax task (i.e., the complement sentence task). Therefore,
177
The Emergence of Theory of Mind Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
E
xecu
tive
F
u
n
ction
s
L
an
gu
age
IQ
S
efo
-T
ask:
R
ev
C
at
G
o-N
oG
o
D
elay
C
O
M
P
s
S
E
T
K
-S
yn
S
E
T
K
-n
oS
K
-A
B
C
in
d
irect
-.003
.191
.030
.145
.141
-.080
.018
d
irect
.032
.2
2
5
(*
)
.072
.035
.035
-.117
.167
N
=
57.
(*)p
<
.10;
*p
<
.05.
T
ab
le
B
.4:
C
orrelation
coe 
cients
of
th
e
im
p
licit
anticip
atory
lookin
g
false
b
elief
task
w
ith
tests
of
oth
er
cogn
itive
d
om
ain
s,
u
sin
g
th
e
n
orm
alized
d
i↵
eren
ce
of
th
e
lookin
g
d
u
ration
in
correct
an
d
in
correct
R
O
I
(n
orm
.
d
i↵
.)
an
d
th
e
average
correct
fi
rst
look
as
m
easu
res
of
anticip
ation
.
C
orrelation
s
are
rep
orted
w
ith
th
e
th
ree
execu
tive
fu
n
ction
tasks
(reverse
categorization
task
[R
ev
C
at],
G
o-N
oG
o
task,
an
d
d
elay
of
gratifi
cation
task
[D
el
G
rat]),
th
e
com
p
lem
ent
senten
ce
test
(C
O
M
P
),
th
e
syntax
p
art
of
th
e
stan
d
ard
ized
lan
gu
age
test
(S
E
T
K
-S
yn
),
th
e
p
art
of
th
e
S
E
T
K
testin
g
n
on
-syntactic
ab
ilities
(S
E
T
K
-n
oS
),
an
d
th
e
stan
d
ard
ized
test
of
gen
eral
cogn
itive
ab
ilities
(K
-A
B
C
).
178
Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann The Emergence of Theory of Mind
future studies should examine how robust this potentially interesting finding
is. Here, however, we refrain from interpreting this finding, because of the
absence of a correlation with the other measures of anticipation.
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Appendix C
Supplements Study 3
Figure C.1: Termination mask for an additional tractography restricted
to dorsal pathways. A plane parallel to the Sylvian fissure was defined
as a termination mask for an additional probabilistic tractography from
the seed regions in the left MTG and right TPJ. This confirmed that the
observed significant e↵ect in the IFG stemmed from dorsal and not ventral
streamlines.
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C.1 TBSS Analyses for Other Cognitive Do-
mains
Similar to the TBSS analysis for the explicit false belief score, a TBSS analy-
sis was performed to assess the correlation of FA with the executive function
score, the standardized language test, and the implicit belief-related antic-
ipatory looking task. Additionally, as for the false belief score, a voxelwise
commonality analysis was performed on the skeleton including age and FA
as predictors for the dependent variable of interest to test whether the e↵ects
were age-related.
Executive functions. A TBSS analysis revealed a significant correla-
tion of the executive function score with FA in the left lingual gyrus (O5)
(MNI coordinates center of gravity (CoG): x =  22, y =  65, z = 0),
which has been shown to be involved in attentional modulation towards
di↵erent visual features of objects (Corbetta et al., 1990) and in categoriza-
tion (Devlin et al., 2002). A second e↵ect was found with FA in the hand
area of the right postcentral gyrus (S1) (MNI coordinates CoG: x = 37,
y =  29, z = 51). The TBSS commonality analysis showed that the e↵ects
both stemmed from age-related changes in FA: The shared contribution of
age and FA in O5 explained 8% and of age and FA in S1 explained 9.6% of
variance in the false belief score.
Language. For language, a TBSS analysis yielded one e↵ect in the
white matter bordering the right IFG (MNI coordinates CoG: x = 34, y =
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25, z = 31) which proved to be age-independent in the commonality analysis
(unique contribution of FA in right IFG: 21.4%; contributions including age:
not significant). Two further clusters made no significant contribution in the
commonality analysis. Broca’s area in the IFG is known to support language
processing bilaterally in early childhood with increasing left lateralization
in the course of development (Friederici et al., 2011).
Belief-related anticipation. A TBSS analysis of the correlation of FA
with the percent correct anticipatory looking in the FB trials of the implicit
belief-related anticipatory looking task revealed no significant correlation of
FA and implicit belief-related anticipation. Future research should follow
up on the brain regions and connections relevant for mastering implicit false
belief tasks, possibly using a battery of di↵erent tasks including anticipatory
looking as well as violation of expectation paradigms. Such an approach
should also study younger infants at an age when the ability emerges and
an age-di↵erence in performance can be observed.
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WM in/near Explained variance Percent overlap p-value
rTPJ 7.4% (95) 10 12
rpMTG/TPJ 6.8% (90) .005
lMTG 7.5% (98) .0007
lITG 6.2% (92) .0004
lSTG 6.4% (94) .01
rVMPFC 4.3% (71) .03
rSPL/PC 6.5% (97) .01
lThalamus 9.8% (100) .0004
WM - white matter, r - right, l - left, p - posterior, TPJ - temporoparietal
junction, MTG - middle temporal gyrus, ITG - inferior temporal gyrus,
STG - superior temporal gyrus, VMPFC - ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
SPL - superior parietal lobule, PC - precuneus.
Table C.1: Commonality Analysis: Mean explained variance in the false
belief score by the common contributions of age and FA, while language,
executive function, and implicit belief-related anticipation scores were con-
trolled for. The mean is computed across significant voxels of the regions
that correlated with the false belief scores in the TBSS analysis. The re-
ported e↵ects were significant at p < .01 tested against a random baseline
with 5000 permutations at voxel-level and corrected for cluster size (p-values
two-sided). The overlap, i.e., the percentage of voxels with significant con-
tribution in the commonality analysis from all voxels in the TBSS region,
is reported in brackets.
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Regions: MNI coordinates Size in Correlation
WM in/near (CoG) voxels coe cient r
rTPJ 32 -45 30 49 .44
rpMTG/TPJ 42 -48 16 39 .42
lMTG -40 -20 -12 39 .46
lITG -42 -34 -6 13 .50
lSTG -32 -30 5 27 .41
rvMPFC 25 37 1 24 .42
WM - white matter, MNI - Montreal Neurological Institute, CoG -
center of gravity, r - right, l - left, p - posterior, a - anterior, TPJ -
temporoparietal junction, MTG - middle temporal gyrus, ITG -
inferior temporal gyrus, STG - superior temporal gyrus, vMPFC -
ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Table C.2: TBSS results when scoring only the first question of each of the
false belief tasks.
Regions: MNI coordinates Size in Correlation
WM in/near (CoG) voxels coe cient r
rAF 28 33 14 90 .39
rAF 28 25 24 151 .39
rAF 26 1 31 346 .38
lAF -25 30 14 65 .40
rIFOF 33 -5 -14 155 .40
WM - white matter, MNI - Montreal Neurological Institute, CoG -
center of gravity, r - right, l - left, AF - arcuate fascicle, IFOF -
inferior fronto-occipital fascicle.
Table C.3: Correlation with streamline density when scoring only the first
question of each of the false belief tasks.
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Abbreviations
ACC anterior cingulate cortex
ASD autism spectrum disorder
BA Brodmann area
CC corpus callosum
CCC cognitive complexity and control
DCCS dimensional change card sorting
DTI di↵usion tensor imaging
dMPFC dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
dMRI di↵usion-weighted magnetic resonance
imaging
EEG electroencephalography
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ERP event-related brain potentials
FA fractional anisotropy
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
fNIRS functional near infrared spectroscopy
IFG inferior frontal gyrus
IFOF inferior fronto-occipital fascicle
ILF inferior longitudinal fascicle
MFG middle frontal gyrus
MRI magnetic resonance imaging
MTG middle temporal gyrus
MPFC medial prefrontal cortex
pSTS posterior superior temporal sulcus
SLF superior longitudinal fascicle
STG superior temporal gyrus
STS superior temporal sulcus
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ToM Theory of Mind
TPJ temporoparietal junction
vMPFC ventromedial prefrontal cortex
VBM voxel based morphometry
VOE violation of expectation
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